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DIVINE PERSONALITY

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No apology is needed at the present moment for a paper concerning the Divine Personality. The truth is one that lies at the root of religion. Its importance affects both the intellectual life of the religious thinker and also the practical life of the multitudes whose attention to religion is that of action rather than of thought. Throughout the intellectual world there are the most varied theories afloat; and the pantheistic and the agnostic views would appear to have taken a new lease of life. In the busy world of non-thinkers, so our parochial clergy tell us, there is a diminishing sense of God's reality and overlordship. The infinite dignity of His Person is becoming less and less appreciated. That such habit of mind in the non-thinking many is the result of the influence of the thinking few, I, speaking for myself have no doubt. But whether it be so or not, certain it is that haziness of understanding about the divine personality is at least one of the most fruitful sources of loose thinking and loose living both amongst the intellectuals and amongst the millions who look up to them. If I am uncertain about the personality of God, to whom am I morally responsible for my conduct?

All moralists however have recognised that divine personality is one of the starting points both in the life of religious thought and in the life of moral action. It is a point which may be affirmed, denied, questioned, discussed. But it cannot be ignored. Hence teachers of all shades of thought have striven to push their respective opinions or convictions to the front. Attempts at restatement have been made first in terms of this philosophy and then in terms of that, but so far without any appreciable sign of agreement. The Catholic

apologist has now no choice as to what philosophical standpoint he must take. The Holy Father has commanded that the philosophy of St. Thomas must be the basis of our apologetic. In sympathy with these principles I offer the following study on the divine personality.

What is a person? Let us take the word in its world-wide signification. Ask the question of a number of intelligent workingmen whose minds are as yet unsophisticated, who have not yet done their year's course at a university hall, who have not yet constructed and formulated their *Weltanschauung*. One will reply: "A man or a woman." Another will say: "Same as myself or you or anybody." Another: "A being that can talk or think." Another: "Not a dog or a cat." Another: "Well, each one of us: two of us would be two persons." Press a further question as to whether God or an angel is a person and the answer will be: "Well, anybody who has a spirit." In these replies there is contained the very essence of what the world understands by a person. In these replies also is contained the classical definition of Boethius adopted by St. Thomas and underlying the whole structure of his doctrine concerning all personality, human, angelic and divine.

The first note which shines from these popular definitions is that of individualness. I am a person, you are a person; anybody is a person; you are not I, and I am not you. The derivation of the word itself is from *persono*, to sound through. In this its original sense it denoted the mask used by actors. The actor put off his own individuality as it were and put on that of the hero whom he impersonated. The Latin term still finds place on our theatre programmes: *dramatis personae*. To appear in person is to appear in one's own individual self and not through the agency of another. To make "personal" remarks is to criticize the individual. Personal property denotes goods, chattels and movable things which belong to the individual and which are distinguished from real property, the land and houses belonging rather to the family. Individualness therefore is that aspect of a person in which he is seen to be a self, undivided in himself, yet divided off from all other things.

The second note which shines out from the popular idea of a person is one for which there is no equivalent English word. It is rendered by the Latin "*suppositum*," which may, in the absence of a better word, be rendered "substantialness." Ask the workingman whether he is a substance, and he will tell you that he is but

that he is different from other substances, such as pieces of things. He is a substance but different from a piece of chalk or a lump of coal. What he means is that he is a substance complete in itself, a suppositum, a *ὑπόστασις*. His arm is not a person, nor his leg, nor his whole body, nor yet his soul. Only that which is complete in itself, the soul and body united together constitute a person.

The third note which shines out from the popular thought-forms is that of rationality. A stone is not a person; a bird is not a person. A man is a person; an angel is a person; God is a person. A person is a being that can talk and think and be responsible for his actions.

Having analyzed the popular conception we are now able to synthesise the scientific conception. It must contain the notes of substantialness, individualness and rationality. Thus a person is an individual rational substance.

Or the conception may be built up by reference to the various categories of being. A being is either a substance or an accident: it exists either in itself or in another. But a person is not an accident since he exists in himself and not in another. He is therefore a substance. This category of being is again divided into first substance and second substance. By first substance we understand that which is singular or individual; by second substance we understand the collection of individuals, that is, the common nature of the species. Manifestly a person is a first substance. It is the individual man who is a person, not mankind in general. Again, individual substances are further divided into rational and non-rational. And clearly that individual substance which we call a person belongs to the rational order. Moreover, the category of the rational order is the most exalted order of being. Rationality is the most dignified of the essential notes of a person. The reason of this is because it implies a right and control over one's constituent parts and actions. A brute must necessarily follow the laws of instinct. A stone must necessarily follow the laws of gravitation. But a rational being is free and determines himself. Probably the derivation of the word person from the actor's masque was owing to the fact that the actors simulated the mythical heroes of such exalted dignity. It was the same sentiment too which in old English times named the parish priest "the parson." He was the person of the place, the chief dignitary of the parish. Thus again we have the definition of Boethius: a person is an individual substance of a rational nature; or the paraphrase

of St. Thomas: a person is a distinct entity subsisting in an intellectual nature.

It may happen that other definitions may seem at first sight to have a richer content, and so convey more to the mind concerning the persons we have known in the concrete, our friends, relations and acquaintances. We must be on our guard, however, against precipitation. We must remind ourselves that a definition must apply to all and only the units of the category defined. A more patient consideration will show, as I shall indicate later on, that such extra richness is either outside the legitimate definition or is but an explicitation of the implicit content of the foregoing notes. Meanwhile let us endeavour to see the relationship between the concepts of human and of divine personality.

No man hath seen God at any time, but every man can by the aid of his natural reason arrive at some knowledge of God. Two ways have been proposed to us, the one associated with the name of St. Thomas, which argues from beings contingent to the Being necessary and absolute; the other associated with the name of Cardinal Newman, and believed by many to be reducible to that of St. Thomas, namely, the way of conscience. Whichever way we follow, however, will eventually lead us to recognize in God those attributes which go to make up the concept of a person. We shall see that He has substantialness, individualness and rationality, but in a different way from that in which we have them. At once therefore we are in the middle of the great question of analogy and of its application to the divine personality. At once we are face to face with one of the most profound difficulties of theological science. In order then to pass from human personality to divine, it will be well to place prominently before our minds our doctrine of analogy. A brief statement will suffice.

Assuming that God exists we must grant that He possesses all possible perfections. Whatever perfection we see in creatures must come from God. All creatures are the offspring of the divine will, and consequently designed by the divine intelligence. God is the exemplar of every finite perfection. If these perfections derive from God then they must exist in God. As they exist in creatures in a finite degree, so also must they exist in God in an infinite degree. And more: this difference between the finite and the infinite perfection is not only a difference of degree but also one of *kind*. The failure to appreciate this is the origin of a whole brood of fallacies.

Our imagination here plays tricks with us. But let us try as much as possible to be independent of our imagination and to trust to our reason. Let us fight to the death against that ineradicable impression that God is somehow the topmost of a pyramid of creatures. He is outside the category of creatures completely. He is infinitely distant from them. Yet at the same time He is infinitely near to them, for by His creation and preservation He sets them and holds them in being. In Him we live and move and are. By apprehending the infinite distance between the divine reality and our conception of it we assure ourselves that our conception is not purely anthropomorphic. By apprehending the infinite nearness of the divine reality to our conception of it we assure ourselves that our conception is not agnostic. Our knowledge is characterized by the two notes of sufficiency and inadequacy. The inadequacy excites the thirst for more knowledge, whilst the sufficiency justifies us in our pursuit and encourages us in our efforts to come to that full satisfaction which shall be given in the Beatific Vision.

See now the application of this doctrine to the question of the divine personality. Substantialness, individualness and rationality are, as we have seen, the essential notes of a human person. If then God is a person these notes must be realized in Him; and realized in Him in a way infinitely distant from the way they are realized in men, yet at the same time infinitely near to the way they are realized in men. When eventually we shall see the Incomprehensible Reality then shall we look back on our earthly analogy and say: "What a poor thing it was, and yet how true! Who could have imagined that such a shadow were capable of so rich a realization and so immeasurable a fulfilment?"

The note of substantialness consists in the fact that the being does not form part of a whole but is a whole in itself; that it is not an attribute of something else; that it does not exist in another; but in itself. The note of individualness consists in the fact that the being possesses properties equal to, but not communicable to or absorbable by other beings of the same nature. The note of rationality consists in the fact that the being is endowed with a conscious power by which it can freely control and direct its actions. And this last note gives it a special dignity over all beings who do not possess it, and entitles the holder both to a respect from others and also an equal respect from himself to himself.

Substantialness is realized in God. God is infinite, and an infinite cannot be part of a whole but must be a whole in itself. For the same reason God cannot be an attribute of another, existing in another, but must exist in Himself. So also on account of His infinity He must of necessity remain distinct from all creatures. His properties cannot be absorbed by other beings of the same nature, for there are no other beings of the same nature. God possesses the divine nature all to Himself and is outside the category of all other natures. Lastly, the note of rationality is realized in Him, for He is the first cause of all the rationality that is directly known to us.

These notes, however, as they exist in men, have a certain imperfection about them. A created substance, although it exists in itself and not in another, is not absolutely independent. It has a principle and last end which is outside and above it. The individualness likewise of created persons is imperfect, because it is not absolute in itself but depends on the distinction of their natures. Persons who participate in one given nature, whether it be that of angels or of men, do not possess a nature which is numerically one, but only similar natures. I participate in humanity, I do not possess it all to myself. So also is the rationality of created persons imperfect; for since their natures are not common they cannot have that intimate knowledge of each other nor yet that mutual esteem and love for each other as would be assured by a common nature analogous to that which exists in the divine Persons.

The personality of God, however, is seen to be devoid of any such imperfections. God is absolutely independent, for all other beings are dependent on Him. His substantialness is therefore infinitely more substantial than that of any other being. The individualness of the three Divine Persons is merely an individualness of person and not of substance. The substance of God is perfectly undivided and indivisible. Since then the personal individualness is so absolute and independent of other attributes it is infinitely more individual than that of created persons. You and I may seem to be very distinct from each other; but we are infinitely less so than are the three Divine Persons amongst themselves. The same unity of substance too is the reason of God's infinitely perfect rationality. Had there not been unity of substance there had surely been a multiplicity of rationalities. But a multiplicity of rationalities would imply limitation in all except one, for there cannot be two infinities. Needless to say I here refer to the infinite rationality of the divine nature. The

finite rationality assumed with the human nature, although the most perfect thing in its order and although completely harmonised with the divine rationality, was nevertheless infinitely less than it in perfection. Substantialness, individualness and rationality, these are the definite marks of a human person; and since they are realized pre-eminently in God, God must be a Person with whom we can deal as with a person.

We may now pass on to consider the fitness of this medieval philosophy for the needs of the present day. An article in the *Hibbert Journal*,¹ entitled: "Personality in God, Christ, Man," by Dr. Alfred E. Garvie, the Principal Elect of New College, London, shall serve to direct our course of procedure.

The first feature which is claimed for personality is that of *unity*. The various phenomena proper to a personal being—thought, feelings and wishes—are recognised as capable of great variety. The field of consciousness is able to entertain an indefinite number of combinations of these activities. Yet amid all the variety there is unity. All the operations are those of the same self. The self which thinks does not need another self to feel for it or will for it. The self which wills also thinks for itself. All of which, being interpreted, is that note of personality above described as individualness.

The next feature observed in personality is what is called *identity*. Together with the variety in unity there is noticed a constant succession in consciousness. The period of sleep does not count, for man is not then conscious. But as long as he is conscious there is a continuous stream of perceptions ever filling his mind. Thought is as necessary for the mind as air for the lungs. The mind is conscious of the unceasing flow of the "now." It lives in the present, but it remembers the past and anticipates the future. A young man starts on his professional career full of hope; in middle life he has realised some of his ambitions and failed in others; in old age he looks back and although he may be inclined to reflect that life is but an empty dream, yet he must nevertheless confess that there has been a cumulation of realities, pleasant and unpleasant, and that he has been subject to them all. It is the same self which enjoyed the hopes and disappointments of youth, the fruitions and renunciations of manhood, the contentments and the regrets of old age. It is the same subject which endures whilst the numerous variations pass away. All of

¹The *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1907.

which, being interpreted, is that note of personality above described as substantialness.

Once more: it is observed that the self must live and act. But in order to live and act successfully it must also think. Man thinks in order to live and to love: he does not live and love in order to think. So although the self must think yet its end is desire and action rather than thought. This third feature of personality is called "conation" or "practicality." Neither name is a happy one, for both might just as well be used to denote the activities of bees and ants. But apart from nomenclature, who does not see that the idea which fits these phenomena is that represented by the term "rationality"? Rationality has all the richness of content which this aspect of personality demands, for it necessarily implies both volition and feeling, volition essentially, feeling accidentally. Every act of understanding, no matter how simple and obvious, is completed by a last practical judgment (*ultimum iudicium practicum*), which means that the will has freely inclined to the one side or to the other after the intellect has presented the available evidence. Every act of understanding, no matter how rudimentary, must also have been fed by feeling, for there is nothing in the intellect except what has previously passed through the senses.

Here then we have the concept of personality recognised first in creatures and then seen to be realised in a more eminent way in God. The proof is apodeictic. If personality is the most perfect and most dignified thing in nature, then it must somehow have its exemplar in the Author of nature. The difficulty is to see the "how." Let us be very careful, however, not to confuse two issues, the question of fact and the question of mode. If we have irrefragable proof of a fact we should constantly remember this when we are puzzling our heads about the mode. We should not hastily conclude, because we cannot see how personality is realised in God, that therefore it is not so realised. Let the fact of God being the exemplar of human personality sink thoroughly into our minds, and then we may profitably embark on the further enquiry as to the mode. This point is insisted upon because the one great difficulty against our conception of God's personality is pressed as if it were against the fact, whereas it is against the mode.

The difficulty, exploited by pantheists, atheists, agnostics and ultra-pragmatists alike, is no new one. It was proposed and answered by St. Thomas. It consists in the seeming contradiction implied

in defining the undefinable. Rationality, so the objection reads, cannot apply to God because the act of reasoning involves discursive cognition. But God sees all things intuitively and at once; and therefore not discursively. Neither can individualness apply to God, for the principle of individuation is matter; and God is immaterial. Nor yet again can substantialness apply to God, because substance is that which underlies and sustains accidents; and God cannot be the subject of accidents. Or to put the objection in a nutshell: if personality is some sort of limitation, how can the infinite be other than the impersonal?

The fallacy lies in the word "limitation." "Limitation" is scarcely the correct word. "Exclusiveness" is a better word. God excludes from His being the whole universe. He is not thereby limited as men are because they are exclusive of each other. There are three kinds of immanence, so the late Encyclical teaches us, one of which is irreproachable, two of which are false. Now it is precisely the irreproachable immanence there referred to which saves us from the pantheistic pitfall. God interpenetrates His whole creation but He is not limited by it: He transcends it infinitely. There is thus a *panentheism* which radically excludes all pantheism. So when we say that God is eminently individual we do not mean that He is so by reason of His materiality, but by reason of His incommunicability. When we say that He is eminently substantial, we do not mean that His substance is subject to accidents, but that in an eminent way He exists in Himself and through Himself and not in or through another. Being the source of all creatures, His independence of them is absolute. When we say that He is eminently rational we do not mean that He is subject, like men, to discursive thought. Discursiveness is not an essential of thought but only an accident of man's thought. Rationality is the power of understanding, and that understanding, such as God's is, which sees all things at one glance (*sub una specie*) is surely the highest and most perfect of all understanding. It will help us to overcome the seeming contradiction if we compare it with the parallel case of God's omnipotence. God can do all things, but He cannot make a square circle. The reason is because a square circle is not a thing. It is an absurdity, a nothing. God's power therefore is not thereby limited because He cannot do absurdities. So with God's personality. If only the imperfections of human personality are excluded, such exclusiveness does not imply limitations. Or the objection may be met indirectly.

The positive argument for personality is conclusive. But it is so highly metaphysical that it tends to produce notional rather than real assent. Now in the field of accepted truths there are two kinds. There are some the evidence for which is so strong that no man can refuse assent to them without making a manifest fool of himself. Take the classical instance: twice two are four. These truths are called "evident." Then there are others the evidence for which is not quite so one-sided. There is very strong evidence in their favor yet nevertheless some evidence against them. The difference, however, between the evidence for and the evidence against is so great that, in matters of moment, a man would be most imprudent who acted contrary to the weightier evidence. He cannot prudently act as if the proposition were not true. Nor on the other hand can he act as if it were true until he has given it a real as distinguished from a notional assent. How is this real assent to be created? It must be created by the action of the will inclining the intellect to the one side rather than to the other. But is this action of the will legitimate? The rational will is man's highest endowment. Man is raised above the brutes in so far as he has the power of free choice. If however he never chooses anything except that which has been demonstrated to be as clear as twice two are four, it is difficult to see where his great dignity of choice comes in. As a matter of fact rational men do not always wait for evident demonstration before acting, but they act, that is, they put forth their wills in choice of the side where the evidence is proportionately greater. Truths assented to in this fashion are called "certain" as distinguished from those more palpable truths which are called "evident."

If such a course of action is legitimate and necessary in the weightier matters of business how much more legitimate and necessary is it in a matter of so great moment as the personality of God? We are forbidden by the recent Syllabus to say that the assent of faith ultimately depends on an accumulation of probabilities. Therefore it is that I insist on that mean which lies between what is probable and what is evident, namely that which is morally certain. For such a truth there is a given amount of positive evidence; and the will, making for the highest good of man, clings to such evidence, according to it a real assent. Hence we again see the wisdom of the Syllabus in condemning that proposition which says that the dogmas of faith are to be held only according to their practical sense, that is, as preceptive norms of conduct but not as norms of believing.

The truths of revelation are not merely practical, but they are nevertheless practical. But how can a truth have a practical value unless a real assent has already been given to its fact value? I cannot possibly act before God as before a person unless I am already convinced that God is a person. I may not have a comprehensive view of God's personality, but I must at least apprehend that the essential notes of personality are realised in Him.

St. Thomas² deals with the same difficulty taken from another source—and incidentally gives us a good principle and example of restatement. The pseudo-Denys says that we should not dare to say or to think anything about the hidden divinity except that which has been divinely expressed to us in the Holy Scriptures. But the name "person," although frequently attributed to men is never attributed to God either in the old or in the new testament. St. Thomas replies that although the name "person" is not found applied to God either in the old or the new testament, still that which the name signifies is found very frequently, namely that God is most especially a being existing in and through Himself and possessing intelligence of the most perfect kind and degree (*quod est maxime per se ens, et perfectissime intelligens*). "If, however, we were only allowed to speak of God in those words which Holy Scripture uses then we could never speak of Him in any other language except that in which the Scripture was first written. But the necessity of disputing with heretics compels us to seek out new names which signify the old faith concerning God. Nor is this a novelty which is to be avoided, for it is not a profane novelty inasmuch as it is not discordant with the sense of the Scriptures. It is only the profane novelties of words which the Apostle teaches us to avoid."³

We are prepared now to distinguish and discuss some important implications of personality. In modern parlance the term has come to connote and even to include a number of things which do not strictly belong to the essence of personality. A person, according to our definition is an individual subsisting in a rational nature. The nature is not numerically one but is similar in different persons. It exists formally as one in the mind but fundamentally and numerically many in the thing. A person therefore although he possesses

²*Summa*, pars 1a, qu. xxix, art. iii, ad 1.

³"O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding the profane novelties of words and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called, which some promising, have erred concerning the faith." I. Tim. vi, 20, 21.

a separate nature from other persons, may however possess it in greater or less perfection. And this perfection of one's nature has come to be spoken of as if it were a perfection of his person. Thus we say: such an one has a strong personality; an individuality all his own; a remarkable independence; a keen intellect; a powerful will; a tender affection. Of another we say that he has no personality at all; that he is too obvious for anything; that he is slightly deficient in memory, intellect and will. It will be well, however, to draw a sharp distinction between that which pertains to the essence of person and that which pertains to the perfection of nature. Else we shall have untold trouble when we come to compare human personality with divine. Let us be quite clear then whether the issue is between personality and non-personality, or between personality good, better, and best. A definition is framed so as to include all and only the individuals of the species defined. Thus the category of person must include the savage, the genius and the hero; the cherub, the seraph and the archangel; God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost; saving of course all the qualifications of the doctrine of analogy.

The first implication is that known as *development*. Conation, so agrees the present-day philosopher, supposes a goal to be aimed at. The striving to reach the goal implies progress. Hence development is a note of personality. By making development one of the essential constituents the conclusion easily follows that personality is not found already made in man but is still in the making.

A second implication is that known as *transcendence*. By transcendence is meant the superior relationship of the soul with the body. On the one hand the human soul apart from the body is recognised not to be a person; and on the other hand the body is recognised to be the organ of the soul. This double relationship constitutes another essential note of personality, and is spoken of as the transcendence of personality over its physical organ. Hence, owing to these notes of development and transcendence, it may be that we are not yet fully incarnate. "It is quite credible" says Sir Oliver Lodge "that our whole and entire personality is never terrestrially manifest"⁴

The phenomena from which these conclusions are drawn are evident. There is a progress observable in man, the result of his will-life. There is a felt superiority of soul over body and of a re-

⁴*Life and Matter*, p. 123.

action of body on soul. But the progress is not an increase of person but rather an increase in the perfection of the person's nature. A person, that is an individual rational substance remains a person no matter what are the fluctuations, progress or deterioration, of his intellectual, volitional and emotional life. It is the quality of his nature which changes, not the notes of his essence.

So too with the so-called note of transcendence. The human soul can subsist apart from the body; it has moreover an essential relationship to the body; it controls, vivifies and informs the body; it is reacted upon by the body. But all this does not pertain to the essence of personality as such. It is an implication of human personality only. It is one of the qualities of the human nature which must be possessed by a human person. A hypostasis, in order to be rational, must be a substance wholly or partly spiritual, wholly as in the case of God and the angels, partly as is the case of men. But the kind of such spirituality is accidental and not essential to the concept of person. The distinction is necessary in order that the concept of "person" may be realised in all the individuals of the category. The spirituality of God and angels is different in kind from the spirituality of men, the one being known as "pure" the other as "impure." It cannot therefore enter into the definition of person.

The most important implication of all is that of volition. It may indeed be said to pertain to the essence of personality; and the only reason why it is not mentioned in the definition is because it is so clearly implied by the note of rationality. There can be neither reason without free-will, nor free-will without reason. And with the light of reason and the power of free-will man can come to know and to love a personal God. The modern mind cannot fail to recognise these phenomena even though it prefer to account for them otherwise. It may say that personality seeks for an ideal and thus bears the characteristics of ideality. It may say that that ideal comes as a categorical imperative calling the mind to seek the truth and the will to seek the good, and thus postulating the moral law of freedom and an immortality. But it will after all fail to grip the truth unless it understands that the will is moved by the divine Will, that the mind must be informed by the laws of the divine Mind, and that the ideal has been supernaturally revealed by God in the person of Jesus Christ.

If then there are any advantages to be perceived in the philosophy of Emmanuel Kant they are all contained in the philosophy

of Saint Thomas Aquinas, minus many inconveniences and plus many further advantages. Is unity required? It is found in individualness. Is identity required? It is found in substantialness. Is conation or development or transcendence or ideality or liberty required? They are all implied in rationality. And more: the whole of the beauty of personality, even according to the highest and latest canons of taste, is found there also. According to St. Thomas, the will is found there also. According to St. Thomas, the will, when exercising its highest office, when occupied with matters of faith, is the noblest faculty of man, nobler than the intellect itself. And this will is not merely a hard force enlightened by a cold intellect, but it is warmed and inflamed by affection and passion. By the doctrine of simplicity of soul it is the same soul in man which feels, thinks and wills. And the mind and will, although fed by the feelings and inflamed by the passions, are not controlled by them. The will under the guidance of reason controls the feelings and the passions, and by constant exercise improves the quality both of itself and them.

Best of all—and this is where modern philosophy hopelessly breaks down—St. Thomas shows us that these tender feelings and loving affections are realised in God. God has no body and no passions. He has in Him though something corresponding to them, He has the same perfections but in a more eminent way. God is at the same time all names, nameless and above all names. All the notes: whether of the essence of a person or of the perfection of a person's nature; everything which goes to make up what we understand by an attractive personality; everything which renders it possible and desirable to deal with a human being as with a person; everything which marks him off from the lower creation everything which distinguishes the better from the good and the best from the better; all these are found in God because God is their exemplar, their root, their source, their creation and their preservation.

Our vision of them is dark and dull. That is because we are in a sinful world and are not holy. In proportion as we grow in holiness so will the outlines of God's personality become to us more and more clear. He that doth the truth cometh to the light. Then when we shall have sufficiently developed our spiritual sense the veil shall be removed from our eyes and a flood of supernatural light shall reveal to us the three Divine Persons as they are. Meanwhile we must be satisfied with that partial vision given to us in the person

of Jesus Christ. In Him were focused and expressed all the beauties of divine personality which sinful eyes could behold. In Him were gathered up and developed all the charms of human personality to the highest perfection possible in a human nature. "And Jesus advanced in wisdom, and age, and grace with God and men." Through His substantial union with the Godhead He possessed a purity of mind which enabled Him to understand the incomprehensible riches of the Blessed Trinity in so far as they were comprehensible. Through the same substantial union too He possessed a purity of Heart which enabled Him to speak those riches to the world of men. Human personality had cried out for a Divine Personality, and Divine Personality had answered with a personality that was at once human and divine. Deep had called unto deep at the noise of His flood-gates and all His heights and His billows passed over us. "For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally: and you are filled in Him Who is the head of all principality and power."

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THE TRUE FUNCTION OF EXPERIENCE IN BELIEF

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The extravagances to which the Modernists have committed themselves in repudiating miracles and prophecy—the hallowed sign-manuals of Revelation,—and in trying to find a sufficient warrant for our belief in the experience and necessities of each one, have occasioned a revulsion against them, not only in those who owe loyalty and submission to the recent encyclical, but in those who are in any way devoted to the traditional method of apologetics. And there is a danger for those who do not realize that as a rule error is merely an exaggeration of the truth, that they would disclaim the aid of our individual experience, not only as an exclusive basis of faith, but even as a valuable auxiliary in confirming us in its profession when we have obtained it through external revelation.

Hence it may be well to consider some cases where it is specially manifest that the firmness and vividness of our belief, though not its actual inception in us, are due to our experience of the pleasure and benefit of living the supernatural life. Without Revelation, human reason and experience could never excogitate even a passable system of religion. As a preliminary to faith certain truths and convictions acquired by God's grace are absolutely essential, but once we accept the faith, we find that these truths are corroborated, and our loyalty and co-operation with them are rewarded by the working of the Holy Spirit in our souls, who disposes all things sweetly for those who love Him. His yoke is sweet and His burden light, and our individual experience and consciousness of this truth is of the first importance in the economy of our spiritual life.

And the first case I would call attention to in illustration of this fact is the loyalty and devotion that even the ordinary uneducated faithful have to their religion, not only in times of tranquility when there is no special temptation to recreancy but also when the fires of persecution are glowing fiercely. The Irish for instance, bereft of their pastors and of every kind of organization, adhered to the Catholic creed, "through joy and through sorrow, through glory and shame." Now the question arises how people in such

circumstances remain true to their faith amidst unexampled temptations to perversion. What is the bond, fine as silk, true as steel, and as enduring as human life itself, that binds them to it?

Such a bond may conceivably be sought for in four directions. In the authority of God—the motive of belief; in the principle of belief—the habit of faith in the soul; in our experience of the transient visitations of the Holy Ghost to the soul—the illustrations and inspirations of actual grace; or, abstracting from the operation of grace, our attachment to certain truths may be empirical—the result of our experience of their beneficial effect on our spiritual life.

Now, speaking theoretically, the first reason is unquestionably adequate to explain the firmness and stability of faith. For the authority of God is sufficient to make us do and suffer everything, rather than compromise one tittle or iota of the truth it guarantees. But in practice, we have to consider how the divine authority is linked with the particular dogma that may be called in question. And of course the link is supplied by a certain process of reasoning, having at one end an investigation into the existence of miracles or prophecy, in the case of the educated, and an acquiescence in the teaching of parents or priests, in the case of the unlearned, and having at the other end actual assent to the dogma on the authority of God. Whether this process is logical and continuous throughout, or whether, as others suppose, the mind in virtue, as it were, of a kind of impulse it has gained in its assent to the *præambula fidei* is enabled to project itself on to quite a different plane when it gives its actual adherence to the dogma, it is not my purpose to enquire. Now, there can be no doubt that it is in some way as this we all first receive the faith, and in after life too, the memory of what we have been taught about God at a mother's knee will often keep us in the straight path in the midst of allurements into the by-ways of sin.

But nevertheless, I believe that the authority of God brought to bear on the truths of religion in this somewhat obscure and circuitous way is not an adequate explanation of all the phenomena of religious life, and in particular, of the unswerving assent of faith. Such a delicate bond, connecting us with the Divine authority, may indeed keep us in our religion when there is no inducement to give it up, when our affairs are prosperous, when we do not feel the chastening hand of God, and when we have only to go with the current. But in times of danger and doubt and difficulty, when the horizon of our lives all round is dark and lowering, and the hour of the prince

of darkness has come, we require something of much less tenuity, something that will appeal much more to our composite nature. When the frail vessel in which our eternal fortunes are embarked has to weather the storm against every buffet of adversity, rather than strike its colours to the powers of evil, it must be anchored to the faith by something much more tangible than any reasoning process or the word of priest or teacher; though these are sufficient at ordinary times to generate certainty in our creed, and secure a practical observance of its precepts. No doubt, many say that in every supernatural act the authority of God revealing must somehow be contained, but I believe that nothing but the most minute introspective analysis will reveal its influence in the ordinary exercise of the virtues.

Generally speaking then, it would seem that the divine authority for religious teaching is not brought home to our minds with that urgency that would explain our unswerving assent to it.

And I think an appeal to the infused habit of Faith—the second possible explanation—will be equally unsatisfactory notwithstanding the opinion to the contrary of many distinguished theologians¹. For the infused virtues do not of themselves import any strengthening or satisfying of our mental faculties. Though of course there is a certain proportion between them, for God no doubt chooses for the higher supernatural life those natures that are most refined, most sensitive, and most spiritual, still these virtues are in no sense the supplements or correlatives of our faculties; nor do the latter experience any pleasurable excitation by their exercises. Just as the supernatural habits do not check the passions or exclude vicious propensities,² so they do not confirm us in our religion or facilitate us in observing its precepts, for unlike actual grace they are in no sense medicinal.

But I believe it is otherwise³ in the case of the third reason I proposed viz:—the operation of actual grace in our souls, especially in times of doubt or difficulty. For in these temporary visitations of the Holy Ghost which constitute actual grace, our spiritual per-

¹v. g. Lugo, *de Fide* d. I N. 105, and Mazzella, *de Vir. Infusis* n. 613, who ascribe the unwavering assent of Faith to the habit as well as to the motive.

²Lugo, *de Euch.* d. 14 n. 46 sqq.

³This seems to be the view of Cardinal Franzelin, for he ascribes the firmness of faith to the action of the will, strengthened by grace. This grace cannot be the virtue of Faith which is in the intellect, and as there is no corresponding virtue in the will, he can only refer to the actual graces which connaturally follow Faith. *De Traditione*, p. 635.

ceptions become clarified and quickened; instead of seeing through a glass, darkly, we see with flashes of divine light that resemble in some way the noon-day sun of the Beatific Vision itself. Similarly in the will, the Paraclete gives a certain feeling of satisfaction, of contentment, of rest and peace which passes human understanding. Considering the intimate relations that exist between body and soul, there is no doubt that these spiritual motions sometimes overflow to the senses, and so obtrude themselves more on our attention than if they were confined to the spiritual faculties. Just as according to St. Thomas "whatever in us the will insists on having done, even the very act of the will so insisting is paid for out of the store of physical energy belonging to the body",⁴ so conversely, the body cannot be wholly uninfluenced by the divine energy that is being communicated to the will.

Hence it is that at such seasons of divine mercy, the whole man—body and soul—is blessed with a certain spiritual comfort and exhilaration; and such experiences almost altogether preclude repudiation or doubt, then or subsequently, of the religion that begets them, and in them we have a sufficient explanation of the lives and deaths of the martyrs.

The fundamental emotion and impulse of fallen human nature is to gratify its passions, to shun the narrow rugged road of religion and to twine its affections round the world and its pleasures. And God designs to counteract or neutralize this bias or propensity, not only by proposing reasons that appeal to the speculative intellect, but by coming down to our level, as it were, by rejuvenating the old Adam and implanting in our nature a countervailing impulse or motion through the means of actual grace. This, I take it, is the meaning of saying that grace is not only elevating but medicinal.

Renouncement of self is not indigenous to the human heart, it is a delicate exotic; and yet we know with what joy and happiness martyrs have died, and saints have crucified the flesh, for they were wedded to their religion, not only because they had heard, but because they had seen and experienced.

* "Comfort came down the trembling wretch to raise,
And his last faltering accents whispered praise."

And in the prosaic atmosphere of ordinary life, those who make a sacrifice for God are often conscious of a feeling of light and comfort

⁴*Of God and His Creatures*, p. 409. Rickaby.

permeating their entire being, for the divine grace comes down as a soothing balm to heal the wounded and tortured heart.

Mere mortification of the passions will not suffice to give this relish for the religious life, for its action is mostly negative; it only conciliates for us a greater measure of God's grace, and by refining away the grossness of our mental powers, facilitates their thorough and harmonious co-operation with it. But by a reverent and dutiful submission, our entire nature becomes gradually adjusted to the exigencies of the inner life, our intellects sensitive to its teaching, and our wills attuned to the motions of divine grace.

In face of this modification of nature, it is plain that the operation of actual grace to which it is attributable must supply a confirmatory argument for our religion based on personal experience, and hence more telling than any mere *a priori* one, no matter how plausible or ingenious.

This teaching as to the strengthening and consoling properties of actual grace is adumbrated in many parts of our theology, where its harmony or congruity with our nature is insisted on, and where it is alluded to as a delectation, especially by St. Augustine⁵ and his school. For it is quite impossible, as we know from psychology, to have any delectation in the mental faculties without a corresponding pleasurable emotion in the body. I do not mean to assert that the one is always proportionate to the other, for experience testifies to the contrary, and in the Penance tract, though external emotion is considered presumptive evidence of the corresponding internal disposition, still we are warned that rebutting evidence is always admissible.⁶ Actual grace then, since it carries with it a certain pleasure or delectation, must of necessity come within the range of our experience.

But the doctrine that divine grace and its effects are an object of experience—even bodily experience—is no where so fully elaborated as in the theology of the Blessed Eucharist.

Urban IV in the bull *Transiturus*, speaking of this sacrament says: "This bread is eaten, but not transmitted; it is nowise changed into the consumer; but if it be worthily received, the recipient becomes like to It. This transmutation is brought about by the streaming in upon us of the spirit and life of Christ. As a result

⁵*De pecc. mer. et rem.* 1. 2. c. 19, n. 33; M 44, 170.

⁶Cf. St. Liguori, n. 460: "Quapropter ordinarie, nisi aliud percipiatur oppositum, credendus est poenitens ex inspiratione Dei lacrymas effundere."

Christ liveth in us; our thoughts, *our senses* and *impulses*, our wills and activities assume a resemblance to the hidden life of the Eucharistic Saviour, and become Divine."

Dr. Hedley⁷ says, "The Holy Eucharist seems to have a special grace for the bodily passions. These passions are not exclusively corporeal, but they are attached to or located in a bodily organ. Hence their violence largely depends upon bodily conditions. It is the express teaching of the Fathers that the Eucharistic contact not only affects the passions indirectly, through the graces which are conveyed to the soul, but has also a directly healing and sanctifying effect upon the flesh".⁸ I lay such stress on these effects of the Blessed Eucharist on the body, because whatever as to its spiritual effects, it is clearly impossible that these physical ones should not be registered in the experience of the recipient.

Another effect of the Holy Communion that goes to show the same is the delight, the sense of pleasure, the mental exaltation that not infrequently accompanies its worthy reception. It is compared by the saints and the doctors to the most delicious bread, to honey and to the wine that makes glad the heart of man.⁹ This means that by worthy and frequent communion the spiritual life becomes congenial to us, we become acclimatised to its higher reaches, and can live with comparative serenity, as it were, in its attenuated atmosphere.

From this it follows that to the devout and thoughtful, the reception of the Eucharist must be a marvellous confirmation of the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence, and of all the doctrines it involves, and inferentially, a crushing confutation of the other Christian churches who do not hold this sublime dogma. From our doctrine of the Eucharistic effects then, it is clear that no Catholic can deny to the theology of experience and emotion an important, though of course, secondary part in the economy of belief.

Our teaching about impetratory prayer and its infallible efficacy in certain circumstances, also bears testimony to the value of experience as an aid to faith in God and His providence. For seeing, on the one hand that God is bound to grant us certain favours, and on the other, that we can be sometimes sure that it was impossible

⁷*The Holy Eucharist*, p. 123.

⁸Cf. Lehmkühl, II. 115; Noldin, *de Euch.* 103.

⁹Hoc autem sacramentum est spiritualis manducatio quæ habet actualem delectionem. *S. Theol.* III Q. 79, A. 8.

to obtain them through the ordinary channels, the circumstances being so unpropitious, no other conclusion is open to us than that we owe them to a beneficent interposition of Providence. Or again, the obtaining of some boon has so synchronised with our prayers for it, that the same explanation is the only one admissible.

It follows, at once, that the answer to our prayers is often a powerful argument in confirmation of the truths common to all theistic religion. And even when our requests seem unheeded, the same may be true; when, for instance, God refuses something to our prayers, subsequent experience often proves to us that the granting of it, instead of being a favour, would in reality be detrimental to the interests we were anxious to serve.

So far we have considered our experience of God's goodness, at work in our spiritual life, and it may be, furthering our temporal interests in answer to our prayers, as wedding us to our religion. And now we come to the fourth reason which I put forward in the beginning as a possible explanation of our irreformable assent to our religious beliefs; how far, namely, our experience of the advantage of particular dogmas to our souls, justifies or confirms our adherence to the religion of which they form an organic part.

In this connection we have already seen some of the effects of the Holy Eucharist, and I shall now consider seriatim a few more of the distinctively Catholic dogmas.

And in the first place, as regards our doctrine about the Blessed Virgin, preachers and writers in their enthusiastic devotion sometimes, as Newman says, use language that is calculated to give a misleading idea of the part we ascribe to our Lady in the work of our salvation, and it occasionally needs the corrective of a little practical knowledge of Catholicism to reconcile the ebullitions of their piety with the principles of sound theology. And this is perhaps partly the reason why Protestants are guilty of the unpardonable folly of slighting the Mother of God, for their detached, non-committal attitude towards her is a mere accretion on their system, and has no logical connection with their characteristic tenets at all. But a short acquaintance with devotion to her, as it is practised amongst us, is bound to remove all misapprehension, and indeed to awake a responsive echo in every human heart of normal sensibility. For such an experience will show that we look upon her as a mother that will heal our wounds and kiss away our tears—that will take us by the hand, and lead our tottering footsteps over the rough and

thorny paths of the religious life. Instead of our devotion to her overshadowing what we owe to God, as may seem to a mere academic onlooker, the practical Catholic feels that loyalty to Him is the *raison d'être* of all the honour we show her, and that her chief office in our eyes is to help to disarm His resentment when we return as prodigals to our Father's house. A short experience of devotion to the Blessed Virgin in this—the true Catholic spirit—will by its chastening of the passions, and its humanising, refining influence on the heart, render superfluous extrinsic reasons or the avouchment of authority as to her prerogatives.

Again, how consoling is our doctrine about the Guardian Angels! How satisfying to know that we have one bright spirit—all to ourselves—ever hovering round to help and comfort and protect us! He is for us a kindly light to illumine the gloom that falls from time to time on the spiritual life of everyone. If we were not taught by faith we should not know what to ascribe their good offices to, but once apprised of their existence, a short trial of their benevolence will enable us to dispense with the complicated and subtle apparatus of faith by which we were first brought into touch with them, and to take our stand on the more familiar and tangible ground of our own personal experience.

What an appeal too, does the doctrine of the Communion of saints make to human nature, unless indeed in the case of those who are specially hardened or depraved! What a consolation to know that when death is near and earthly ties are being severed, that new ones are being forged, closer, more spiritual, more enduring, and incomparably more prolific of good results. It enables us to clasp again in spirit a hand long vanished from our material touch, to bridge the gulf between time and eternity, and hold loving converse with those who are gone.

In the case of Infallibility again, a person relying merely on *a priori* arguments may be, in a sense, excused for thinking that it was likely to be a relentless foe to all theological progress, and to be responsible for a cast-iron, lifeless system of dogmas, whereas a practical acquaintance with its scope and limitations will convince anyone, that it is, on the contrary, a careful guide for human reason, sustaining its feeble and uncertain steps towards a fuller knowledge of the divine Revelation. To us, Catholics, who understand the character and rationale of our creed, how fitting Infallibility seems,

once it is proposed for our acceptance. We see in it the coping stone of the great spiritual edifice, which would be else in somewise unworthy of the Master Mind that designed it.

Our life or death insistence on distinctively Catholic teaching forming an integral part of the school curriculum of our children has always been a rock of scandal to those outside the Church, and at present perhaps more than ever, at least in England. But to one impregnated with the spirit of Catholicism, denominational teaching commends itself instinctively, and indeed to him any other attitude would appear suicide. For he will understand that we cannot lay an amorphous foundation that may suit anything or nothing, and then erect a jerry-built structure on it, in accordance with our own peculiar views. He knows by experience that from foundation to apex the edifice of our spiritual life, like the edifice of our Church must be compact and homogeneous throughout; and that if religious education is anaemic and characterless in the beginning, it will remain so to the end, and can never become definite and characteristic and Catholic. This is plain enough to the experienced Catholic instinct, but it is no matter for wonder that outsiders cannot understand the principle on which we object to have those doctrines that we hold in common with them, taught to our children in common with theirs.

In fact, I believe that Protestant hostility to some of our most cherished beliefs arises largely from the fact that they cannot be adequately appreciated except through experience.

I do not mean to contend that all the Catholic dogmas, like the ones I have considered, are guaranteed by our own experience, as well as by the divine authority, or that those I have specified have equal warrant in the experience of every one, but at the same time it is well to remember that if we have reason to believe in one characteristic tenet of a particular church, that that carries with it strong presumptive evidence of the truth of the other doctrines of the same Church as well.

I venture to think I have shown that our experience of the workings of God's grace in our souls, and our experience of the value of certain doctrines to our spiritual life, have a share with authority in convincing the intellect of religious truth and in moulding the heart to virtue.

The just man lives by faith; it is the beginning in us of the supernatural life, and we may also consider it as the soil in the garden of the soul, for it is the indispensable foundation of all virtue. But experience also has an important place, for in order to bring forth fruit in due season, the subsoil (human nature) must be nourished and refreshed by the living waters of divine grace.

DAVID BARRY.

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THE CURRENT SCIENCE-PHILOSOPHY

Francis P. Duffy, D. D.

It is now seventy years ago since Macaulay, writing on Lord Bacon in the *Edinburgh Review*, made the following comparison between the practical results of the old philosophy and the new science:

“Suppose that Justinian, when he closed the schools of Athens, had called on the last few sages who still haunted the Portico, and lingered round the ancient plane-trees, to show their title to public veneration; suppose that he had said: ‘A thousand years have elapsed since, in this famous city, Socrates posed Protagoras and Hippias; during those thousand years a large proportion of the ablest men of every generation has been employed in constant efforts to bring to perfection the philosophy which you teach; that philosophy has been munificently patronized by the powerful; its professors have been held in the highest esteem by the public; it has drawn to itself almost all the sap and vigor of the human intellect; and what has it effected? What profitable truth has it taught us which we should not equally have known without it? What has it enabled us to do which we should not have been equally able to do without it?’ Such questions, we suspect, would have puzzled Simplicius and Isidore. Ask a follower of Bacon what the new philosophy, as it was called in the time of Charles the Second, has effected for mankind, and his answer is ready: ‘It has lengthened life; it has mitigated pain; it has extinguished diseases; it has increased the fertility of the soil; it has given new securities to the mariner; it has furnished new arms to the warrior; it has spanned great rivers and estuaries with bridges of form unknown to our fathers; it has guided the thunderbolt innocuously from heaven to earth; it has lighted up the night with the splendor of the day; it has extended the range of the human vision; it has multiplied the power of the human muscles; it has accelerated motion; it has annihilated distance; it has facilitated intercourse, correspondence, all friendly offices, all despatch of business; it has enabled man to descend to the depths of the sea, to soar into the air, to penetrate securely into the noxious recesses of the earth, to traverse the land in cars which whirl along without horses, and the ocean in ships which run ten knots an hour against the wind. These are but a part of its fruits, and of its first fruits. For it is a philosophy which never rests, which has never attained, which is never perfect. Its law is progress. A point which yesterday was invisible is its goal to-day, and will be its starting-post to-morrow.’”

Since these lines were written science has gone on working wonders which even the brilliant generalizations of Macaulay fail to cover. Its triumphs have aroused the enthusiasm of the age which has witnessed them; they have been made the theme of its orators and poets; they have become so common as to furnish stock

in trade for the humorist. Says the genial American philosopher, "Mr. Dooley," commenting on the Victorian age: An' th' inventions,—th' steam-injun an' th' printin'-press an' th' cotton-gin an' the gin sour an' th' bicycle an' th' flyin'-machine an' th' nickel-in-th'-slot machine an' th' Croker machine an' th' sody fountain an' —crownin' wur-ruk iv our civilization—th' cash raygister. What gr-reat advances has science made in my time an' Victory's!"

They can scarcely be spoken of except in the form of the paradox. As a specimen of this I may quote from an article by Mr. Gerald Stanley Lee:

"The man who finds himself on a planet that is only lighted part of the time, is merely reminded that he must think of something. He digs light out of the ground and glows up the world with her own sap. When he finds himself living on an earth that can only be said to be properly heated a small fraction of the year, he makes the earth itself burn itself and keep him warm. Things like this are small to us. We take water and burn it into air and we telegraph boilers and we flash mills around the earth on poles. We move vast machines with a little throb, like light. We put a street on a wire. Great crowds in the great cities—whole blocks of them are handed along day and night like dots and dashes in telegrams. A man cannot be stopped by a breath. We save a man up in his own whisper hundreds of years when he is dead. A human voice that reaches only a few yards makes thousands of miles of copper talk. Then we make the thousand miles talk without the copper wire. We stand on the shore and beat the air with a thought thousands of miles away—make it whisper for us to ships."

If one were to attempt in more serious mood to fill up the lines of Macaulay's picture, he might say: Science has entered into every phase of human life: it has been pressed into the service of the family; it has lightened the work of the household, furnished and beautified the home, invented new methods and materials for the construction of the dwelling; it has irrigated, tilled and reaped the fields, making not only two blades of grass grow where one grew before, but evoking smiling harvests from the desert, and then carrying them to the populous centers of the world; it has invented countless methods for the utilization of products which formerly were lost to the use of mankind; it has delved into the bowels of the earth and laid their treasures at the feet of men; it has revolutionized medicine by making surgery possible and by abolishing diseases which were the scourge of the race; it has affected jurisprudence by inventing new methods for the detection of crime; it has modified most profoundly the relations between man and man by the facilities it has created for intercom-

munication, opening new fields for the labors of the trader and the missionary, promoting the migration of nations to new lands, rendering possible the growth of cities; it has cut through continents, straightened rivers, leveled mountains; it has tamed the destructive powers of electricity and explosives and has used them to destroy the barriers of space and time, until now the ether has been made a vehicle for speech which travels across thousands of miles at a speed almost equal to that of thought.

By its aid man has overcome the most dreaded powers of nature and has rendered himself independent of the more beneficent. It prophecies storms, it destroys pestilences, it makes habitable the waste places; it boldly essays to go down into the deeps in sub-marines, to ascend towards the firmament in airships, to overcome the powers of ice and snow and set the flag of civilization at the poles. It has made the mariner independent of the stars; it supplies warmth where the sun does not shine, and living waters where the rain never falls; it lights up the darkness of the night so that in great cities men forget the existence of the moon.

One can scarcely speak of its beneficent victories without employing language which has been consecrated to the uses of religion. It instructs the ignorant, heals the sick, feeds the hungry, clothes the naked. Like the prophet of old, it lays the mountains low and fills up the valleys and makes straight the paths of the world for the coming of—of whom?

All this would seem at first sight to be a glorious tribute to the achievements of modern science. But many a scientist would laugh it to scorn. Why, he would say, you are simply speaking of the menial occupations of science when she was the Cinderella of the sisterhood of knowledge, when she was content to scrub the floor and cook the food and run errands for the family. But it fails to estimate her position now. Her scornful sisters, philosophy and religion, are thrust out of doors and are wandering on wounded feet through the dark and waste places of the world while she sits enthroned dictating her lessons and laws to humanity.

That there is a large measure of truth in this view no well-informed person can deny. The achievements of science in the world of human service or utility which Macaulay contemplated, certainly form only the less striking part of its successes. The most magnificent results have been in the extension of the bounds of human knowledge. And here, though we must proceed more cautiously,

there is still ample room for the full triumphal note. For science has weighed and measured the heavenly bodies, calculated the speed of light, and tracked the path of the comets; it has peered into the cosmic process of the suns; watched the formation of our planet and traced the outlines of its history at a time when no living thing yet existed upon it; it narrates the succession of various forms of life from the protozoa to man; it has unearthed from the ashes of forgotten civilizations and from the hidden mysteries of dead tongues the history of man on this planet for thousands of years. And on still profounder mysteries it has its more or less confident word to say—on the inner nature of the atom, the secret of life, the human soul, the destiny of man.

What wonder then that men should make of it a religion? Men have worshipped the sun for its beneficence—but the benefits of science have entered into every channel of life. Men have been found to follow any guide who could offer a solution to the problems of thought—but few prophets have spoken with the authority of this new leader of humanity. What wonder then that its more enthusiastic votaries should exclaim: "Science has lifted the veil of Isis; loosed the Gordian Knot; it solves the mysteries, makes the prophecies; it is the seer, the sage, the preacher of humanity."

And yet—and yet—in our less ecstatic moments we begin to fear that there may be something in the fling: "What science says goes—at least with the unscientific." May it not be that while the worshippers wait for the auguries with bowed heads outside the temples, the soothsayers within are wrangling with one another, or lost in doubt, or, it may be, smiling a knowing smile when they pass, as in the days of Cicero. Indeed, some come to the door and say: "God save you, Christian gentlemen" (or words to that effect) "we know naught of the things you fain would hear. Go to your homes—mayhap you will learn the secret there." Evidently the counsels are divided. Some preach that the key to all truth is the mystical formula of evolution—and others protest that this is being carried too far. And one who announces his doctrine in words "of learned length and thundering sound" is accused by his own followers of talking "solemn nonsense." Some lesser priestlings would perform the mystery of evoking life—soberer heads assure them that the trick has never been done. Some blend mind and matter—and a perfect chorus of dissentient voices proclaim that the connection is impossible. Another assumes the voice of the oracle and solves

all the riddles of the universe—and a British dissenter proclaims him to be old-fashioned and behind the times.

“The progress of thought has left him, as well as his great English exemplar, Herbert Spencer, somewhat high and dry, belated and stranded by the tide of opinion which has now begun to flow in another direction. He is, as it were, a surviving voice from the middle of the nineteenth century; he represents, in clear and eloquent fashion, opinions which then were prevalent among many leaders of thought—opinions which they themselves in many cases, and their successors still more, lived to outgrow; so that by this time Professor Haeckel’s voice is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness, not as the pioneer or vanguard of an advancing army, but as the despairing shout of a standard-bearer, still bold and unflinching, but abandoned by the retreating ranks of his comrades as they march to new orders in a fresh and more idealistic direction.¹

When men eminent in science say that the solemn philosophical pronouncements of many among their brethren are not the voice of science itself, but of an old-fashioned and discredited philosophy dressed in the clothes and speaking through the mask of science, we lesser men begin to take heart, and to enquire more boldly where the truth may be. And we are stimulated to the enquiry all the more by the fact that the philosophy of scientific monism is still strong. In fact, there is a reason to believe that if matters of speculation could be decided by a show of hands, it would be the winner—almost surely so if we admitted to the polls only those whose philosophic systems are held independently of religious faiths.

* * *

Science, then, aims at being considered as a philosophy. Now a philosophy is always an attempt to give an ordered presentation of all reality, to reduce this higgledy-piggledy world to a system of origins, natures and ends.

It is evident that everybody nowadays who aims at a philosophy must take into consideration the results of science. We shall see later on how much it has done to help the work of systematizing. Nor is there any reason whatever why the scientist should not attempt the task of philosophy. Our main objection against the class of scientists whom we are criticizing is not that they become philosophers, but that they do not. But if the scientist does venture on philosophy, he has a decided advantage in his knowledge of a great part of reality. On the other hand, though, he may suffer a drawback in the one-

¹Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 51.

sided bent which his particular trade may have given him. One does not expect a manufacturer of steel rails, no matter how sincere a patriot he may be, to give an absolutely unbiased opinion on the tariff. After all, as David Harum says, "There is as much human nature in some folks as there is in others, if not more."

But when science aims at becoming a philosophy—that's another story, as Kipling has it. This is a proposition eminently open to discussion. It means that all reality can be examined by the methods and catalogued in the categories of the physical sciences. It *might* not mean just that, but it does mean that if it means anything more than the truism that one should not philosophize without knowing what science has to tell. And as a matter of fact this is just what the current science philosophy does contend. The concepts of physics may be softened a bit here and there to suit new needs, but in the long run the new philosophy gives us just the mechanical concept of the universe which is associated with physics.

We shall see more clearly as we go on what this means, but it is worth while to stop for a moment here to develop this general idea of what a science philosophy is. Let us consider science as a method, for a method it is primarily. It is a method of codifying sense experiences, of arranging the things perceived by sense in order of coexistences, similarities, sequences,—what things invariably go together, are like one another, follow one another. It learns its trade in a portion of reality where things go according to set forms and laws; and it has made the discovery that its progress depends on applying mathematics to facts. It weighs, measures, counts—the scales and the tapeyard are the instruments of its craft. A good *bourgeois* in its point of view, it has no use for the spontaneous and the unusual. Freedom and spontaneity it rejects or reduces to the level of its counter. What cannot be weighed by its system of avoirdupois, what its measuring string will not go round is non-existent. It may have various theories—or no theory at all—concerning the nature of the matter of which it treats; but it retains as a philosophy its original assumption—that there is no knowledge except of things which are perceptible by sense and can be considered as fixed, determined, mechanical; that all things which at first blush seem to be exceptions, life, souls, wills, consciences, gods, must submit themselves to the methods and ultimately to the concepts of physics.

But let us proceed to study historically the successes which science has already attained in reducing the complex world to its own form of unity. And since it is good for us to view the opposing position at its strongest, we shall not boggle over lesser points, but rather concede to monism all the advantages it can possibly claim.

The modern scientific conception of reality begins with the good Polish canon Copernicus who first opened the way for a systematic view of the universe. The earth we live on took its position in a general scheme of things—unfortunately for our self-complacency, a very subordinate position. We are used to it now, but no revolution in the human point of view has ever been greater. No wonder that it was violently opposed. But it established itself in spite of opposition, as every truth must ultimately do. Copernicus and Galileo reduced the heavens to a system. By the law of gravitation Newton showed the bonds which unite its gigantic molecules so closely that a man cannot flick the ashes off his cigar without disturbing the harmony of the spheres. Later still Kant and Laplace traced a genetic similarity between the parts of the universe by pointing out the laws of their formation from the original nebular mass. And our modern astronomers such as Father Secchi have read in the messages which light inscribes on the spectroscope the further lesson that all the heavenly bodies are formed of similar substances.

Meanwhile patient investigators had been establishing unities in the narrower field of those substances which lie within the reach of our hands. At first glance the world seems to be made up of a vast number of quite different sorts of things. A lump of quartz, a handful of sand, a cup of water, an oaken plank, a sheet of linen, a volume of gas, and the human hand seem to be radically different in their make-up. But the science of chemistry has shown that these and all other material things are only different structural combinations of some seventy different kinds of entities called elementary substances.

In reaching this conclusion physics too had played its part. First of all it smoothed the way by showing what philosophy had often guessed at—that the principal qualities by which things seem different to sight and taste and hearing do not exist as perceived. Color, sound, heat and cold, savors, odors, do not really exist in things—they are only ways in which a sentient organism reacts to movements from without. The material universe is colorless, odorless, soundless. We sit in a church or a theatre. We gaze at the beautiful paintings.

and decorations, are entranced by the harmonies of sound evoked from organ or violin. breathe in the odor of incense or of violets—in reality there is nothing in the room, not even our own bodies and brains, but the varied, recurrent, ceaseless jiggings of particles of matter. To a man of artistic perceptions it is no doubt a bleak and repulsive view to think that the world “which lies before us like a land of dreams, so various, so beautiful, so new” is really only a place in which a vast storm of corpuscles move. However, it is a view which presents harmonies of its own, and it is certainly a convenient view for the man who wishes to do accurate thinking; a view, moreover, which justifies itself by its results.

The tendency in physics, indeed, is to go beyond the findings of the chemist, and to assert that the chemical atoms are fundamentally the same, their differences being once more the result of molecular arrangements of the ultimate homogeneous atoms or ions. These atoms form the universe of matter. They gather in swarms too small for the microscope to detect, or great as Arcturus. Their various combinations, more or less stable, may impress us with their differences, but they are the same. They may gather or scatter, lie above or below or Nor'-nor'-West of each other, move faster or slower, around or across, but they differ only in position, they do nothing but move.

Matter in motion, then, or matter *plus* energy is the fundamental concept of the universe. And these primary entities (which are *one* for the monist) are conceived as being at bottom everlasting and unchangeable.

The matter may be driven apart or drawn together in new forms, but at least so far as the test of weight goes, it is never destroyed. And the energy too, though different in its manifestations as heat, electricity, etc., is fundamentally the same and is invariable in amount if account be taken not merely of the energy which is found to be at work but of that which is stored up for future activity as in a lump of coal.

The main contributions therefore of physical science towards a philosophy are the mechanical concept of the world as a procession or dance of material particles, and the two laws of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. As the universe is to-day so substantially it has ever been. Nothing real ever ceases; nothing real ever begins—things change only in position—things differ only in structure. No will of either God or man has ever added to its

substance or changed the course of its energies. What it is to-day was absolutely laid down by what it was before this planet was flung off as a solar ring; what it will be a billion years from now is already determined by the collocation of atoms this minute.

With the first dust they did the last man knead
And then of the last harvest sowed the seed
And the first morning of creation wrote
What the last dawn of reckoning shall read.

Such is the testimony concerning the nature of the universe which we get from such sciences as astronomy, chemistry and physics. But unfortunately for the theory (fortunately however for larger interests) there were found certain classes of things which presented phenomena that stubbornly refused to accommodate themselves to a physical explanation: those facts which form the subject matter of biology, psychology, ethics, politics, religion—life and the distinction of classes among living things, consciousness, human reason, free will, the dictates of conscience, duty, sin, the supernatural. True, these events do not manifest themselves in as wide a field as do those of the physical order. The latter hold sway throughout the eight thousand miles of solid earth—they stretch beyond the confines of this planet to the ends of all creation; the former reveal themselves (so far as our direct knowledge extends) only in connection with certain organisms which exist on or near the surface of this planet. If they be weighed indeed in the golden scales of worth the vital phenomena will be found to outweigh in nobility and importance the burly universe of matter. But, setting this point aside, all who aim at a philosophy are willing to grant that the narrow range of any set of phenomena is no reason for excluding it from consideration in a system which aims at explaining all reality.

They constitute therefore a set of facts which cannot be pushed aside, which must be explained, or explained away. As they stand to ordinary view they present aspects quite out of harmony with the physical view which we have been considering. In the first place life could not have always existed on this planet—therefore it would seem that some really new thing had been introduced into the supposedly closed series—and this is the greatest heresy for the orthodox physicist. Moreover the action of mind and will seem to affect the disposition of matter—a blasphemy against the sacred law of the conservation of energy. But the main difficulty lies still deeper. Thoughts, volitions, feelings present none of the marks of

the physical series. They cannot be weighed or measured—cannot be thought of as having size or shape, as being above or below each other, larger or smaller, cubical or spherical. They elude geometry; they cannot be conceived in terms of space or matter or motion. Moreover the higher regions of thought, the dictates of moral conscience, the experiences of religion point in the direction of a higher sphere of reality than sense reveals or science knows aught of. Such in brief outline is the problem that a scientific philosophy must deal with.

From the first it had one great fulcrum—the fact that, so far at least as our normal experience goes, these vital and mental facts are always found in connection with a material organism. There are certainly difficulties as to what life is—but living things are in one aspect collections of atoms of carbon, oxygen, etc., which were drawn from the storehouse of inanimate nature and which return thither when life is withdrawn. If we consider man on his bodily side he obeys the laws of matter. If I break through a scaffolding, thought has no wings to keep my body from following the law of gravitation and coming to the ground. And I depend for physical strength on sunlight and air and water and carbohydrates, etc. And even my sensations and other mental products are always associated, at least in ordinary experience, with the activities of a nervous system which is composed of the most familiar elements of the chemical laboratory. A Welsh rarebit can derange the speculations of a philosopher, and the cudgel of a savage can put a quietus on them forever.

In our own generation good work has been done in the new science of psycho-physics towards establishing the relations between the physical and the mental series. However, but little has been added for our present purposes to the generalizations which were made as long ago as the time of Aristotle. The brain has been mapped out so that we can tell the portions which are connected with the various classes of sensations and the movements of different portions of the body. But no special organ has been discovered for the higher mental operations. The attempt to apply mathematics—the favorite method of science—has been disappointing, as all know who are familiar with the limitations of Weber's Law. And so far as physiological psychology can go, the original difficulty of reducing the facts of consciousness to a neural tremor or an atomic knot in the brain or any other sort of material jiggle—remains just where it was. But of this presently.

In the domain of ethics and politics the work of scientific reduction has been mainly done along the lines of studying the effects of physical environment on the character of individuals and races, and of applying mathematics to the facts of conduct by the use of statistics. But all of these have become subsidiary to one great theory which has affected speculation in every department of human knowledge—the theory of organic evolution.

Before the time of Darwin the general view had been that living things were of as many distinct classes as there are species of plants and animals. The existence of each species formed a separate difficulty for any philosophy which aimed at finding a single basis for reality. By proving (at least to the satisfaction of many) that they all had a common origin, and that their differences were only accidental results of structure or arrangements of the organic parts, Darwin introduced into biology a unity akin to that which had been shown in the world of physics. The whole range of living things from the smallest micro-organism to man, belong, it could be contended, to the same series, the same species—they belong indeed to the same family by virtue of a common descent.

Difficulties, it is true—tremendous ones, indeed—still remain: the difficulty of scientific proof under which the theory of evolution must labor; and the apparent “gaps” in the continuity of the process.

But the scientific philosopher makes short work of these difficulties. Darwin has supplied him not only with a new kind of unity but with a valuable hint. The most radical kinds of apparent differences were found to disappear by tracing them to their origin. Only go back far enough, and things become homogeneous and simple—heterogeneity and complexity are the result of time and development. Laplace has presented a cosmic evolution of the stellar bodies from a vague and formless mass of nebulae. Darwin in his turn has shown the evolution of living things. Just join those two processes together and view the latter as a phase of the former, and you have your complete and ready made explanation of all things in heaven and on earth.

The beautiful patchwork garment thus fashioned for Nature looks so well at a little distance that it is almost a pity to venture on a nearer inspection. Do so, and you may find that the pieces do not join at all.

Confessedly, indeed, the theory is not without its difficulties, the main one being that of finding in the original cosmic dust all the elements out of which the present universe is constructed. If this

point be abandoned, one may have to fall back on what Professor Haeckel styles in his usual judicious manner "the absurd hypothesis of a God."

We shall proceed to examine the theories which have been elaborated to satisfy the needs of the situation. One of these is the rather old-fashioned out-and-cut Materialism of the "crass" or "gross" variety, which sticks closely to the concepts of physics.

But a more noteworthy theory is that which goes by the name of Scientific Monism, although it is really a pluralism. It sets about its work by a shrewd preliminary process of "leveling up" and "leveling down." The main factors of the problem are four:—matter-energy, life, animal consciousness, the higher human faculties. The "leveling down" process consists in reducing the second of these to the first, and the fourth to the third. The final unification is established by "leveling up" matter by injecting consciousness into the atoms.

* * *

In order to understand the strength of any system we must appreciate, perhaps sympathize with, the state of mind which is back of it. And it is easy for a man of large views to sympathize with the monistic tendency in speculation. Philosophers are popularly supposed to be logic-machines; but in fact all of the craft who are worthy of the name have a bit of the poet about them. They see things in large ways and from uncommon points of view; they have the faculty of constructive imagination; their theories are great epics. And the dominant passion of the reason is that of explaining all things by some common concept. This is the key to the history of philosophy from Zeno to Mrs. Eddy. And the human mind will go on forever in the attempt to reduce all things to some sort of unity, even though it suffer the disappointment over and over again of finding that "we can button a monistic system over the front of Reality only at the expense of splitting it up the back." Actuated by this impulse the convinced evolutionist who considers that by combining the biological system of Darwin with the cosmogony of Laplace, he has discovered a continuous process of one material principle, jumps impatiently over the serious breaks in his process made by the lack of proof for spontaneous generation and the need of a higher principle to account for the facts of consciousness. The monistic temper can never be thoroughly empirical, for nature stead-

fastly refuses to be cabined and confined in the narrow limits of any one principle. Only by the methods of Procrustes can it be made to fit the monistic couch.

One may sympathize with the monistic temperament, but sympathy should not get the better of one's judgment. And the time has certainly come for a protest against hasty generalizations, in the name of logic, facts, and common sense; against scientific monism in the name of scientific methods. It is the glory of science that not the least fact is left unnoted. Its progress has depended largely on the attention it has given to the "residual phenomena," the less obvious or less frequent facts which common sense (or nonsense) dismisses with the silly formula "The exception proves the rule." Has the monistic tyranny grown so great that we must humbly sue the scientist to give a little consideration to those petty residues: mind and reason and conscience and God?

Haeckel is a good example of the monist rampant. He is a patient investigator in his special field of biology, but when possessed by his great idea, he rejects honest investigation of opposing facts, and dogmatizes in learned words like the village schoolmaster. In his *Riddle of the Universe* he offers his single patent formula for the settlement of all the questions that have perplexed mankind since the days of Job. It may be that the riddle is not stated by him as nature has proposed it; it is true that at times he has a certain high and mighty Alexandrian way of cutting knots he cannot loose, or on occasion a tricky conjuring way of making it seem that there really never was any knot to be untied, but the reader is always impressed (if he does not spoil the effect by thinking) that there are no mysteries in the universe for "Ernst Haeckel, Ph. D., M. D., LL. D., Sc. D., etc." The past has nothing in its bosom which escapes his eagle glance; other scientists may confess the limitations of their knowledge and defects of evidence, but the genius of Haeckel falters at nothing—there are no limitations to his knowledge, and where stubborn nature refuses to give the necessary evidence, he can tell what *must* have been. He speaks as familiarly of the workings of evolution in the past as if they had gone on under his superintendence and according to his will.

One is reminded of the story told of the Norfolk alderman who placed benches on the sea strand in his native town with the inscription: "Presented to his fellow citizens by Alonzo Gubbins, Esq. *The sea is his and he made it*". His omniscience extends to the practical

workings of the universe. In his lighter moments he suggests solutions for the difficulties encountered by mankind in running its little sphere of the cosmos; he propounds systems of government and of education; he solves the difficulty of dealing with his bugbear, the Catholic Church; he speaks with all the authority of his knowledge of animalculæ on the training of lawyers and the proper viewpoint in art.

Years ago, and time has certainly not improved him—his logical (or illogical) methods were well characterised by Sir William Dawson:

“An eminent French professor of the art of sleight-of-hand has defined the leading principle of jugglers to be that of ‘appearing and disappearing things’; and this is the best definition that occurs to me of one method of reasoning largely used by Haeckel, and of which we need to be on our guard when we find him employing, as he does in almost every page, such phrases as ‘it cannot be doubted,’ ‘we may therefore assume,’ ‘we may readily suppose,’ ‘this afterwards assumes or becomes,’ ‘we may confidently assert,’ ‘this developed directly,’ and the like, which in his usage are equivalent to the presto of the conjuror, and which, while we are looking at one structure or animal, enable him to persuade us that it has been suddenly transformed into something else.

In tracing the genealogy of man he constantly employs this kind of sleight-of-hand in the most adroit manner. He is perhaps describing to us the embryo of a fish or an amphibian, and as we become interested in the curious details, it is suddenly by some clever phrase transformed into a reptile or a bird; and yet without rubbing our eyes and reflecting on the differences and difficulties which he neglects to state, we can scarcely doubt that it is the same animal after all.”²

* * *

It would be foolish to attempt to treat in the limits of a single article all the objections that are offered by both science and philosophy to the adequacy of scientific monism. It must suffice to enter a protest against the assumption of the eternity of matter and energy; of spontaneous generation; of the essential identity of plant and animal, sensation and reason; of the applicability of the physical laws of conservation of energy and inertia of matter to mental facts; against the rejection of purpose in the universe; of the evidence that may be advanced for the existence of purely spiritual agencies; and of freedom, intellect, and conscience in man; and finally, against the smuggling in of contraband metaphysics in the form of positivism or agnosticism when the invoice explicitly declares that the cargo contains nothing but facts.

²Sir William Dawson, *Modern Ideas of Evolution*, p. 35.

We shall confine our enquiry to a single point—the “gap” between matter and consciousness. If it can be established in this crucial instance that monism is utterly unable to account for the facts, its inadequateness as a system will be manifest. One might go about the problem in another, perhaps better way. One might begin with the facts of consciousness, which, after all, are the nearest and most evident. One result of this beginning might be idealism. Matter, which looms so large in the vision of the physicist, would become a mental fact; matter—m-a-t-t-e-r—is something I happen to think. Or, if we suppose that consciousness reveals in ourselves a duality of mind and body, this dualism could be extended, after the system of Aristotle, in ever diminishing degrees to all grades of being. This latter method has the advantage of carrying the mind over difficult spots by the force of the original impulse—an advantage which we have ceded to the materialist by starting out with our eyes filled with the vision of the sweep and the power of matter. Despite the disadvantages of the method we employ, it has, however, one important point in its favor; it meets the materialist on his own grounds. He would accuse Aristotle and Berkeley of reasoning *a priori*; we can convict him on his own evidence of reasoning *a priori*.

We have already seen the physical concept of matter as consisting of homogeneous extended corpuseles which do nothing but move. It remains to examine the facts of consciousness. It seems an odd thing that these latter facts, which lie so much nearer to our thought than any others, are harder to grasp clearly than those of the outer world. Most people live habitually on the outside of their own minds—if it were otherwise, materialism would never acquire the strength it often does. It is irritating to hear even religious-minded people speaking of the ideal as if it were always synonymous with the non-real, through a failure to distinguish its meaning as referring to mental facts from its use as equivalent to “imaginary.” Ideas not real! Well, if we consider them merely as modifications of consciousness, they are at least as real as the things they represent in the world outside. More so, indeed, in some cases. My sensations of redness and of pleasant odor are real facts while they last; but what are color and perfume in the rose? And if we go back to the substances which sustain them, does not the majority of mankind believe that the true and stable and lasting reality is that of spirit, and not this “real world” of matter which I can see and handle and

knock my shins against; that God and souls will remain forever, even though

The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like an insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind."

But even for those who possess such beliefs, a clear view of the nature of thought is difficult. What must it not be for the man whose whole bent of mind is towards external reality, and whose methods of observation and appliances for experiment are continually used in connection with things that can be weighed and measured. A little insight into the real meaning of materialism will reveal that the following fancy scene is not so much of a burlesque as it may seem at first sight.

A physicist stands in his laboratory amid the implements of his craft.

Someone says: "Here's a curious sort of agglomeration, Professor. They call it a man."

"Ah! let us analyse it," quoth the professor.

He hauls it over to his work-bench and proceeds to apply his tools—scales, metewand, thermometer, lancet, microscope, retort. The results: "Length, 5 ft. 9; weight, 157.8 lbs; cubic inches, 406; temperature when operation began, 98.8; parts—bone, muscle, adipose, blood, etc.; chemical constituents—C., H., O., N., S., K., Ca., etc. Very interesting specimen—some complex reactions—that's all."

Is that all? Why, man, that thing was the theater of pleasures and of pains; it reflected in itself the whole universe without; it had that within which transcended the little portion of space and time it occupied; from its slight standing point on this planet it soared aloft and wandered through the stars; it delved into the remotest recesses of the past and watched the birth of ancient suns; with clear and steady vision it read in the changing world the eternal laws that govern it; it faced the terrific powers of matter and mastered them to its own uses; it throbbed with love and devotion and despair; it heard in the sacred call of duty a voice which the elements never spake; it mounted above the world of matter and set itself face to face with God. And all this is nothing!

Surely we can gather from this at least that we have here a fact, a "residual phenomenon," if you will, that is worth analysing. But

in our description of the nature of the facts of consciousness we shall not endeavor to make the argument turn on the higher forms of human consciousness. Whatever we have to say will apply equally to the dimmest sensations of warmth or pressure which a jelly-fish may feel.

The first thing that impresses us about ideas (using the term in the broad sense indicated above) is that we cannot apply to themselves or their inter-relations any of the notions that are bound up with space—length, breadth, thickness, size, shape, distance, velocity, weight, resistance, motion. If we ever use such terms concerning them, we do so by metaphor or in jest—and we see that this is so just as soon as we turn our attention to it. In reality we do not think (and we cannot) of states of consciousness as being larger or smaller, cubical or cylindrical, solid or hollow, light or heavy, rotary or zigzag, rough or smooth, heaped or scattered, far or near, right or left. Is the idea of a million larger than that of a unit? or the idea of Sirius heavier than that of an atom? Is honesty square, and hate corrugated, and love smooth, and indecision rotary? Do ideas clash and jostle when they contradict one another? Does the mind get cluttered up with them when they increase in number? If these examples seem ridiculous, it is only because the attempt to apply the concepts of extension or matter to consciousness is ridiculous. Ideas are not material. "The microscope does not detect them. They cannot be weighed, measured, or bottled."³ They are not "a secretion of the brain," nor a twist, or tangle, or coagulation, or track, or furrow of brain or anything else that occupies space. Nor is there any help in the naive notion of the popular materialism that if we could only strain out the coarse matter of everyday experience until it is thin enough, we would have a gruel that might suit for thought—ether and electricity are suggested as solutions. The suggestion would be amusing if it were not pathetic. If all that physics says be true, the atoms are fine enough for any sort of work that can be expected of matter. But of course the problem is just the same whether it be stated in terms of electrons or of pumpkins.

Physics has dug its own grave. The universe is a swirling mass of homogeneous atoms that do nothing but move, A local eddy in the maelstrom is the brain. Why should this particular agglomeration of matter and energy acquire consciousness any more than an

³Maher, *Psychology*, p. 496.

earthquake or a prairie fire? "Redistributions of matter and motion"—all of them. The pool-balls on a table are sent rolling about; four or five are jammed together in a corner, still moving; and there they get the idea that they are one being, that they are bruised, that the table is green. Is this science, or is it magic?

Or consider the process of sensation. A gun is shot off in my neighborhood—a discharge of energy. It sets up a movement in the atmosphere which is carried to my ear. This starts a series of movements in a string of atoms called a nerve and afterwards causes a jiggle in a pulpy mass of matter, the brain. And then? And then it goes on about its further business. Is that all? That is all that physics knows about it. Its atoms move. And "a feeling," warns Mr. Spencer, "has nothing in common with a unit of motion."⁴ A boy sets up a row of ten dominoes at close intervals. He pushes the first, which knocks over the next, and so on. What happens with the tenth? Does it look back and associate itself with the other nine, or feel hurt, or go after the boy? No, it just falls and passes its motion on. And indeed, as Tyndall says:

"Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all their electrical discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution of the problem: How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness?"⁵

We may terminate this section of our study with a quotation from Professor Paulsen:

"The proposition, Thoughts are in reality nothing but movements in the brain, feelings are nothing but bodily processes in the vaso-motor system, is absolutely irrefutable; not because it is true, however, but because it is absolutely meaningless. The absurd has this advantage in common with truth, that it cannot be refuted. To say that thought is at bottom nothing but a movement is to say that iron is at bottom made of wood. No argument avails here. All that can be said is this: I understand by a thought a thought and not a movement of brain-molecules; and similarly, I designate with the words anger and fear, anger and fear themselves and not a contraction or dilation of blood-vessels. Suppose the latter processes also occur, and suppose they always occur when the former occur, still they are not thoughts and feelings. Turn it which way you will, you will never find thought in movement. The common man knows nothing whatever of the motion in the brain or of the vaso-motor process, but he knows what anger is, and what thought is, and he

⁴Spencer, *Psychology*, I. § 62.

⁵Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, "Scientific Materialism." p. 419.

means these, when he speaks of them, and not something else of which the physiologist alone knows or thinks he knows. Or will the physiologist stop talking of thoughts and feelings after his science will have acquired more exact information concerning the bodily processes, and will be, instead, speak only of what they are at bottom and in reality or objectively considered, that is, movements? Will he, in case he should happen to fall in love, no longer confess his love, but mention the corresponding vaso-motor processes or, in the words of Tyndall, discourse on the right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain? Does that tell the whole story? How nonsensical!"⁶

* * *

It is evident (though many folk seem not aware of it) that materialism of the cruder sort is dead—and waked and buried, for the matter of that. But there has arisen in its stead a new system which rejects the old name, but which is the same in all practical results concerning knowledge, ideals, views of life, freedom, immortality, God. It is less loyal to physics than its predecessor, but it is materialism just the same.

It is a new answer to the old problem: how to account for everything in the cosmos to-day by elements in the primitive nebular mass—everything from Orion and the Pleiades to

"Shoes and ships and sealing-wax
And cabbages and kings."

The old scientific materialism had no difficulty with the constellations, but it stopped short when it came to the "cabbages and kings." The new unscientific monism meets the difficulty by chopping those useful objects up fine and distributing them piecemeal through chaos. The argument is simple:—They must have come from the nebular mass; true, we cannot detect them in it, but let us put them there and then we can go and find them there. Just suppose that every atom has a shred or tag of life or consciousness attached to it somehow, and the trick is done. This is known as the "double-aspect" or "mind stuff" theory.

Now it may seem harsh language, but this sort of thing is only a bit of metaphysical "bunco-steering." Certain enterprising fellow-citizens of ours in the Western States have invented an ingenious method of obtaining the superfluous wealth of their brethren in the effete East or their confiding cousins from across the seas. They select a worked out gold mine and inject into it gold dust and slugs of quartz. Then they lead the confiding investor to the mine, and

⁶*Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 82-83.

thence, laden with specimens, to the assayer's office. The result is generally satisfactory—to the ingenious Westerner. The process is called "salting the mine." The monists have made use of the trick on a magnificent scale—they have "salted" the universe.

It would be unpardonable to turn a serious system into a joke if there were a single particle of proof in the whole inorganic universe to support its claims. Indeed, if it goes beyond a joke, if it insists on being taken as anything more than a passing play of fancy, more especially if it be proposed as the results of "science," it merits more serious rebuke. As Father Maher says,⁷ the advocate of this system

"has to make an absolutely incredible assumption without a scrap of evidence in its favor. In order to do away with the souls of a few living beings, who do not constitute the one-hundred-millionth part of the mass of the physical world, he has to assign a mental life to every grain of sand and drop of water on the earth. He has to ascribe to every molecule of matter in the universe something the nature of which cannot be imagined, and of the existence of which neither the experiments of science nor the observation of mankind has ever discovered the slightest trace. Such is the modest demand on our powers of faith made by scientists—who can, when it suits them, be so exacting in their demands for proof. Even Tyndall, sympathetic though he be with such views, is forced to declare: 'It is no explanation to say that objective and subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two sides? There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it rises into frost ferns upon a window-pane? If not, why should the molecular motions of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion consciousness?'"

In fact, the new monism lends itself much more to the requirements of humor than to those of philosophic thinking. Professor Haeckel (on the lack of saving humor in the Professor and his school see Chesterton's *Heretics*) unconsciously supplies a theme for wit and fancy. Speaking of chemical affinities, he says: "Every shade of inclination, from complete indifference to the fiercest passion, is exemplified in the chemical relation of the various elements towards each other, just as in the psychology of man, and especially in the life of the sexes."⁸ Here is a field for someone possessing the genius for the absurd of Lewis Carroll or the imagination of Poe or Fitz-james O'Brien. Such a writer could chronicle the loves of Mr. Carbon and Miss Oxygen. He could picture the affinities, the domestic broils and explosions of the atoms, their tribal wars and coalitions,

⁷Maher, *Psychology*, pp. 509-510.

⁸*Riddle of the Universe*, p. 224.

the rise and fall of empires. And this would be an outcome of exact science! Father Michael Maher—as one might expect from his name—does not miss the suggestion of humor in the theory. This mind-stuff, he says, must be conscious or unconscious. If the latter, “how is it like our mortal life? Does a multiplicity of unconscious acts constitute an act of conscious intelligence? If, on the other hand, we ascribe real but incipient consciousness to the molecules of matter, and if mental life is the outcome of their combinations, it would seem that a mental existence ought to belong to all material objects with which experience presents us.... Is a new steam-tug a thing of joy to itself? What are the emotions of a deserted coal-mine? Or is it only very *small* lumps of coal that have minds?”⁹

Immaterial substance has evidently taken a complete revenge on its assailants. It is but a little thing, said the atoms, and we shall reduce it to the position of a petty province of our domain. And when the war is ended, we find them offering to it an equal share even in the vast territory in which they had claimed undisputed sway. But in vain. It possesses a spirit of pride and independence. It consents to an alliance only where it can maintain its superiority.

Matter is not spiritual any more than spirit is material. If any confidence whatever can be placed in human powers of knowing, the spiritual and the material are two different sorts of things. Experience testifies indeed that they *act* on each other, but reason forbids us to hold that either *is* the other. But, perversely enough, this new double-aspect Identity-hypothesis, rejecting, as we think, both experience and reason, says that matter and mind are so different that they cannot act on each other, but are still only phases of the *same* thing. It begins to look as if logical consistency had been sent the same road as experience and rational inference. We can conceive of two different entities which can act on each other; we can conceive that there might be two things so absolutely different or apart that neither could influence the other; but what are we to make of two things so essentially at twain in their operations, and yet so inextricably at one in their being? Have we here two entities or one? If one, we are back to materialism¹⁰—a system that is consistent at any rate, even though it does burke the facts. If two (and the whole argument points to two) why not admit dualism without more ado?

⁹*Psychology*, p. 511.

¹⁰We are not considering here the answer of Idealistic Monism.

Monism has been driven to this self-destructive position partly by its recognition of the essential difference between the facts of physics and the facts of consciousness, and partly by its allegiance to the law of the Conservation of Energy. This law was used first against freedom of the will. If the will could affect energy from without, it was argued, then the sum of energy would be increased, and the law set at naught. But it did not take much reflection to see that the law could not be consistently applied without denying *all* interaction between mind and matter. Once granted that the mental and physical facts are on different planes, it follows that if the mental activities affect the physical in any way, the sum of energy is increased; and if motion passes out of its own plane to produce thought, the amount of energy is diminished. Here is not the place to discuss this use of the law of conservation. In passing we may remark that if we examine the kind and extent of the proof for it even in the physical world, we shall be justified in saying that it is a bit of impertinence to use it as a basis for deduction in psychology. But we must take monism as we find it. And monism must accept the consequences of its position.

Matter and its changes never affect consciousness. They are not merely strangers

"hedged with alien speech
And lacking all interpreter."

They cannot get into touch at all. I have a sensation of being burned. But I have no right to say that it was caused by fire, or even by the reaction of my nervous system—these things belong to another world. On "scientific" grounds one might more reasonably claim that the rings of Saturn are the cause of the Hudson River, for these are both in the physical order, and might at least conceivably be connected. And so too the sensations of sight and hearing, of smiting or being smitten, have no relation to the movements of light or air or the more ponderable things of the physical universe. The two series run parallel, they never meet or collide. Passing over the more evident objections which everyday experience offers to this theory, we ask what becomes of science itself if it be held. If the material world stands so completely aloof from my consciousness, how can I claim to know anything about it?

And if we turn to the other half of the theory, the difficulties are no less overwhelming. We need not delay over them. The following quotation from Professor James will suffice to indicate the

final results of a system which has been proposed as a *scientific* presentation of the *facts of experience*.

"To comprehend completely the consequences of the dogma so confidently enunciated, one should unflinchingly apply it to the most complicated examples. The movements of our tongues and pens, the flashings of our eyes in conversation, are of course events of the material order, and as such their casual antecedents must be exclusively material. If we knew thoroughly the nervous system of Shakespeare, and as thoroughly all his environing conditions, we should be able to show why at a certain period of his life his hand came to trace on certain sheets of paper those crabbed little black marks which we shall for shortness' sake call the manuscript of Hamlet. We should understand the rationale of every erasure and alteration therein, and we should understand all this without in the slightest degree acknowledging the existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare's mind. The words and sentences would be taken, not as signs of anything beyond themselves, but as little outward facts, pure and simple. In like manner we might exhaustively write the biography of those two hundred pounds, more or less, of warmish albuminoid matter called Martin Luther, without ever implying that it felt."¹¹

* * *

If monism be considered the best that human reason can do to solve the relations between matter and mind, it is small wonder that many fall back on agnosticism. This is of course Mr. Spencer's final solution of the problem, although he makes tentative efforts towards some more definite theory. We have seen that he recognized the difference between motion and feeling to be one that "transcends all other differences." This statement would make an excellent basis for a system of dualism. On the other hand his theory of evolution draws him in the direction of monism. In fact Professor James is able to quote certain passages from the *Synthetic Philosophy* in which Mr. Spencer seems to be asserting the evolution of consciousness from the unconscious. And in answer to Mr. Spencer's disclaimer that he never really meant to explain how consciousness is evolved, James says in his delightfully impudent way: "That, when a critic calls attention to the inanity of his words, Mr. Spencer should say that he never meant anything particular by them, is simply an example of the scandalous vagueness with which this sort of 'chromo-philosophy' is carried on."¹²

But the ultimate solution of Mr. Spencer and his school is that mind and matter are twin manifestations of the one Unknowable Reality. This theory is not without its serious logical defects. As

¹¹*Psychology*, I. pp. 132-133.

¹²*Psychology*, I. p. 149. Footnote.

Dr. Pace remarks: "Before saying that two things are the same, one may be reasonably supposed to have some slight acquaintance with each. The fact that we have found no value for x and no value for y is hardly a warrant for inferring that x is equal to y ; they may be unequal."¹³ In truth, this identifying of things on the basis of *what they are not* does not meet with the approval of logicians. A good example of the results of it is shown by the answer to the conundrum of our schoolboy days: that an elephant is like a brick because neither can climb a tree.

Mr. Spencer's argument concerning matter and mind might be fairly summed up: Points of diversity: practically everything we know about them; points of identity: what we do not know about them. Result: they must be identical. But on this point a master of the art of criticism has spoken, and to him we shall give the final word:

"Since the unknowable declines to recognize the laws of logic, rational criticism would be obviously futile. In its dark continent the identification of thought and matter may be peacefully accomplished without the disturbing interference of either the profane scientist or the impertinent philosopher. Screened off from the inconveniences of public discussion, rebellious facts, and repugnant principles can there be silently suppressed. The freedom, responsibility, abiding identity and individuality to which conscious experience testifies can be rejected as irrelevant evidence—because, of course, no evidence is accepted within the jurisdiction of the Unknowable. The difficulties of the theory which maintains that human thought has never influenced human civilization, are easily overcome—the resources of the Unknowable being equal to all emergencies. Enjoying the hospitality of its ample territory, the most violent contradictions and implacable inconsistencies can rest in tranquil repose. Its frontiers once crossed, the Monist has reached a hallowed asylum, into which even the most relentless persecution of logic or common sense cannot follow him. There, at last, all objections are answered, all difficulties are solved, all doubts are assuaged by the one great axiom so well—if not wisely expressed by Dr. Hodgson: "Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else."¹⁴

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¹³NEW YORK REVIEW, Feb.-Mar., 1906, p. 545.

¹⁴*Psychology*, by Rev. Michael Maher, S. J., p. 524.

A STUDY IN BUDDHISM

A. Roussel, D. D.

The Catholic whose privilege it is to possess the Christian faith in its integrity, does not need to be informed about other religions in order to be convinced of the beauties and excellence of his own, but such knowledge, always useful, becomes to a certain extent indispensable if he would form for himself an adequate conception of its superiority. If besides, he wishes to contribute to the diffusion of Christianity in the world, his first task must be to convince those whom he would convert, of the inadequacy of their own religious system. This is an important factor in the formulation of his message, and consequently a knowledge of other religions becomes absolutely necessary.

It is a noteworthy fact that notwithstanding the prevailing atmosphere of indifference, never perhaps have religious problems been the object of so much interest and pre-occupation as in our own day. Unfortunately, however, the trend is too often in the direction of negative rather than of positive results. Certain writers are bent on explaining away the supernatural character to which all religions lay claim, and as Christianity which they desire especially to overthrow, is the one which above all other religions clearly establishes this claim, an attempt is made to dim that halo whereby the Church of Christ compels the recognition and even the admiration of the unbeliever. With this purpose in mind, efforts are made to find rival systems of religion and even to establish their superiority by extolling their tenets and forms of worship, and depreciating those of Christianity. Care is taken in this comparison to pass over in silence those religions which with their deities have long since been discarded and which have retained only a historic interest. Naturally appeal is made only to those religions which still live and are perpetuated from generation to generation. More fortunate than their predecessors of the eighteenth century who were less well informed, the infidels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries oppose to Christianity what they consider to be a worthy rival, one whose triumph they are striving to secure, viz., the religion of Buddha. It is by proclaiming loudly the superiority of Buddhism—awaiting the moment when it too shall be discarded—that modern infidelity endeavors

to undermine Christianity and offset its claims. Buddhism is thus valued merely as a tool wherewith to demolish that pillar and ground of truth which was proclaimed indestructible by its Founder; and could it once be made to bring about this result, it would doubtless soon be set aside and lose all interest.

The enemies of Christianity are chiefly at pains to proclaim the great power and influence as well as the antiquity of Buddhism, and the fabulous number of its adherents; whence they conclude that a religion which is older than Christianity, which is even at present practiced by a greater number of men, must possess in itself a greater vitality and be at least equal if not superior to it.

These assertions involve a challenge which we cannot afford to disregard. We need not shrink from bringing to the test the rival claims of the two religious systems, but we must choose between two tactical methods, each of which has its drawbacks as well as its advantages. The first, which for a long time was the only one employed, is less aggressive and consists in maintaining a defensive attitude in presence of the enemy. It has perhaps the advantage of allowing us to quietly concentrate our strength on the means of defence, and force our adversaries to exhaust themselves in successive attacks. This method may save us from defeat in the eyes of many onlookers, but, on the other hand, it cannot assure us the victory, and many witnesses of the conflict may be tempted to admit that so many assaults must have weakened our position.

The other method consists in carrying the war into the enemy's camp, on the oft justified principle that the best way to defend oneself from an adversary is to attack him. The chief drawback to this method of warfare would arise from lack of proper preparation, from the use of antiquated weapons or the enrolment of undisciplined forces. In the present controversy therefore, between the religion of Christ and that of Buddha, since the latter has been compared with the former, let us endeavor to ascertain what Buddhism really was, and what it is.

The present writer is convinced, that since Christianity is at present attacked on all sides, it is more than ever incumbent on Catholic scholars to apply themselves assiduously to the comparative study of religions; and this conviction caused him to give a series of university lectures during the past year, not only on the philosophical systems of India, but also on the principal religions of the extreme Orient. Of these the first to be discussed was Buddhism,

and it is the substance of the lectures delivered on that subject that will be presented in this and in subsequent articles. The matter will be divided into three sections treating respectively of the person called the Buddha, of his doctrine or Dhamma, and of his community or Samgha.

In the first section we shall endeavor to distinguish the historical from the legendary elements in the life of the Buddha, examining critically what is known, or at least affirmed, concerning his youth, the beginnings and duration of his preaching and his death.

In the second part we shall discuss the philosophical and moral doctrines of Buddhism (for of theological doctrine there can be no question) viz., the Dhamma, signifying Law or Duty.

Since the great aim of the Buddha is the suppression of pain, it will be necessary to examine what he understood by that term, how according to him pain originates and develops and how it can be overcome.

The *Samgha* or Buddhistic community will be studied in the third section, viz., the origin of the famous *viharas* or monasteries which even at the present day form such an important factor in Buddhism, as may be inferred from the fact that certain *lamaseries* in Thibet count as many as ten thousand bonzes.

Thus the first part of the discussion belongs to the domain of history and especially of legend, the second belongs to philosophy, while the third deals exclusively with matters of discipline; from which it will appear that Buddhism, at least in its primitive form, has really nothing in common with theology in the proper sense of the word. Indeed it could hardly be otherwise since its founder studiously excluded God from the object of his speculation.¹

¹In these studies the writer adopts the order and divisions as contained in the excellent work of Oldenberg, of which there exists an English translation by Hoey, London, 1882. Besides this treatise, there are some other works on Buddhism which I take the liberty to recommend especially to the reader; they are chosen from among many. *Buddha and his Religion*, Barthelémy Saint-Hilaire, new edition. Paris, Didier, 1862. This work is, of course, quite old, but it is far from having lost all its value. Monier, William. *Buddhism in its Connection with Brahmanism and Hinduism, and its Contrast with Christianity*. London, 1889. All the assertions of the Author are not equally acceptable. Bigamdet (Mgr). *The Life or Legend of Gautama, the Buddha of the Burmese*. Two English editions of this work appeared in Rangoon in 1858 and 1866. A third was published in London in 1880: M. V. Gauvain translated it into French in 1879. *The Dhamma of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus the Christ*, by Charles F. Aiken. Boston, 1900. Abbé Collin brought out a French edition of it with Lethielleux in 1903. Chantipie de la Saus-saye. *Lehrbuch der Religions-Geschichte*, 2 Bde Freiburg im Brisgau. This manual has just been translated into French under the direction of Henri Hubert and Isidore Levy. Armand Colin, 1904.

Buddhism began about 500 years before the Christian era, with a society of what we would now call "mendicant friars," who went about from place to place preaching the doctrine of deliverance from pain—in other words from existence itself—and making known the means of arresting in its course the terrible wheel of Samsara, viz. by putting an end to that metempsychosis or endless series of re-births whereby the soul no sooner completes one life of terrestrial suffering than it is forced to begin another in similar painful conditions.

The new religion, if we may bestow upon it this undeserved title, spread rapidly and soon dealt the death blow to Brahmanism, many of whose adherents became zealous apostles of Buddhism. How can this wonderful success be explained? Was Buddhism something entirely new, the exclusive creation of its founder, or did it have some historical connection with the past? These and others questions claim our attention, but before taking up the subject proper, it may be well to say a word about the land which became the theatre of the great conflict of philosophical, religious and social ideas.

India forms a vast peninsula joined by the Himalaya mountain range to the Asiatic continent. On the West it is separated from Beluchistan by the Indus, while on the South of the Himalayas and towards the East flows the Ganges one of the greatest rivers of the world, to which the ancient Brahmans ascribed a celestial origin, and of which the waters have always been considered as holy. The historic role of the basin of the Indus—apart from the Punjab which is common to both—fades into insignificance when compared with that of the great valley of the Ganges. To the latter belong all of the most celebrated cities of ancient and even of modern India: Delhi, Agra, Kanodje, Lucknow, Benares (the holy city *par excellence*), Patna and the very recent Calcutta. This region was the cradle of Brahmanism and later, of Buddhism which belonged more particularly to the angle of territory formed by the Ganges and the Yamuna, one of its tributaries, and at the junction of which is situated the city of Benares. In this region lived the various peoples who are famous in Indian epic poetry: The Angas, Magadhas, Videhas, Kasis, Kosalas, etc. They were not aborigines but came either from the North or from the West. They called themselves the Aryans i. e. nobles, and consistently with this title they formed the three privileged castes of India, the fourth caste being composed of slaves and captives.

To form a true notion not only of the propagation, but also of the origin of Buddhism, it is necessary to take a preliminary glance at the religious condition of India in the 5th Century B. C.

In consequence of a natural evolution, the progress of which can be traced with tolerable accuracy, Vedism had gradually been supplanted by Brahmanism without however, entailing any complete break between the two, for in the Brahmanic monuments still extant we find numerous evidences of Vedism, as also in the ideas and language. Whether the primitive religion of the Aryans consisted in nature worship is a question which in our present state of knowledge it is hard to answer. The most ancient documents bearing on the point are the Vedas, and these pre-suppose a religion which has already become refined and speculative in character. Sacrifice and prayer are the two elements that constitute the essence of the Vedic cult, which can be termed primitive not in the sense that it was not preceded by more rudimentary forms of worship, but because the historic knowledge of its earlier stages has not come down to us. The altar and its accessories, all the instruments of sacrifice were held not only as sacred but as divine—so many gods—and the time came when even the spoon used in the sacrificial ceremonies became itself the object of sacrifice. Prayer also was deified, and the sacred monosyllable *Om* so often met with in the Hinduism and Buddhism of to-day, from being the monogram of the *Trinnurti* (the Brahmanic Trinity inherited from Vedism) came to be honored as the *Trinnurti* itself.

Certain fundamental philosophical ideas passed from Vedism into Brahmanism. Thus, there is the *Atman*, or soul, the precise meaning of which it is not easy to define. It is not unlikely that the word had several different significations at different times, or even simultaneously. Finally it was defined as "that which is and is not," by which was meant that it was both visible and invisible, palpable and impalpable. It is All, it is Brahma. As everything proceeds from Brahma in order to return to him, it follows that all things presently outside of his being are merely in a transitory state which is neither definite nor true. Hence arose in the minds of certain Vedantic philosophers desirous of safe-guarding the unity of being, the idea of denying the reality of the visible universe. They wished to avoid the difficulty arising from the existence of contingent beings outside of the absolute Being, and thus affirmed that the latter alone existed; all visible things were but an illusion.

Buddhism on the other hand, far from denying the reality of the visible world, emphatically asserts its existence. But going to another extreme, it proclaims, not that existence in this world is something good, though limited and imperfect, but that is simply an evil—the Evil. What added to the Buddhistic horror of existence was the belief—ancient though perhaps not explicitly contained in the Vedas—that mortals are condemned not only to one life, but to pass through a series of re-births during countless ages. Those who find themselves fairly comfortable in their present existence are haunted by the fear of misery in a subsequent life, and those who are miserable in this life are liable to have the same lot later on, or even worse. For all there is distress in the present life caused or aggravated by the fear of lives to come. If it be asked why a re-birth following upon a good life should be feared, since more favorable conditions might be expected as a recompense, the Hindu replies that the new life will bring with it the danger of lapsing from the right way, and all the more as its conditions are to be, *ex hypothesi*, more fortunate; and thus the unhappy man will have later to begin another life of misery. Our existence then, revolves in a fatal circle and the best for us is to get out of it altogether and as soon as possible.

Brahmanism had laid down the premisses, and Buddhism drew the conclusion: existence is an evil. Hindu fatalism contained the germ of Buddhistic pessimism. The prevalence of such a doctrine explains the torpor in which the peoples of the extreme Orient have languished for so many centuries, and from which, with the exception of Japan, it is so difficult to arouse them even in our own day. On the other hand this religious fatalism explains the present rapid spread of Islam in central Asia.

That the Buddha was not so much of an innovator as has been generally supposed, will appear more and more in the course of this study. Thus, for instance, monasticism is not a Buddhistic invention, though Buddhism is essentially monastic. Anchorites were common in Brahmanism at all times; solitude, a life of retreat in the depths of the forest or in the jungle found place among its recognized and approved institutions. The Mahabharata and the Ramayana abound in stories of monks living in community. Throughout these vast repertories of ancient tradition we are continually meeting with solitaries eminent in science and in sanctity to whom disciples flock from all parts on account of their renown, and we find that the great number of these cenobites belong to the Brahmanic caste. Nor

were the travelling monks less common in Brahmanism than the solitaries, but what does seem to be peculiar to Buddhism is the practice of nuns living together in the *viharas* or convents, about which more will be said in the sequel.

THE LIFE OF BUDDHA.

At an early date legends began to grow up in connection with the life of Buddha, and it is quite probable that here, as in many similar instances, legend has preceded as well as obscured history. Indeed so large is the place occupied by it in the accounts that have come down to us, that in the opinion of certain scholars it is the only source from which they are derived, and Buddha according to them would be nothing more than a solar myth. No attempt was made to write a biography of the founder until long after his death, when all the witnesses of his works and their contemporaries had passed away. Until then the account of his life passed by means of oral tradition from one generation to another, and it is hardly necessary to say that it was not embodied in a fixed or stereotyped tradition, but was transmitted with many variations and additions. And so, when finally an attempt was made to gather up and unify these oral and fragmentary written traditions, it was already a difficult task to distinguish the fabulous from the historical elements, and indeed no thought of attempting such a discrimination entered into the minds of the compilers. On the contrary, the greatest importance was attached to the marvelous episodes of the accounts as being alone worthy of such a personage. It is well known that the hagiographers of the Middle Ages proceeded in the same manner in composing the "edifying" lives of the saints, as is amply shown in the excellent treatise of Delehaye *Les Légendes des Saints*. Modern critics therefore, in studying the accounts of the life of Buddha are endeavoring to do what his first biographers not only omitted, but which they had neither the desire nor the means of accomplishing, namely to eliminate from the story the unhistorical elements.

The most ancient traditions concerning Buddha are those of the island of Ceylon on the South, and those of Nepal on the extreme North. The former have always been and still continue to be studied; the latter after having lain for centuries in oblivion were brought to light only in recent times. All these traditions are preserved in *Pali*, the sacred language of Buddhism. In dealing with the productions of these ancient hagiographers of the East we of

course expect to find none of the qualifications required in the modern historian, such for instance, as order, or precision or a coherent method of exposition. We should seek in these writings only what their authors wished to put into them, to wit, incidents supposed to be edifying, and which are generally set forth without any serious guarantee as to their actual occurrence. This indeed was a secondary consideration in the hagiographer whose purpose was to move the reader by the narration of edifying examples and precepts rather than to supply the mind with a knowledge of facts.

The writings in which the life of Buddha is related are for the most part collections of discourses or sermons attributed to the Master. Care is taken to indicate where and before what audience these discourses were pronounced, v. g. at Jatavana, near Kipilavastu, in the park of Anathapindika, in the midst of a great assembly of Bhikshus, etc. but the dates are not given. The Buddhistic writings are generally meagre with regard to details of the early years of Gautama (Buddha) and in many instances even these are manifestly legendary in character. Nor is this paucity of facts hard to account for. Gautama is of interest to the Buddhists only in his capacity or character of Buddha (i. e. the perfectly enlightened one) and consequently in the story of his life, all that preceded his illumination was held to be of little account. Besides, the form given to these texts, their object and peculiar character, precluded all research concerning the early life of the Saint. In the innumerable Buddhist *Sutras* for instance, as also in the *Vinaya*, it is only a question of his preaching and rules together with the various explanations and interpretations that have been given of them; of his existence before he became the Buddha little or nothing is said.

Such are the so-called historical data concerning our personage. Throughout this discussion the proper names shall be given in their original Sanscrit form: it was only later that they were modified into their Pali equivalents.

* * *

It was about six centuries before the Christian era that the founder of Buddhism was born in Kapilavastu, the capital of the Sakyas on the left bank of the Ganges. He was called Siddhartha. His father was Prince Suddhodana and his mother's name was Maya. His family, after the fashion of the princely races of India, wished to be considered as connected with some Vedic ancestor and Gautama

was chosen to that effect, hence the name Gautama or Gotama given to Buddha. He is also known in history as Sakyamuni, a title which signifies the *muni* or original ancestor of the Sakya family. Maya his mother having died when he was only eight days old, he was brought up by his aunt Mahaprajapati. Arriving at man's estate, he was married to a princess whose name, though absent from the more authentic legends, is given in the others as Gopa, and to them was born a son who was named Rahula. Such are the only details which history has preserved concerning the youth of Buddha. Naturally legend could not be satisfied with such a meagre content, and it busied itself with long disquisitions on his miraculous birth and the prodigies of his childhood, which for brevity's sake are here passed over. Thus we come directly to the famous "goings out" (*sorties*) which were the occasion of his vocation, and which being in all the accounts, cannot be omitted.

According to the story, the father of Siddhartha (Buddha) in order to keep him in complete ignorance of human misery, had him brought up in a vast palace where everything was disposed with a view to charm his senses and deceive him as to the fleeting and unstable character of worldly happiness. Those who had charge of the young prince's education, were forbidden to allow him to go outside of this royal dwelling. Tired of moving always in the same restricted surroundings however enchanting in themselves, Siddhartha, already married, managed to evade the vigilance of his guardians and make a few rapid visits to the outer world.

On the first of these occasions he met an old man with gray hair and beard and quite decrepit. He inquired if he had been born in that condition, and was informed that he had once been young and vigorous like himself, but that old age had reduced him to his present condition. He asked if such were the fate of all men, and was told that none could escape it provided they lived long enough. The prince returned to his palace in a pensive dreamy mood. On the occasion of his next exit to the outer world, he beheld a sick person stretched on a couch and screaming because of the excruciating pains he was enduring. He asked an explanation and learned with stupefaction that sickness and pain respected no one, and that sooner or later he himself would have to experience them. Again he returned to his quarters with a new theme for meditation. On a third excursion outside the prescribed bounds he met with a funeral procession. Death, even the name of which he had thus far been

ignorant of, suddenly appeared to him in all its hideous reality. He discovered that this great evil was even more inexorable than the others; that it spared no one, king or slave, prince or pauper, and that each day it was making a new advance toward himself in order to strike him down in his turn. The young man returned a prey to an extreme agitation of mind. All the splendors wherewith he was surrounded melted away from his view; the vision of the repulsive corpse lighted in ghastly fashion by the funereal torches haunted him day and night, and he could neither eat nor sleep.

Finally in a fourth visit beyond the forbidden precincts he came across a man with shaven head and a yellow garment, who went along with his eyes cast down and without paying any attention to his surroundings. The prince accosted him and inquired who he was and what was his occupation. The other replied that he was an ascetic and that he was laboring for his salvation. This was an occupation of which Siddhartha had never heard, and feeling a deep interest in the subject, he brought the monk back with him into the palace and placed himself under his instruction. It was this his first master who decided his vocation.

Such is in substance the most famous perhaps of all known legends. St. John Damascene found it circulating in his day, and was firmly persuaded that it was of Christian origin. From him it was borrowed by Jacobus de Voragine who incorporated it into the *Legenda Aurea* under the title: 'Lives of SS. Barlaam and Joasaph'. It goes without saying that the primitive story underwent many changes in the long course of ages before it was embodied in the work of Jacobus the Archbishop of Genoa.

The fantastic Hindu imagination gave itself a free rein in dealing with the episode of Siddhartha's departure from his palace. However, the more ancient documents speak of it with more sobriety, and first of all they set forth briefly the considerations which determined the young Kshatriya to leave home and those dear to him. He said to himself: "Family life is a life of subjection and servitude, a sinful condition; liberty consists in abandoning one's home." Thus thought Gautama and he left his home.

He departed, not as is stated in the later documents, furtively and without even saying adieu to his wife and child, but with the full knowledge of the members of his family who by their prayers and tearful entreaties vainly sought to retain him. Turning his back on his home, he gave himself up straightway to the quest of that

science which was to dissipate the darkness of his soul and permit him to behold truth as it is in reality; in the possession of this science he sought for the discernment necessary in order that he might be delivered from his present state of illusion.

The sequel of the account of his life is almost entirely made up of late legends from which it is difficult to separate the few grains of historic truth which they may contain. During a period of seven years he wandered like a fugitive from solitude to solitude, from forest to forest, visiting the most renowned ascetics and placing himself under their direction. Thus he journeyed through vast regions, though always keeping near to the great basin of the Ganges, the holy river which he had been accustomed to revere ever since his early childhood. Nowhere in his peregrinations did he meet with aught but deception, but far from giving way to the temptations of discouragement by which he was at times assailed, he kept on his way, obstinate in his resolution to master at all costs the science of salvation.

His long perseverance was finally rewarded at a moment when he least expected it. One night weary from vain meditation on the great problem that had weighed so long and so heavily on his mind, he fell asleep at the foot of a *pippala* or sacred fig tree, when all at once the truth he had been seeking dawned upon his intelligence like a flash of lightning piercing through a mass of dark clouds, and immediately he was illumined to the very depths of his being. The young ascetic awoke to find himself the *Buddha* or illuminated one. At the same time a happiness such as he had never experienced flooded the soul of the seer. The crisis was over. The world no longer had for him any secret or mystery; henceforth he was enlightened as to its origin and destiny. Full of the assurance that he was not condemned to be born again, he felt in himself an intense and boundless joy.

In this illumination of Buddha (as we shall henceforth call him) some writers are pleased to see a solar myth, while others perceive in it a historical fact explicable by a kind of auto-suggestion such as we meet with so often in psychical investigation. The former view is hardly tenable, nor can much credence be given to the latter theory, however much in itself within the limits of possibility, for it is more than likely that we are dealing with a pure legend. his I venture to put forward as my own opinion until such time as new

evidences, which I do not expect to be forthcoming, will have decided the case otherwise.

* * *

The newly illumined spent four weeks in recollection, solitude and silence. The comparison which has been made between this retreat in which Buddha prepared himself immediately for his apostolate and that of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the desert just after His baptism, is only, as Oldenberg remarks, a chance identity of situation, and of circumstances determined by this situation. I would add that that identity is merely on the surface, and that the conditions in which Christ sojourned in the desert are not at all the same as in the case of Buddha. The Messiah never doubted of his mission, nor hesitated in fulfilling it, as happened with Buddha. Nor had He need of light from without to illumine Him in the accomplishment of that mission, He who was the Light itself come into the world.

At the end of the first week of his retreat Buddha saw unfold before his mind the whole chain of causes and effects of transmigration. Here briefly is his account of it.

"From ignorance come forms, and from forms knowledge, etc."

I will come to the last links of that long chain which binds the first cause to last effects.

"From concupiscence comes attachment (to existence), from attachment (to existence) conception, from conception birth, from birth come old age and death, sorrow and groaning, pain, chagrin and despair." Ignorance, it is seen, produces, if not immediately, at least by a series of secondary causes of which it is itself the principal cause, birth into this world with all its evils. It is the mother of sorrow: to suppress the one we must begin by suppressing the other.

In that last night of the first week, the Sublime, as he will call himself hereafter, assists at this long series of causes and effects. His imagination descended from that high pyramid where ignorance held sway to the ever enlarging base, where all the vanities and miseries of this world were rampant. When the vision was at an end and he turned back upon himself to draw the moral, the Perfect, (another of his numerous surnames), pronounced the following stanza: "Whilst the reign of eternal order unveiled itself to meditation, to the ardent meditations of Brahma, Brahma routed the legions of the Tempter as the sun pierces through the clouds."

The Tempter in question is none other than the famous Mara, the Spirit of evil, the Wicked One, who strove three several times to turn Buddha from his mission by promising to make him enter immediately into the supreme felicity of Nirvana. To the first temptation of Mara Buddha replied that he did not wish to enter Nirvana until he had formed a body of religious; to the second he replied that he wished first to assemble the religious women; to the third he expressed himself in these terms: "I shall not enter into Nirvana, O Wicked One, until the holy way of life I preach develops, is heard, is propagated among all the people and becomes familiar to all, after having been announced to all."

The texts in which we read this legend are far from being the most ancient, and if the Mahaparinibbana-sutta where they are found for the first time, as well as the Lalita-Vistara which reproduced it later are of a primitive redaction, anterior to the Gospels, which is not at all absolutely demonstrated, there is nothing to assure us that these works have escaped the common lot of Oriental writings, that they have not been retouched and have not undergone interpretations more or less considerable.

What might furnish this problem with a solution favorable to the partisans of the theory of borrowings from Buddhistic legends on the part of traditions in general and especially of the Gospels—a thesis dear to Ernest de Bunsen, Rodophe Seydel and Arthur Lillie, not to speak of Max Müller, of Rhys-David, savants otherwise very estimable, nor of Emile Burnouf or of Jacolliot, to descend to these names—is the epigraphic and iconographic monuments of India, for it can hardly be question here of other countries where Buddhism was solidly implanted only in the first centuries of our era, posterior therefore to the composition of the Gospels and to the fixing of the traditions relative to the life of Christ. And to return to the point we are treating, if we discover in this period for example an inscription of Acoka which makes mention of the temptation of Buddha by Mara, so different otherwise from that of Our Savior by Satan, or if we discover an image or a statue representing the episode, and dating plainly back beyond our era, there would be ground to conclude, not that Christianity had borrowed some of its traditions from Buddhism, Oldenberg, Barth and Eugene Burnouf, their master (do not confuse Eugene with Emile) would forbid us this, but it should at least be recognized that Buddhism, in this regard and on this side, owes nothing either to Christianity.

The borrowings of modern Buddhism from Catholicism, from the liturgical and cultural point of view, are numberless. What it does now in this line it may very well have done in other lines before. It is a religion of adaptation and this explains in part its enormous and lasting success.

Let us not forget, I say it once for all, that our position, for us Christians, is excellent when it is question of borrowings and plagiarisms, a propos of the similarities existing between the traditions of Christianity and Buddhism. The Gospels can be dated within the limits of a century, and apart from certain contested passages, mostly of secondary interest, they have not undergone interpolations, whereas the writings of Brahmic and Buddhist India wherein are related the deeds and exploits of Krishna and of Buddha cannot be dated even approximately, and they may have undergone incessant retouching even down to our own day.

We have just read the account of the triple temptation of Mara to turn Buddha from his mission. According to another Buddhist monument of greater importance, the Mahavagga (the Great Part, the Great Good) things did not happen the same way. The newly-illuminated asked himself whether he ought to keep for himself the truth he had conquered at the price of such terrible conflicts. While he deliberated within himself upon it, the god Brahma came down from heaven to comfort him and to determine him to undertake the conversion of the world despite the fatigues and the perils that would attend it. "Arise, he said to him, arise valiant hero, rich in victories, walk through the world thou stainless guide! Raise thy voice O Master: many will comprehend thy word."

Buddha did not respond to this first summons. He raised the objection of the uselessness of his efforts for a great number, who would reject his teaching.

Notice the difference between this legend and the preceding, that of the temptation of Mara. Three times Mara tried to turn Buddha from teaching the good doctrine, alleging besides what we have seen that same indifference of people toward him, and three times Buddha replied that had he but one soul to listen, that would suffice to determine him to speak. Here Brahma renews his prayer three times and presses the Sublime to quit his solitude and instruct the multitudes. It is not till the third time that he allows himself to be convinced. We are in the presence of two contradictory currents of tradition.

Buddha finally yields to the insistence of the god, he who later seems not to admit the existence of the Divinity, and is taken for an atheist. The world, according to the image employed by the poet of Mahavagga, appeared to him a pool full of lotuses, some blue, some white, some above water, others on its surface, the rest at the bottom. The latter represented base sordid souls with whom his preaching would be ineffectual. The lotuses resting on the surface of the water were a figure of souls incapable of saving themselves, but only awaiting a ray of the sunlight truth to emerge and open out in full bloom. The first finally were the intelligences of the elite open before the sunlight. So a third of men were damned in spite of him, another third were saved without him, and the other third awaited him in order to be able to avoid hell and to attain the felicity of Nirvana.

Buddha cries out: "Let this gate of salvation be open to all! Let him that hath ears hear my word and believe! I thought of my own suffering; this is why, O Brahma, I have not yet revealed the noble word to men.

The god withdrew satisfied.

Buddha experiences no further obstacles; his scruples are dispelled; a new phase of his existence is about to begin—preaching.

His first sermon Buddha gives at Benares. He had for auditors five monks who had formerly followed him, at the time he was leading the penitent and mortified life, but who had left him later when he believed he ought to renounce that life of privation and live like the rest of men. They had seen him coming from afar, when after his illumination he turned toward Benares. After a little hesitation they consented to hear him, demanding however how he had been able to attain unto truth leading a comfortable and easy life, since he had not found it in the macerations of the most rigorous asceticism. Buddha replied that the truth is precisely in the way which lies equally distant from macerations and voluptuousness. It is the sacred way of eight branches viz. "pure faith, pure will, pure language, pure action, pure means of existence, pure aspirations, pure memory, pure meditation."

Birth, old age, sickness, separation from what one loves, union with what one does not love, privation of desire; all this is sorrow. In fine sorrow is the five-fold attachment viz. attachment to the five elements which constitute the physical and moral being of man: the body, sensations, representations, formation of tendencies, and

knowledge. It is the thirst for life that causes rebirth; quench this thirst and we shall be reborn no more.

Knowledge of the fourfold truth—sorrow, its origin, its abolition and the means of abolishing it—this is the essence of Buddha and consequently of Buddhism.

Such is the substance of the famous sermon at Benares. Buddha, according to the consecrated expression, had “turned the wheel of the law” in order to arrest the law of Samsara or of transmigrations.

The five monks were converted to the doctrine of Buddha and so became the first disciples of Buddha. They were the sacred Bhikshus, or as it will be pronounced Bhikkhus. Soon the number of neophytes was sixty. The Perfect One sent them out alone to preach the holy truth. He said to them: “O disciples, go forth for the salvation of many, for the happiness of many, through compassion for the world, for goodness, for salvation, for the happiness of gods and men. Go not two in the same way. Preach, O disciples, the doctrine which is glorious in its beginning, glorious in its surroundings, glorious in its end, preach it in its spirit and in its letter, publish the full life, the perfect and pure life, the life of sanctity. There are beings whom the dust of the earth does not blind; but if they do not hear this doctrine preached they cannot attain salvation. They will embrace the doctrine.”

This is indeed a program magnificent in appearance, and yet what Buddhism pursues by another way, is, like Brahminism, the destruction of personality. In Brahminism, however, that destruction consists in the absorption of the individual soul, of Jîvatman, of Paramatman or the Supreme Soul, while Buddhism ignores the Supreme Soul, at least it is not occupied with it. It places salvation in Nirvana, the nature of which we shall study later on, but of which we may say here that it is a destruction and not an absorption.

Setting out from Benares, the Perfect One turned his steps toward Ourouvela where lived a thousand ascetics whom he undertook to convert. They had as chiefs the three brothers Kassapa. Buddha first delivered these Muni from an infernal serpent that troubled their sacrifices. The gods themselves came down to hear him, so eloquent was his word! One of the brothers still resisted after all his companions had been converted to the new doctrine. A last conference got the better of his resistance. From Ourouvela Buddha betook himself to Rajagaha, the capital of Magadha, where he was awaited by the king Bimbisara whom he converted without difficulty

to his teaching together with all his people. It was at Rajagaha that Oupatissa put to the disciple Assaji his famous questions, and held with him the dialogue mentioned in the inscription of Bairat, engraved at the instance of the Buddhist king Acoka, about 260 B. C. and recently discovered. Oupatissa besought Assaji to sum up the doctrine of his master for him, whereupon Assaji recited this stanza: "Objects result from one cause, the Perfect One teaches this cause and shows how they come to an end."

That speech was a revelation for Oupatissa, who concluded: "All that is subject to birth, is subject also to disappearance." And taking leave of his interlocutor: "Even tho the doctrine of the Master confined itself to this you would none the less have attained to the state wherein there is no sorrow, a state unknown for myriads of cycles." Buddhism counted one more adept.

According to previous agreement, the neophyte went in search of a friend named Moggalana and announced to him that he had at last found the truth for which they had each been seeking. Seeing him afar off Moggalana cried to him: "Friend, thy countenance is serene and thy face pure and clear. Hast thou found deliverance from death?" And Oupatissa answered him joyfully: "Yes, friend, I have found deliverance from death." He then recounted to him his conference with Assaji. Moggalana had his eyes opened in turn and ranged himself under the banner of Buddha. The inhabitants of Magadha complained of the many conversions wrought by Buddha and his disciples especially among the youth. Children quitted their parents to attach themselves to his following. Buddha stopped their murmurs by converting the malcontents. These primitive traditions for the most part legendary, help us, in the absence of documents clearly and candidly historical, to form an idea of the way the generations following almost immediately that of Gautama understood the origin of Buddhism and its developments. We have to deal here with peoples of a special temperament, of a spirit at once religious and very philosophical, starving for beliefs and greedy of reasonings, disposed to believe all and yet equally inclined to dispute all. Having thought they recognized the insufficiency of ancient traditions, they embraced with enthusiasm a new doctrine which appeared to answer better their preoccupations and of a nature to dissipate their doubts. The hour of reflection will come when that of infatuation is passed. They will discuss, and consequently will doubt. Buddhism, at least in India, its cradle, will not be

able to endure that crisis of examination, and there will be as much precipitation in abandoning it for the ancient beliefs as there was in deserting them for it. So this almost total disappearance of Hindu Buddhism which seems to have been so rapid, (history telling us nothing but the mere fact), can be explained in large measure, without having recourse to the hypothesis of persecutions, of which there is no mention, by that dissolving spirit of examination which has always characterized the people of India.

Pursuing this study, we shall see how much modern Buddhism differs from primitive Buddhism, how much that of China and of Japan, for example, differs from that of Mongolia and Thibet, and we shall be led to conclude that this word is like a tent that covers much merchandise of every sort.

Siddartha was forty years of age when he became Buddha, and his preaching lasted, it is said, the other forty years of his life. Of that preaching of nearly a half century we have an infinite number of details but very little information that is precise or characteristic. Legend has transformed this last period of the life of the Master, as it has the first, and transmitted, it has been well observed, not portraits of individuals but purely conventional types, each one of a whole category of personages. The Buddhist is one type, his enemy is another. Going through the life of Buddha as it is described in the most ancient monuments, we see that the figure of the Master detaches itself in bold relief, and it could hardly be otherwise; but it is not so with its entourage. His disciples, or simply his partisans, were all cast in the same mould, likewise his adversaries. All are alike and when you have met one you know them all. This desolate uniformity is found not only in persons but in their discourses and their acts. They use the same formulae in interrogating the Master, who for his part is at no more expense to his imagination. An example which I take from Oldenberg is quite typical.

Buddha is at Rajagaha when a crowd of unqualified persons each one having a diriment impediment, present themselves for minor ordination, Pabbajja. They are about to proceed, not knowing of these defects, when remonstrance is made, attracting the attention of the Master, who decides that the candidate is not admissible in a certain determined case. His decision is law. We pass on to another case of irregularity which is debated and settled in the same fashion. It is a course in canon law dramatized, but all the persons are alike as well as their sayings, and the monotony that perhaps

was sought to be avoided by this process becomes only heavier and more fatiguing, at least for us Europeans who much prefer a regular treatise without all this stage-setting. The Asiatic temperament is not the same as ours, especially the Hindu temperament. What we regard as sobriety would pass as indigence with this people, and what we would call a foolish debauch of the imagination would seem to them quite simple and natural.

Buddha was wont to interrupt his evangelical courses during the rainy season, which lasted three months. He then took refuge as best he could in huts of foliage a little apart from the populace. The day began with meditation, then in the morning the Bhikkhus went begging through the neighboring villages. They presented themselves in silence at each door, dish in hand, and waited for some time. Whether they were given or refused an alms they departed without a word and returned to their hermitage a little before noon to take their repast, which was the principal, even sometimes the only one of the day. After eating they took a siesta which was followed by another meditation interrupted by instructions for the edification of the people from outside who came to visit the Master, or by instructions from himself.

The rainy season over, Buddha quitted his asylum to resume the course of his pious pilgrimages. He was always followed by a troupe of faithful, varying according to the estimate of ancient texts, from three hundred to five hundred. His field of action was chiefly the North-East of India, what is now the provinces of Oude and Bihar which formed at that epoch the ancient kingdoms of Kocakas and Magadhas.

Buddha preached in the open air, at the gates of cities and towns or in public gardens and parks, the most famous of which were the Velouvana and the Jetavana, the former graciously given to the Sublime by his friend king Bimbisara, the second bought from Prince Jeta by the rich merchant Anathapindaka. When they heard of his arrival in one of these parks or pleasure-groves which encircled every town of importance, the whole population, headed by the king if it were a royal city, gathered around him, according to tradition, to salute him, to submit their doubts and to hear his exhortations.

Nevertheless all did not accept at once the new doctrine, particularly the Brahmans, up to this the exclusive and undisputed masters of science, and it was in their ranks that Buddha, who it will be remembered belonged to the warrior caste, found his most bitter

adversaries. The ancient annalists complacently describe these numerous tournaments which of course invariably ended in a victory for the Master and the conversion of the vanquished.

The person of Buddha was an object of contention, and it was accounted a great privilege even for a prince, that he should consent to dine with him together with his disciples. He honored the feast out of deference for his hosts, avoiding of course everything that might reflect upon his reputation. These marks of condescendence had the effect of gaining hearts to him; they approached him willingly because they saw he was easily accessible, without ever pushing liberty to the point of familiarity. His most distinguished hosts, kings, queens, the latter especially, served him with their own hands and accounted it a great honor that he should but accept their pressing attentions.

We shall see later upon what subjects the Sublime turned his thoughts, and there perhaps, we shall, while admiring the constancy of his efforts, regret the end to which he devoted them. At any rate at first sight this attitude is not lacking in dignity, and even in a certain grandeur.

The first Buddhists were monks, for they were only admitted into the growing community after having passed, not perhaps an apprenticeship or regular novitiate, but at least a sort of initiation, and having been submitted to an interrogation the formula of which has been preserved to us. We shall consider it later on. Exterior marks distinguished them in public; the yellow robe, the tonsure, and the alms-dish. They were thus separated from the profane by their manner of dress and of life, for they were vowed to poverty as well as to celibacy. Everything was abandoned to follow what was regarded as one's vocation, and there is recorded this word of the father of a family whom his wife, showing him his little babe, sought to keep him at home and prevent him from answering the call of Buddha. "Though you throw our son to the jackals and the dogs you will not persuade me to remain, O miserable woman, for the love of our child." Hence the reproaches addressed to Buddha that he was accused of depriving children of their parents and parents of their children, and wives of their husbands, leaving behind him, like cruel conquerors, none but widows and orphans. Be it noted here that if the Buddhist community were not a closed one, and if its members were allowed to remain with their families such complaints would not have been raised on this point. Moreover the-

Master was not reproached with having inaugurated a new kind of life, monasticism, but with having recruited his neophytes even from among fathers of families.

All the members of the Buddhist community were equal, whatever the caste to which each might belong. We have already observed that Buddha did not endeavor to abolish castes nor did he preach that social equality that he is credited with. He contented himself with ignoring them in his community where all lived on the same footing, which indeed was already a progress and a great progress. I may add that this was all in this matter, and that the laity affiliated to Buddhism in the quality of protectors, as we shall see later, might preserve and did preserve their social rank.

To pretend that Sakyamuni abolished these is contrary to the truth: "Every conscientious historian of Buddha," says Oldenberg, these are his own expressions, "must deny him absolutely the glory of having accomplished a revolution of this kind, in any other way than is represented in the details." The eminent Indianist recalls that even this pretended progress which I spoke of just now in the abolition of castes in religious communities, the Cramanas or Samanas practiced long before the appearance of Buddhism, so that here again Gautama did no more than follow a tradition regularly and firmly established. Oldenberg goes further. While recognizing that in theory Buddha did not close the gates of his community to any one, he observes that in fact the community is recruited exclusively from the privileged castes and especially from the ranks of the Brahmans. He cites the principal disciples of Buddha whose names and titles tradition has preserved to us; they are all "sons of family" as we would say to-day. The sole exception usually made in favor of the barber Oupali and which, perhaps, would only prove the rule, would not really be an exception, Oupali being an official person, accredited to the family of the Sakyasto which Buddha himself belonged.

Another remark to make, and which has been made, is that according to the Buddhist dogma a Buddha can only be born in the caste of the Brahmans or that of the Kshatriyas. So in that case the bourgeois element itself is eliminated, a fortiori the popular element. The old documents, which are the best authorized, when speaking of the early days of Buddhism as being best formed in the original spirit, never fail in referring to a person considerable for his eminent sanctity, to note that he was priest or noble, Brahman or Kshatriya.

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[TO BE CONTINUED].

THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST AND MODERN CRITICISM

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I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The concentrated attack, so fiercely launched by the radical wing of modern German and English New Testament critics, against the Scriptural and traditional doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth has reached, of late, such an acute stage that it has created, we must confess, an alarming situation, alarming for Catholics and conservative Protestants alike. The attack, it must be recognized, is not merely an isolated effort, but it represents a movement and a tendency on the part of certain German and Anglican theologians and critics to discredit the historical trustworthiness and authenticity of the Gospel narratives and to reduce Christianity to a set of historical and psychological phenomena which were exceptional indeed, but still quite natural in character. Were the movement in question confined to German critics alone it would not perhaps have created such consternation, as German theological surprises, critical shocks and pan-Babylonian earthquakes are the order of the day and always ready for delivery; but the fact that the movement in question has been heartily welcomed, patronized and even pushed forward by some of the most distinguished and most representative Anglican critics and theologians has produced a most lamentable impression.

It is needless to say that scientific freedom in New Testament criticism and exegesis should be welcomed by all those who have at heart the real interests of religion and science. But when this freedom becomes merely an instrument of destructive criticism which goes beyond its own limits, and bases itself on unwarranted assumptions, presuppositions, prejudices, fancies and mythological mania, it must be denounced and opposed not only for the interest of religion but also for that of true science and criticism. We cannot but greatly admire and welcome the splendid work accomplished by these same critics in many of their investigations in the vast and difficult field of Old and New Testament literary and historical criticism, but we must speak out vigorously against the abuses and indiscretions which they

have, directly or indirectly, committed in many of their investigations and conclusions; a splendid specimen of which is furnished in their criticism of the Christian doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

It is hardly necessary to insist on the capital importance of the dogma in question, as it affects the very vitals of the organism of Christianity, the very heart of Christian tradition and belief. With the destruction of the historical character of the dogma of Christ's Virgin Birth the whole fabric of dogmatic Christianity would be shattered.

PART I.

HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY.¹

In its present shape, the attack against the dogma of Christ's Virginal conception is of quite recent date. It started in Germany in a rather mild and general way some fifty years ago, became more earnest thirty years later and assumed a dangerous aspect in the last ten or fifteen years. From Germany it crossed into England where at first it aroused only a passing interest. Towards the closing years of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth, however, it burst out with startling vehemence and raged with such violence that it threatened for a while to disrupt the powerful organization of the Church of England. America, France and Italy refused for a while to be drawn into the controversy, but in the last three or four years they have been forced to enter the arena by the pressing nature of the question at issue.

Strauss and the Tübingen school may be properly asserted to be the pioneers in the negative criticism of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth. But as Prof. Sweet rightly remarks, "It is to be remembered that Strauss should not be quoted against the Infancy section *exclusively*, inasmuch as he was the assailant of every cardinal fact in the N. T. narrative....The Tübingen theory of the origin of

¹For the history of the Controversy see in particular: L. M. Sweet "*The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ according to the Gospel Narratives*," Philadelphia, 1906; A. J. Maas, S. J. *Modern Protestants on the Virginity of the Mother of Christ*," in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, April, 1903, and separately in the collection entitled *The Catholic Mind*; Lobstein P. *Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York, 1903, especially in the *Introduction*, and in the *Notes* appended to the volume; Mgr. T. Batiffol, *La Question Biblique dans l' Anglicanisme*, Paris (collection *Science et Religion*); Orr A. *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York, 1907, lecture 1st, and especially S. Verschoyle, "*The Liberal Movement in the Church of England*," in the "*Contemporary Review*," August, 1903; and Abbé Houtin in "*La Question Biblique au XXe Siècle*," Paris, 1906. pp. 223-240.

the New Testament dealt impartially with all the documents, ranging them on the one side or the other of the great Pauline-Petrine controversy according to the alleged tendency of each. In this distribution, the Infancy documents shared with the others, but suffered no more severely than any".²

The Strauss-Tübingen attack was resumed and more systematically engineered by critics like Keim,³ Beyschlag⁴, De Wette,⁵ Reuss,⁶ O. Holtzmann,⁷ Sydow,⁸ Fischer,⁹ Hillmann,¹⁰ Harnack,¹¹ Usener,¹² Rohrbach,¹³ Schmiedel,¹⁴ Hering¹⁵, Gunkel,¹⁶ Soltau,¹⁷ Lobstein,¹⁸ and others.¹⁹ Their concentrated attack on the Virginal Conception

²*The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, Philadelphia, 1906. pp. 288-289.

³*Life of Jesus of Nazara* (Eng. tr. Williams and Norgate, 2d. ed.).

⁴*Leben Jesu*, vol. I.

⁵In his commentary on the Gospels, ad locum.

⁶In his Commentary on the Gospels, ad locum.

⁷*Life of Jesus* (Eng. Translation, 1904,); also H. J. Holtzmann, *Synoptischen Evangelien. Ihr Ursprung und Geschichtlichen charakter*, secs. 12 and 13.

⁸*Die Wunderbare Geburt Jesu*; Berlin, 1873, and *Aktenstücke betretend das ueber mich verhangte Disciplinarverfahren wegen meines Vortrags über die wunderbare Geburt Jesu*, Berlin 1873.

⁹*Das Berliner Consistorium und Sydow*, Berlin, 1873.

¹⁰*Die Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu nach Lukas*, in the *Jahrbuecher fuer protestantische Theologie*, 1891, pp. 192-261.

¹¹*Das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss*, Berlin, 1892, p. 23ff.

¹²*Religionsgeschichte Untersuchungen*, vol. I. Bonn, 1899; and his article on *Mary*, in Cheyne's *Encyclopaedia Biblica*.

¹³*Geboren von der Jungfrau. Das Zeugniß des Neuen Testaments gegen die Lehre von der uebernaturlichen Geburt Jesu Christi*, Berlin, 1898.

¹⁴In his articles *Jesus*, and *Brethren of Jesus* in Cheyne's *Encyclopaedia Biblica*.

¹⁵*Die dogmatische Bedeutung und der religioese Wert der uebernaturlichen Geburt Christi*, in the *Zeitschrift fuer Theologie und Kirche*, vol. v. (1895) pp. 58-91.

¹⁷*Die Geburtsgeschichte Jesu Christi*, Leipzig, 1902; translated into English under the title *The Birth of Jesus Christ*, Edinburg, 1902.

¹⁸*Die Lehre von der uebernaturlichen Geburt Christi*, Freiburg, 1896. This work, which was originally written in French (1890) and afterwards revised and enlarged in German (1896), appeared also in English under the title *Virgin Birth of Christ*, Putnam, 1903, forming vol. 2nd of the *Crown Theological Library*.

¹⁹The doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth was also indirectly attacked in Germany about 15 years ago when the heated controversy over the Apostle's Creed was in full rage. As was to be expected, this often bore upon the dogma of the miraculous Birth, and gave rise to a certain number of works immediately inspired by it. The defensive side was taken by Wohlenberg, *Empfangen und heiligen Geist, geboren von der Jungfrau Maria*, Leipzig, 1893; Wagner, *Mitteilungen und Nachrichten fuer die evangelische Kirche in Russland*, Januarheft, 1894; Haussleiter, *Zur Vorgeschichte des apostolischen Glaubensbekenntnisses*, Muenchen, 1893; Th. Zahn, *Das apostolische Symbolum*, Erlangen and Leipzig, 1892; and Cremer, *Zum Kampf um das Apostolikum*, 1892. The negative side, on the other hand, was advocated by Harnack, *The Apostles' Creed*, London, 1892; Herrmann, *Worum handelt es sich im dem Streit*

of Christ naturally terminated in a consistent denial of Mary's "*ante-partum*" and "*in partu*" as well as "*post-partum*" virginity. These various German attacks on these unique privileges of Jesus and Mary have been summarised in a masterly way by Father A. J. Maas S. J. as follows: "The modern school rejects to a great extent even the divinity of Christ, and denies therefore, almost of necessity the virginity of His Blessed Mother. Hermann Usener²⁰ derives what he calls the legend of the Virgin Birth from pagan sources, seeing in it a Christian adaptation of certain parts of pagan mythology. H. J. Holtzmann²¹ considers all the gospel passages which imply Mary's virginity as later interpolations. Joh. Hillman²² attempts to prove that the 'redactor' is responsible for all the objectionable passages, i. e., for all the verses favoring Christ's miraculous conception and birth. Joh. Weiss,²³ though not favourably impressed with Hillman's theory, feels quite certain that the Judæo-Christian source of the third gospel knew nothing of the virgin birth. Both Hillman and Joh. Weiss, therefore, agree with Usener in tracing the account of the miracle back to mythological sources. Adolf Harnack²⁴ considers it as one of the most certain results of historical criticism that the words 'born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary' formed no part of the original gospel teaching. P. Lobstein,²⁵ though he is either not acquainted or not satisfied with the work of some of his predecessors, applies the principles of not merely the higher but the highest criticism to what he calls the myth of the virgin birth. F. Kattenbusch believes the main critical difficulty can be removed by the omission of the few words 'because I know not man'.

"Meanwhile, H. J. Holtzmann, dissatisfied with his former solution of the problem, proposed a new way of removing the objection-

um das Apostolikum? Leipzig, 1893; Bornemann, *Der Streit um das Apostolikum*, Magdenburg, 1893; Kattenbusch, *Das apostolische Symbol*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1894-1897-1900; also Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. I. For these and other details see in particular Lobstein, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, pp. 115-118; and Holtzmann, in his *Handbook of New Testament Theology, Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, 1897, vol. I. pp. 409-415. See also James Orr, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, Scribners, New York, 1907, pp. 4-6.

²⁰*Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen I: Das Weihnachtsfest*, Bonn, 1889.

²¹*Hand-Commentar zum N. T.*, vol. I. Freiburg, 1889, p. 31 f.

²²*Die Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu nach Lukas kritisch untersucht*, in *Jahrbuecher fuer protestantische Theologie*, vol. XVII., 1891, p. 192-261.

²³Bernhard Weiss und Lic. Joh. Weiss zu Luk. i, 34-39, in H. A. W. Meyer's *Krit-exegetische Kommentar ueber das N. T.*, Goettingen, 1892, p. 302, 305.

²⁴*Das Apostol. Glaubensbekenntniss*, Berlin, 1892, p. 23 ff.

²⁵*Die Lehre von der uebernatuerlichen Geburt Christi*, Freiburg, 1896, p. 27, 33, 36.

able passage in Lk. i. e. 34 f.;²⁶ but H. Weinel²⁷ pronounced Kattenbusch's theory the best way out of the difficulty. But even with all this, Adolf Harnack did not consider the spuriousness of Lk. i. 34 f. sufficiently established; he therefore summarized his own proofs against the authenticity of the passage in a paper contributed to the *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, leaving it, however,²⁸ doubtful whether the passage had been inserted by Luke himself or a later interpolator. Whatever effect Harnack's proofs may have produced on the circle of his own followers, they did not convince Adolf Hilgenfeld;²⁹ this independent critic assigns the whole account of the birth and infancy of Jesus³⁰ to a later recension of the third gospel, and objects most decidedly against the practice of treating the above shortened passages in the narrative as interpolations. Still, while this eminent scholar answers most of Harnack's arguments quite satisfactorily, he agrees with Harnack, and with Lobstein too, in deriving the so-called myth of the virgin birth from a false interpretation of Is. vii., 14, current in early Judæo-Christian circles.

Of late, Ludlow Conrady³¹ has come to the conclusion that the history of the infancy has been derived from Egyptian mythology; he believes that it passed into our gospels through the medium of the *Protoevangelium Jacobi*, an apocryphal work written by a good-natured Christian poet in Alexandria, about 120 A. D. But Conrady found out to his sorrow that our professional higher critics are as averse to any theory that outrages common sense too much as they are impatient of any view which agrees too closely with the dictates of sound reason. Hence representatives of as different critical tendencies as Ernst von Dobschutz,³² H. J. Holtzmann³³ and J. Hillmann³⁴ agree in disagreeing with Conrady's explanation of the account of the virgin birth. But the end is not yet. Theod. Zahn, of Erlangen, a scholar well known for his conservative tenden-

²⁶*Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie* I. Freiburg, 1897 p. 412 f.

²⁷*Die Auslegung des apostolischen Bekenntnisses von Kattenbusch und die neutestamentliche Forschung*, in the *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, II., 1901, 37-39.

²⁸vol. II., 1901, pp. 53-57.

²⁹*Die Geburt aus der Jungfrau in dem Lukasevangelium*, in the *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, vol. XLIV, p. 313-317.

³⁰Luke I., 5-ii., 52.

³¹*Die Quelle der Kanonischen Kindheitsgeschichte Jesu; ein wissenschaftlicher Versuch*; Gottingen, 1900.

³²*Litteratur Centralblatt*, vol. LI, 1900, 2153 f.

³³*Theologische Litteraturzeitung*, XXVI., 1901, 135-137.

³⁴*Deutsche Litteraturzeitung*, vol. XXII., 1901, 1605-1607.

cies,³⁵ and Professor F. A. C. Sieffert, of Bonn,³⁶ have refurbished the old weapon so often and so ineffectually wielded against Mary's perpetual virginity. They again appeal to the brethren of Jesus in order to show that Mary cannot have remained a virgin at least after giving birth to our Lord.³⁷

The destructive criticism of these otherwise brilliant scholars and critics, who, by the way, deny more or less explicitly the divinity of Christ, was met, by strong protests and opposition from scholars like Weiss,³⁸ Endemann³⁹ Resch,⁴⁰ Steinmeyer,⁴¹ Nebe⁴², Berthoud,⁴³ Thraen,⁴⁴ and Zahn,⁴⁵ in Germany; Lightfoot,⁴⁶ Gore,⁴⁷ Ramsay,⁴⁸ Sanday,⁴⁹ Plummer,⁵⁰ Robinson,⁵¹ Knowling,⁵² Allen,⁵³ Orr,⁵⁴ and

³⁵*Forschungen zur Geschichte der neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altchristlichen Literatur*, vol. VI., 2, Brueder und Vettern Jēsu, p. 225-372; Leipzig, 1900.

³⁶*Jacobus im N. T.*, in the *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3d edit., vol. VIII, Leipzig, 1900.

³⁷*Modern Protestants on the Virginity of the Mother of Christ*, in the series called the *Catholic Mind*, pp. 6-8, originally appeared in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, April, 1903.

³⁸*Life of Jesus* (English translation), Edinburg, 1883, and the same author's *Introduction to the New Testament* (Eng. trans.) 2 vols. Also Lange, *Life of the Lord Jesus Christ* (English translation by Taylor and Ryland), Philadelphia.

³⁹*Zur Frage über die Bruder des Herrn*, in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, vol. IX., 1900, 833-865.

⁴⁰*Das Kindheitsevangelium nach Lukas und Matthäus*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 327 ff.

⁴¹*Die Geschichte der Geburt des Herrn und seiner ersten Schritte im Leben, mit Bezug auf die neueste Kritik*, 1873.

⁴²*Die Kindheitsgeschichte des Herrn nach Matthäus und Lukas*, 1893.

⁴³*La naissance miraculeuse de Jesus-Christ*, in the *Chretien évangélique*, 20 Mai, 1893.

⁴⁴*La naissance miraculeuse*, in his *Conférences apologetiques et dogmatiques*, Paris, 1900, pp. 51-161.

⁴⁵*Einleitung in das N. T.* An English translation of this masterly work is about to be issued by Scribners.

⁴⁶*Essays on the work entitled Supernatural Religion*, London, 1889, p. 235 ff; *The Brethren of the Lord*, in *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age*, London, 1892, p. 1-45; and *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, London, 1892, pp. 252-291.

⁴⁷*The Virgin Birth of Our Lord*, in his *Dissertations on subjects connected with the Incarnation*, London, 2d ed., 1896, pp. 1-68; and in his *Bampton Lectures on The Incarnation of the Son of God*, London, 1891, 10th ed., 1898.

⁴⁸*Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* New York, 1898.

⁴⁹*The Virgin Birth of Our Lord Jesus Christ*, in the *Christian World Pulpit*, 4 February, 1903; and in his *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, New York, 1905, reprinted from *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*.

⁵⁰*Commentary on Luke*, in the *International Critical Commentary*, New York, 1896.

⁵¹*Some Thoughts on the Incarnation*, London, 1903.

⁵²*Our Lord's Virgin Birth and the Criticism of To-day*, London, 1904.

⁵³*Commentary on Matthew*, in the *International Critical Commentary*, New York, 1907.

⁵⁴*The Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York. This book contains Dr. Orr's Lectures on the subject delivered in New York, April, 1907, under the auspices of the Bible

others in England; and by Godet⁵⁵ in France. Even Mary's *perpetual* virginity found strong defenders in Lightfoot,⁵⁶ Feine,⁵⁷ Plummer,⁵⁸ Nösgen,⁵⁹ Resch,⁶⁰ Endemann,⁶¹ and others, not to speak of our Catholic scholars, Dr. Fonck,⁶² Bardenhewer,⁶³ Lagrange,⁶⁴ Maas,⁶⁵ Durand,⁶⁶ Batiffol,⁶⁷ Camuset,⁶⁸ Vacandard,⁶⁹ Lesêtre,⁷⁰ Rose⁷¹ and others.

Teachers' Training School. These interesting lectures are followed by an Appendix giving the opinions of various living scholars on the subject. These papers were procured by Dr. W. W. White, of the Bible Teachers' Training School. The authors are the following: Prof. Sanday, of Oxford; Sir William Ramsay, of Aberdeen; Rev. G. Box, of Herefordshire; Prof. Addis, of Manchester College; Canon R. J. Knowling, of Durham College; Principal Alfred Garvie, of New College; Rev. Wheeler Robinson, of Rawdon College; Prof. Theodore Zahn, of the University of Erlangen; Prof. Seeberg, of Berlin; Prof. Bavinck of Amsterdam; Rev. Prof. Doumergue, Montauban, France; Rev. H. C. G. Moule, bishop of Durham; Rev. Griffith-Thomas, Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford; Prof. H. Cowan of the University of Aberdeen; Joseph Jacobs (Jew), of New York; Prof. Ismar J. Peritz (Jewish convert), of Syracuse University; Pasteur Hirsh, of Paris, and Rev. Gabriel Oussani of St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie. With the exception of Mr. Joseph Jacobs, (who is a Jew), all the above mentioned writers defend more or less explicitly the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

⁵⁵*Commentary on Luke's Gospel* (American Standard edition, Funk and Wagnall). It is needless to mention here the "scurrilous indecency" with which that most superficial and indecent of Deists, Voltaire, treated the Gospel narrative of Christ's Virgin Birth (see his *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke*, ch. x). Not less insipid was Paulus who tried to give a natural explanation of the event by supposing Mary to have been the victim of a deception practised upon her by her kinswoman Elisabeth (See Strauss's *Life of Christ*, vol. I. p. 18). Renan, of course, denies the supernatural element (*Life of Jesus*, ch. II.).

⁵⁶In his works cited above, especially in the second.

⁵⁷*Eine vorkanonische Überlieferung des Lukas*, Gotha, 1891, pp. 27-30.

⁵⁸*Commentary on Luke*, 1896, p. 6, 24.

⁵⁹*Die Evangelien nach Matthaeus, Mark und Lukas*; in the *Kurzgefasster Kommentar*, München, 1897, p. 291 ff.

⁶⁰*Das Kindheitsevangelium nach Lukas und Matthaeus*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 327 ff.

⁶¹*Zur Frage über die Brüder des Herrn*, quoted above, pp. 833-865.

⁶²in the *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, vol. IV. 1901, pp. 649-677.

⁶³*Zur Geschichte der Auslegung der Worte "Wie soll dies geschehen, da ich keinen Mann erkenne?"* in the *Compte rendu du Ame Congres scientifique internationale des Catholiques*, Freiburg, vol. II. pp. 13-22; also his *Patrologie*, 2d ed. Freiburg, 1901, p. 128; *Lit Rundschau*, vol. XXVII., 1901, 7-9, but especially his *Maria Verkündigung, Ein Kommentar zu Lukas I, 26-38*, forming Heft 5 of Band X. of *Studien Biblische*, edited by the distinguished same author.

⁶⁴*Revue Biblique*, 1895, pp. 160-185.

⁶⁵op. laud.

⁶⁶In a series of articles entitled *L'Evangile de l' Enfance*, in the *Revue Pratique d' Apologétique*, vol. IV. 1907.

⁶⁷*La Question Biblique dans l' Anglicanisme*, Paris, forming a vol. of the well-known series *Science et Religion*.

⁶⁸*La conception virginal de Christ*, in the *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, vol. IV. N(1907), pp. 701-709.

While these attacks were being launched in Germany against the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth, English theologians and critics did not remain, and how could they? unaffected and inactive. At first, and even as late as the year 1900, the great majority of Anglican critics and divines held steadfast to the traditional belief, so much so that all candidates for the ministry who did not explicitly profess the Gospel doctrine in question were *ipso facto* ineligible to Anglican orders. But the destructive fire of German criticism swept slowly but surely into the Anglican camp with the lamentable result that nowadays the Gospel doctrine in question forms no longer an obligatory article of faith, and is, consequently, quite openly and safely rejected by a great number of the most distinguished members of the Church of England.

In England, the controversy over the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth may be said to have started as early as 1861 when a book entitled *Essays and Reviews* was put forth by some liberal Anglican clergymen. This work advocated a larger freedom in the interpretation of the Bible and of dogma than was then considered compatible with the Thirty-nine Articles. The book, on its very first appearance, raised a storm of alarm and indignation. A review in the *Quarterly* by one of the Bishops was the first thunderclap of the storm. This was followed by a meeting of Bishops summoned by the Primate, the immediate result of which was an Episcopal pronouncement formally condemning the heretical book. The Primate, as mouthpiece of the Episcopate, wrote, in reply to indignant addresses that had been received, that the Bishops "unanimously agree with me in expressing the pain it has given them that any clergyman of our Church should have published such opinions as those concerning which you have addressed us. We cannot understand how these opinions can be held consistently with an honest subscription to the formularies of our Church, with many of the fundamental doctrines of which they appear to be essentially at variance." The change in the attitude of the Anglican Church may be judged from the following sketch:

"An Episcopal pronouncement of course increased the violence of the storm. Proceedings in Convocation, where the book was

⁶⁹*Saint Marc et la Conception Virginale*, in the same *Revue*, vol. IV. (1907), pp. 412-417.

⁷⁰*Lesêtre H. La Vierge-Mère*, in the *Revue de Clergé Français*, July, 1907, pp. 113-130;

⁷¹*Studies in the Gospels*, translated from the French by Robert Fraser, Longmans, Green Co. 1903 pp. 41-86.

described as 'corrupting the young and thrusting them almost into hell,' were adjourned during the progress of suits against two of the authors, and after the delivery of the final judgment by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to which the accused had appealed from the sentence of the Court of Arches, a Synodical condemnation of the book was passed by both Houses of Convocation in July, 1864.

"Thus the storm was still raging more than three years after it arose; and even after an interval of several years, when one of the authors of the condemned book was appointed to a Bishopric, efforts were made to stop his election, and at the eleventh hour Episcopal opposition was offered to his consecration.

"Thirty-three years after this last experience of Episcopal censure the Liberal clergyman in question, who had been publicly stigmatised by the Archbishops and Bishops for dishonest subscription to the formularies, died, and the whole Church of England lamented him, while the rugged nobleness and fearless honesty of his personal character were not more eulogised than the perfect orthodoxy of his views and the greatness of his services to the Church. That clergyman, Frederick Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, had, it may be added, flatly refused to make any retraction or even to dissociate himself from his fellow authors in *Essays and Reviews* at the time when condemnation of the book was violent and universal, replying to Bishop Tait, whose large and liberal mind was the reconciling and peacemaking influence in the Episcopate, 'Nothing on earth will induce me to do what you propose; it would be base and untrue.' It is true, however, that Dr. Temple, as soon as he had been made a Bishop, withdrew his Essay, but this may be best explained like Bishop Gore's withdrawal from the E. C. U. A bishop is no longer pleading at the Bar, but is on the Judicial Bench. Then it was, I think, that Dr. Temple laid down an axiom that, thanks to his influence, has of late years greatly modified Episcopal action: 'You cannot narrow the Church of England', an axiom in perfect harmony with the spirit of the Church of Hooker and Butler, of which breadth of view is the distinguishing characteristic. Once more, after forty years, the Bishops of the Church of England have been pressed and entreated to condemn another of the Liberal clergy, this time the Dean of Ripon, a well-known Liberal theologian, and a persistent advocate of the freedom of enquiry and opinion, so stoutly championed all his life by Archbishop Temple.

"And the purpose and significance of this condemnation, urged alike by the extreme men of the Church Association and by the extreme Sacerdotalists of the opposite party in the Church, was to condemn not merely Dean Fremantle individually, but in Dean Fremantle's position the whole position of the Liberal clergy. This attack on the position of the Liberal clergy amounts, in fact, to an attack on the best tradition of the Church, on its breadth of view and faith in divinely-guided progress; on its Liberalism, in short, maintained by a long array of Liberal clergymen, among whom in the immediate past are to be found the Primates, Tait and Benson and Temple, and many scholars and thinkers of the type, though not of the calibre, of Lightfoot and Westcott."⁷²

Now, in one of these famous "Essays", among many other things, freedom was advocated in interpreting the Gospel narrative concerning the Virgin Birth. This particular attack, however, did not arouse any more indignation and criticism than any other attack contained in that famous book, as the appeal for freedom was general and sweeping; so the Virgin Birth controversy remained, at least for the time, in the background. From 1890 to 1898 the controversy, which was then furiously raging in Germany, attracted once more the attention of the liberal Anglican clergymen but in a rather conservative direction, and scholars like Lightfoot, Robinson, Gore, Plummer, Sanday, Ramsay and others took valiantly the defensive side of the controversy. In 1889, however, Dr. Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*⁷³ made its first appearance. In this work (which is cleverly written indeed and in which the author, it must be confessed, shows a remarkable acuteness and ability marred, however, by a far too subjective criticism) the dogma of Christ's Virgin Birth is ascribed to Heathenish influences. In Chapter XIX, entitled "The Birth at Bethlehem",⁷⁴ our author maintains—I. "That the narratives in which the birth is spoken of are, as historic documents, very unsatisfactory. II. That the tale of a miraculous birth was not generally accepted by the first Christians; and III. That the tale would have arisen, in all probability, whether true or not". On page 245 he argues that on doctrinal or dogmatic grounds the dogma in question may be held as such but on historical grounds

⁷²J. Verschoyle, *The Liberal Movement in the Church of England*, in the *Contemporary Review*, 19 3, pp. 233-234.

⁷³*Exploratio Evangelica*, A brief examination of the basis and origin of Christian belief, London 1899. See especially pp. 234-254.

⁷⁴p. 234 ff.

it has absolutely no *raison d'être*. Having thus defined his position, the author, in a long and spirited note (pp. 247-254), attacks Canon (now Bishop) Gore and Prof. Ramsay's famous essays in defence of the dogma, which have for their principal keynotes the veracity and historical accuracy of Luke's narrative.

In 1899-1900 the controversy was still on in England. And in 1901, Harnack's remarkable lectures on the *Essence of Christianity* (which were then translated into English) gave it a new impetus. This was soon followed by the startling and scandalous articles of Schmiedel and Usener on "Jesus", "Mary", the "Virgin Birth" (art. *Nativity*), in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* edited by that most radical and eccentric of Old Testament critics, Canon Cheyne of Oxford. Schmiedel and Usener's savage attacks on the historical character of the Gospel narratives in general and on that of the Virgin Birth in particular, aroused indignation and stormy protests in the conservative and moderate liberal camps of the Anglican Church. Nevertheless, Cheyne's *Encyclopedia* found its way into every stronghold of liberal Anglican theology and criticism. In 1903, the English translation of Wernle's *Beginnings of Christianity*,⁷⁵ of Lobstein's *The Virgin Birth of Christ*,⁷⁶ and of Soltau's *The Birth of Jesus Christ*⁷⁷ added still greater confusion to an already very chaotic theological situation. This series of attacks was soon followed by Canon Cheyne's bold yet reverent lecture (afterwards published in book form with numerous notes and discussions) on *Bible Problems and the Materials for their Solution*.⁷⁸ This famous Oxford scholar, whose name is already linked with several fantastic Old Testament theories, and who for erudition and originality has hardly an equal, never appeared to better advantage. His attractive style, constantly permeated with veiled but sufficiently pointed sarcasms, and, strange to say, always clothed with an apparently most reverential theological tone, threw another bomb into the conservative camp by his attack on the Virgin Birth. Following Winckler, Stucken, Gunkel and others, Cheyne tries his best to show that in the Gospel narrative of Christ's Virgin Birth we have clear and unmistakable South Arabian and Babylonian mythological elements and infiltrations.

But a few months previous to Canon Cheyne's delivery of his lecture before the Churchmen's Union at the Church House (June

⁷⁵Translated by G. A. Bienemann, in 2 vols.

⁷⁶Being vol. 2d of the *Crown Theological Library*, published by Putnam's Sons.

⁷⁷Translated by Maurice Canney, London, Adair & Charles Black, 1903.

⁷⁸Forming vol. 8th of Putnam's *Crown Theological Library*, 1904.

16, 1904), the controversy had already reached one of its acutest stages by the publication in the *Hibbert Journal*⁷⁹ of an article by Dr. Beeby. After controverting and attacking the traditional doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth, the writer launches an impassionate appeal to all his Anglican confreres to come forward with an honest expression of views on the real significance of that article of the Creed in which the Virginal Conception of Christ is officially formulated.

Beeby's attack earned him his immediate deposition from the ministry of the Church of England, and the event caused a sensation in Anglican circles. In the month of October of the same year, Dean Fremantle read before the Churchmen's Union a paper on "Natural Christianity" which attracted great attention. The English newspapers immediately circulated the report that the distinguished Dean of Ripon had denied in his paper the Incarnation and Resurrection of Our Lord. The Bishop of Ripon, "a theologian of clear vision and large sympathies dealt with the situation promptly and judiciously. Knowing Dean Fremantle to be truly orthodox, that is, a fervent believer in Christ and Christ's teaching, he wrote asking him to give the assurance that would remove the alarm and disquiet occasioned among simple believers, and the Dean unhesitatingly gave the assurance in words that had the ring of Christian sincerity. This assurance, however, while it satisfied the Bible Society, at whose annual meeting at Leeds the Dean soon after presided, did not remove the suspicions of his clerical critics, and the controversy went on in the religious Press, the Dean very properly endeavouring to stand aloof"⁸⁰

As a matter of fact, Dean Fremantle had not explicitly denied in his paper the Virgin Birth of Christ, but simply tried to harmonize the traditional doctrine with the laws of biology. And, in fact, in one of his letters to the Bishop of Ripon this distinguished Dean wrote as follows: "Not only was there in my paper no denial of the birth from a Virgin, but there was an attempt to explain (I trust humbly and reverently as befitting such a subject) how we might understand without any violation of biological law the words of the Apostle's Creed and the words of St. Luke's Gospel".⁸¹

Dean Fremantle's sophistic attempt to harmonize the Gospel account with the laws of biology was afterwards given in summary

⁷⁹In the October issue pp. 875, a propos of which see Prof. Percy Gardner's article in the *Independent Review*, Sept. 1904, entitled "*The Abbé Loisy and Mr. Beeby.*"

⁸⁰*J. Verschoyle, art. cit.* p. 235.

⁸¹*ibid.* p. 236.

form to J. Verschoye who reproduced it in full in his often quoted article in the *Contemporary Review* as follows: "In Darwin's book on *The Changes of Plants and Animals under Domestication* he points out that Parthenogenesis is found much higher than is generally known in the organised creation, and he asks why the operation of the male is required, the germ or ovum of the female being complete in itself. He answers that he can give no reason except, probably, that force and energy is thus added. If then, the accounts in the Gospels—that is, Matthew i. and Luke i.—are true literally, the meaning of my suggestion would be, that the yearnings of a young Hebrew woman, longing with intense and holy desire to be the Mother of the Messiah (which longings were the direct action of the Holy Spirit) excited and quickened the germ within her, and produced in this case what is usually produced by the action of the male. This seems to me the only meaning that can be got out of the words of St. Luke, unless you are to invoke the word 'Miracle'. But this will not help us. It is really nothing more than a confession of our ignorance: or, if definition be imposed upon it, such as that assumed by writers like Paley, then we must say that it is not only ambiguous but it is not a scriptural word at all. nor a scriptural idea; for *σημείον* and *δύναμις*, the Greek words which our version translates by miracle, do not mean what Paley meant, and what in a somewhat vague way is popularly understood by the word."⁸²

This ingenious attempt of the Dean of Ripon to account for the Gospel narrative without any violation of biological law clearly shows that Dean Fremantle did not accept the Matthew and Luke narratives of Christ's Virgin Birth in their literal and obvious meaning, for, according to him, the Angel's Annunciation represents symbolically the purely spiritual experience of the Virgin Mary in the same way as Our Lord gave a symbolical account of His spiritual experience in the words of the Devil who tempted Him not less than three times and in three different ways. According to this symbolical interpretation of Mary's spiritual experience, although we still have an instance of a working of some sort of Parthenogenesis in conformity with natural law, the fact is left, nevertheless, as a unique working of that law. Hence it is clear that Dean Fremantle's system of interpretation is not only analogous but almost identical with Archbishop Temple's argument advanced in his famous paper in *Essays and Reviews*, mentioned above, that the Virgin Birth should remain

⁸²p. 236.

a miracle only for the purposes of revelation, though not a miracle for the purposes of science, having proved to be a unique instance of the working of a natural law.

Dean Fremantle's attempt made a favourable impression on some other Anglican clergymen and church dignitaries. The Bishop of Worcester, for instance, in one of his lectures on the historic trustworthiness of the Gospels, openly says that "it was not a part of the Apostolic testimony, which was testimony to that which they had seen and heard, beginning from the Baptism of John until the Ascension.... Even to-day this question of the Virgin Birth was not the ground on which belief is asked".⁸³ The Bishop of Ripon, too, in his Introduction to the "Temple Bible," speaking of the relation of moral supremacy to the miraculous element, says: "Now, in the Common Stock Gospel, the miraculous accessories connected with the Birth and Resurrection of Jesus Christ do not find a place. These accessories are found in the group of secondary witnesses—i. e., in a narrative common to two Evangelists. Upon these, in the first instance, we have purposely refused to lay stress; our belief in Jesus Christ must be based upon moral conviction, not on physical wonder".⁸⁴ And Archdeacon Wilberforce in one of his sermons clearly states his mind in the following question and answer: "In order to believe rightly in the Divinity of Jesus Christ, is it necessary to believe that he was supernaturally born of a Virgin Mother without human paternity? Answer: No."⁸⁵

These and many other instances which for brevity sake we omit, clearly show that in 1904, some of the most representative members of the Church of England had almost entirely drifted from the traditional doctrine to one of more or less conventional character, with the consequence that in the Church of England the controversy of the Virgin Birth of Christ became concerned not so much with the historic trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives in question as with the doctrinal importance of the belief itself in relation to Christian faith and dogma, the principal contention of these distinguished Anglican theologians and critics being that differences of opinion concerning the Virgin Birth of Christ are compatible with loyalty to the Christian faith and in no way incompatible with the Divinity of Christ and the Incarnation.

⁸³*ibid.* p. 238.

⁸⁴*ibid.* p. 239.

⁸⁵*ibid.* p. 239.

The attacks of Beeby, Fremantle and other liberal Anglican theologians, directed more or less explicitly against the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth, accomplished in the long run their end and produced their poisonous effect on the younger members of the Anglican Church, many of whom joined openly the liberal school. In 1904, Canon Hensley Henson's attack on the historical character of our Lord's resurrection⁸⁶ aggravated still more the already very grave situation. The Canon was publicly criticised and denounced by his own bishop who, although endowed with large sympathies for modern biblical criticism, felt, nevertheless, the necessity of putting a stop to the steadily increasing infiltrations of destructive German criticism into the Anglican Church. But, as is always the case in theological controversies, the episcopal censure increased the violence of the storm, creating unrest and agitation rather than tranquility and peace. In the same year, a Committee, originally composed of but twenty-one distinguished Anglican theologians, but afterwards increased to one hundred and one members, was organized for the purpose of advocating still more freedom in New Testament criticism than had as yet been officially granted in their church. The original members of the Committee were the following: Papillon, Escreet, Palmer Smythe, Atkinson, Wood, Shaw-Stewart, Mann, Boyd, Hutton, Tollinton, Comper, Jephson, de Sausmarez, Wragge, Oxford, Sharp, Handley, Bury, Dodd, Elliot and Colchester. Of those who later on joined this original committee it will be sufficient to mention names like Charles, Henderson, Woods, Barnett, Geikie, King, Gray, Shepard, Henslow, Abbott, Rashdall, Allen, Bartlett, Jackson, Mastermann, Hunt, Aitken, Healey, Edmonds, Mann, Douglass, Talbot, Boyle, Baxter, Mitchell, Wilson, Hutton, H. J. Palmer, Sommerville, Lilley, Chambers, and Beaumont, most of whom are familiar to us by their scholarly researches in Biblical studies, especially through their active cooperation in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, and Cheyne's *Encyclopedia Biblica*. A circular was sent by this committee to the ministers of the Anglican Church all the world over for the purpose I. of testing their opinion in the matter, and II. of enlisting their help and sympathy.⁸⁷

⁸⁶"*The Resurrection of Our Lord.*" London 1904.

⁸⁷Concerning the history, work and results of this Committee, the reader is referred to the following work "*A Declaration on Biblical Criticism by 1725 Clergy of Anglican Communion, together with (1) the letter of invitation to sign, and a list of the 101 inviting clergy; (2) a public explanatory letter from the Dean of Winchester; (3) an introduction of some results of the declaration, by the editor; (4) the names and*

This circular created at first a furor in England. Nevertheless, it was adhered to and signed by not less than 1720 Anglican clergymen, divided as follows: 1362 from England, 363 from the Colonies (Canada, Australia, South Africa) and 20 from India, Burmah, and Ceylon. The same was afterwards, in 1906, adopted by 76 ministers of the Episcopal Church of America. From 1904 down to the present time the controversy concerning our Lord's Virign Birth has been kept going in England, but with less and less vehemence, apparently for the reason that the liberals have won most of their contention. The literature on the subject, for and against, has been constantly increasing but with the lamentable result that at present the majority of the most distinguished and representative theologians of the Church of England seem to stand on the negative side in the discussion, some denying the historical character of the doctrine, others contending that, whether it be true or false, it is neither essential to the truth of Christian dogma in general, nor to the doctrine of the Incarnation in particular.

In America, the controversy has not provoked the same degree of unrest and agitation as in England and Germany, and if we except the contributions to the subject by scholars like Briggs, Allen, Sweet, Machen, Ropes, Cooke, Steele, Potter, Terry, Hoben, and a few others, the great majority of the American Protestant clergy have stood aloof from it. It must be added, however, that by far the greater number of them profess more or less explicitly their firm belief in the traditional doctrine.

Within the Catholic Church, as was to be expected, the controversy has not yet, at least not to any great extent, influenced our theologians and critics. The lack of interest that most of our Catholic students and prests ordinarily show in face of such burning questions is much to be lamented, whether this lack of interest is to be attributed to a deficiency in knowledge or to a condition of intellectual apathy. Exceptions, however, must be made of scholars like Bardenhewer, Lagrange O. P., Rose O. P., Maas S. J., Batiffol, Lesêtre S. S. and a few others who have come to the front valiantly defending the traditional dogma of Christ's Virgin Birth. Their contributions have been quoted above.

addresses of the signatories; (5) some anonymous extracts from a large mass of private correspondence concerning the Declaration chosen by two Members of the Committee; (6) the allied American Declaration; edited by Hubert Handley, M. A., Vicar of St. Thomas's, Camden Town, N. W. the London, 1906, in-8, 149 pp.

Three Catholic critics, however, have of late disturbed this serenity, viz: the Abbé Loisy in his *L'Evangile et l' Eglise*⁸⁸ and *Le Quatrième Evangile*;⁸⁹ the bold and reckless Abbé Houtin, in his *La Question Biblique au Vingtième siècle*, Paris, 1906.;⁹⁰ and a certain unknown Herzog (probably a pseudonym) in a recent article in the *Revue d' histoire et de littérature Religieuses*.⁹¹ These departures, how-

⁸⁸Paris 1902. "It is true, however, that these narratives (of the birth of Jesus) represent a normal development of the history of Christ. The very nature of their subject, the critical examination of the two versions (Matthew and Luke) taken separately or compared, and an analysis of evangelical tradition, make it impossible to regard them as a definite expression of historical memories; none the less they are put forward as a document of Christian faith, and in this capacity attract the attention of the historian. The idea of the Virginal Conception by the operation of the Holy Ghost is not merely, as is readily admitted, a physical explanation of the Divine Sonship of Jesus, but a religious explanation, like that attached to the idea of the Messiah, and a metaphysical explanation like that that belongs to the idea of the Incarnation; it is of the nature of both, because, if the Virginal Conception in a sense demonstrates the Fatherhood of God, the operation of the Holy Ghost has not for its immediate end the miraculous formation of a purely human being, but rather the communication of Divine life, which makes Jesus, from the earliest moment of His existence, the elect of God, the Christ anointed by the Spirit, the only Son of the Heavenly Father... The narratives of the Childhood of Christ are for the historian only an expression and an assertion of faith in the Messiah, that faith which is affirmed at the beginning of the Gospel of Mark, and transfigured the memories of the Apostles, which is also affirmed and developed in Paul, and then in the Fourth Gospel. This faith is, as it were, the reply made by the generations of believers in succession to the proposition of the gospel of Jesus; it increases, yet remains the same, like an echo which, reverberating from mountain to mountain, becomes more sonorous the further it travels from its point of origin.

"The subject of this faith is at no stage of its development presented to the historian as an actual reality. Criticism has not to decide if Jesus is or is not the Word Incarnate, if He existed before His terrestrial manifestation, if He were consecrated Messiah from His conception, or from the day of His baptism, if the idea of the Messiah in its earliest form and in its successive transformations, is a truth. Considered as belief, this idea is addressed to faith, that is to say, to the man, judging with all his soul the worth of the religious doctrine presented to him. The historian as such need not constitute himself either apologist or adversary. He knows it simply as a conception or a force whose antecedents, central manifestation and indefinite progress, he can analyse up to a point, but whose deep meaning and sacred power are not things that can be deduced from simple analysis or critical discussion of texts and facts" *L'Evangile et l' Eglise*, pp. 29-32, which corresponds to pp. 48-51 of the English translation, by Christopher Home, N. Y. Scribner's Sons, 1904. This translator's name is unknown to us, but his English rendering of Loisy's deep and difficult book shows once more the ignorance of many Protestant writers concerning the dogmas of the Catholic Church. A striking example is to be found in the above mentioned rendering where the translator stupidly renders "*Conception Virginale*" by "*Immaculate Conception.*" op. cit. p. 49.

⁸⁹Paris, 1903. See especially pp. 177-183.

⁹⁰pp. 241-261.

⁹¹"*La Virginité de Marie après l'enfantement*, vol. XII (1907) pp. 320-340.

ever, represent but an isolated attempt, although it is asserted that a few members of the younger generation of the French clergy are on the negative side of the controversy, but are reticent of their opinion through prudential motives.

From the above sketch our readers can easily appreciate the gravity and importance of this new attitude towards one of the most cherished dogmas of Christianity. Its burning actuality should stimulate the most talented of our young clergy to take up the study of this and other such vital problems and assume the role of exponents and defenders of the deposit of faith, a mission to which they are called by the very fact of their vocation and office.

PART II.

THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY AND THE REAL KEY TO ITS SOLUTION.

The opponents of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth are forced to assume the unreasonable position and the difficult task of attacking a traditional and a scriptural belief, which is, to say the least, of venerable antiquity—and almost contemporary with the age of Christ Himself. For, while it is universally admitted that many of our Christian dogmas cannot be historically traced farther back than the fourth, fifth or even later centuries of the Christian era, that of Christ's Virgin Birth is at least as old as Matthew and Luke's Gospels which are regarded by the great majority of critics as written but a few decades after Christ's death and, in all probability, but a few years after that of Mary, the Mother of Jesus, and that of the apostles and the other relatives, members and acquaintances of Christ's family circle. Hence, at the very outset, and quite apart from all other internal and external considerations, the presumption remains tremendously in favor of the genuineness, reliability and credibility of the Virgin Birth narrative, unless it can be shown that the fact, or the event itself, miraculous and supernatural as it is, involves either contradiction, or impossibility or improbability—a hypothesis, as far as we know, by no one openly maintained.

Another consideration must be constantly borne in mind, viz: that not every historical event, in order to be acknowledged as such, need *necessarily* be verified or verifiable by strictly tangible, experimental and infallible methods of testing; as historical facts are of various orders, some verifiable, others scarcely so or not at all. Now, to the category of this latter class belongs undoubtedly

the miraculous conception and the Virgin Birth of Christ. Unlike the other miracles of the New Testament, that of the Virginal Conception of Christ is by its very nature of the utmost privacy, and could have been known directly by only three persons, namely Mary, Jesus and Joseph, and indirectly but by a few close relatives and friends. Accordingly the defenders of the doctrine, from the very nature of the phenomenon itself, need take but one line of argument and defence, namely: to show that the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth rests ultimately on a historical event and basis which can be substantiated as having occurred on the ground that a distinct notice of it has come down to us through the testimony of men morally and intellectually qualified to testify, and who were, furthermore, in a position to know of it and to inquire about it from persons either directly connected with it (as Jesus, Mary and Joseph), or from those in position to know of it, such as the relatives and the apostles and disciples of the Lord. We must also be able to show that the written and oral testimony of these witnesses has come down to us without substantial modification. Fortunately enough, nowadays it is generally admitted that the Evangelists were men unimpeachable for their truthfulness, sincerity and general historical accuracy, and who had, furthermore, ample opportunity to learn about the facts, to investigate their origin and to determine their historical value. Consequently, unless these fundamental premises can be gainsaid (a feat which has been, especially of late, strenuously undertaken but without success) every Christian is bound to accept the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth not only as dogma but as history as well.

This is, according to us, the real status of the controversy, and it is around these elementary premises that the ultimate solution of the problem must rest. Other details and considerations are but logical consequences of these few fundamental principles which should form, after all, the real battleground for both orthodox and heterodox critics. Radical critics, indeed, have, now and then, attempted to discredit the Matthean and Lukan authorship of their two respective narratives. They have tried to offset Matthew's and Luke's testimonies by the apparent silence of Mark, John and Paul. They have even attempted to point out contradictory statements in regard to the matter in the Gospels of the two first named Evangelists (such as the mention of the brothers and sisters of Jesus). They have attributed the story of the two Gospels to Jewish theological speculations. They have, finally, endeavored to detect in them traces of

Greek, Roman, Hindoo, Babylonian, Arabian, Zoroastrian and Egyptian mythological beliefs and superstitions, in which efforts, but especially in the last, they have shown more ingenuity than sound reasoning, more learning than good sense. But, these efforts notwithstanding, our critics have not been able, as yet, to discredit the fact of the antiquity, authenticity and historical credibility of the Gospel narrative, and this, as we have above remarked, is and must always remain the real question at issue; so much so that many of these critics have concentrated their destructive fire on this phase of the problem only. In the last part of this study we shall show how the theory of Oriental and Graeco-Roman mythological infiltrations in the narrative is neither warranted nor pertinent. We shall show that this is simply the result of that mythological and pan-Babylonian mania which has of late so deeply stirred the vivid imaginations of some of our most distinguished modern biblical scholars. We shall also examine the question of the antiquity, authenticity and credibility of Matthew's and Luke's narratives. Such being the case, we may sum up this preliminary part of our study with the following consideration: It is an approved canon of legitimate historical criticism that when a supposed fact or event, in itself neither contradictory, nor impossible nor improbable, is related by two or more contemporary, reliable and qualified writers, or witnesses, their testimony is to be presumed and accepted as correct, even though other contemporary and equally reliable witnesses and writers do not make formal mention of it,—unless it can be shown that these same contemporary witnesses who simply omit it would have or should have mentioned it had they known of it. Now, as we shall see later on, this latter restriction does not apply to the present case. It is true that Mark, John and Paul do not expressly mention the Virgin Birth, but it is not less true that they not only do not oppose it but almost presuppose it. Furthermore, it cannot be shown that it was within the scope of their viewpoint and plan to make explicit mention of it. The Gospels of Mark and John, as Dr. Briggs remarks, agree in having no gospel of the infancy of Jesus. This was due, doubtless, to a lack of interest in that part of the life of Jesus, as well as to the fact that both of these Gospels seem to be limited to the testimony of what the primary authorities themselves had seen and heard, St. Peter in Mark, and St. John in the Gospel of John. Furthermore, the fact that in both cases the gospel of the Infancy is attached to genealogies shows an interest in Matthew and Luke in proving that Jesus was

the son of David, the heir of the promises to David and his seed, and so the Messiah. The references to Christ's brothers and sisters found in some of the Gospels, even were they His own brothers and sisters from Mary and Joseph, do not, of course, as we shall see later on, affect or impair the fact or the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth. These, indeed, may be reasonably accounted for as the issue of the union of Joseph with a former wife. Hence, we can safely conclude that Matthew's and Luke's accounts of Christ's Virgin Birth cannot be shown to be either non-authentic, or interpolated or unreliable, or contradictory, or impossible, or improbable, or legendary and mythological or, finally, purely theological. And, such being the case, we may safely and on strictly historical evidence cling steadfastly to the venerably old, traditionally sacred and evangelically genuine doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth.

This is all that a believer in the dogma in question can hope or can be expected to show in order to justify unalterable belief in it. On the other hand, if the adverse critic can *disprove* this position, he shall certainly have succeeded in his attempt to remove from the domain of history the dogma of the Virgin Birth of Christ.

PART III.

THE DOGMA OF CHRIST'S VIRGIN BIRTH AND THE THEORY OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT.

In the Catholic Church the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth has given rise to various theological and devotional developments. The first stage, and undoubtedly the only one which can be shown to rest on unmistakable Scriptural authority, is the one concerning the virginal conception of Christ without the cooperation of man based on the explicit testimony of Matthew and Luke. It has been accepted by the earliest Fathers and writers of the Church, such as Ignatius, second bishop of Antioch, martyred between 107 and 117 A. D.; Aristides (circa 138 A. D.), Justin Martyr (about 110-166 A. D.), Tatian (about 110-172 A. D.), Irenaeus (about 120-202 A. D.), Tertullian (about 150-240 A. D.), Clement of Alexandria (died about 220 A. D.), Origen (185-254 A. D.), Hippolytus (flourished 198-239), Cyprian, bishop of Carthage (martyred 258), Novatian, a Roman presbyter (circa 256), Malchion (about 270), Archelaus (about 277), Arnobius (flourished 290-310), Lactantius (about 250-330), Methodius (martyred about 311), Victorinus (martyred about 312), and many

others. The doctrine in its first stage is that Jesus Christ, the son of God, was conceived by the Holy Ghost in the womb of His Virgin Mother, Mary, without the co-operation of man. The ground for this doctrine is twofold: first, Scriptural (or historical); and secondly, theological.

The historical basis rests evidently on the narratives of Matthew and Luke, both couched in words and expressions as clear and unmistakable as can be, as well as on early oral traditions. The apparent and, to a certain extent, real incompatibility of these two narratives in many of their minor details and expressions concerning the Nativity of Christ and the events immediately anteceding and following it, are to be neither denied nor ignored nor belittled. These incompatibilities, to be sure, must have impressed themselves on the minds of such men as Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen just as deeply as on those of our own modern critics. But these incompatibilities, important as they may appear to be in themselves, do not in the least affect the main doctrine at issue, viz: The divine conception of Christ and His Virgin Birth. On the contrary, these little discrepancies between the two accounts, which are manifestly independent of one another, serve purely to strengthen their witness to the great central fact in which they are at one. At any rate the testimony of the earliest fathers of the Church indicates that, even before the death of the last apostles, the doctrine of the Virgin Birth of Christ must have been among the rudiments of the faith in which every Christian was initiated, and this not only in one church or another but in all Christian Churches and communities, such as the Church of Rome (Irenaeus), Greece (Aristides), Africa (Tertullian), Asia (Irenaeus, Justin and Ignatius), Syria and Palestine (the documents of the first and third Gospels, Ignatius, Justin), Alexandria (Clement and Origen), Mesopotamia and Persia (Aphraates, Ephrem) etc. The same doctrine is either explicitly affirmed or implicitly involved in almost all the other Fathers and Councils. In their writings and decisions variations in words may indeed be found, but variations in the words of creeds are to be carefully distinguished from variations in the substance of tradition. Thus, for example, the creed of the Church of Caesarea, as it was presented in the Council of Nicaea, and the actual creed of Nicaea itself, state the fact of the Incarnation, but make no specific mention of the *Virgin Birth*, through which the Incarnation took place. This, however, does not mean that they attach no importance to the Virgin Birth. Eusebius, the

bishop of Caesarea, shows us in his writings that the Virgin Birth was supposed to be *involved* in any statement of Incarnation. Thus in *contra Macellum de Eccl. Theol.*, after much discussion of the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth is incidentally mentioned.

Such a consensus, accordingly, in the third and second centuries, reaching back to the end of the first, among very independent churches, seems to us, apart from any question of the Gospels, to prove for the belief an apostolic origin. It could not have arrived at such an undisputed and universal acceptance unless it had really the countenance of the apostolic founders of these same churches—Peter, Paul, John, James, Mark, etc.; and the argument of Tertullian and Irenaeus from the identity of distinct traditions to their apostolic origin is here, in the main, of conclusive force.

Our adversaries do not, of course, deny the antiquity of the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth in the primitive church. They do, however, attempt to offset its historical value by the contention that it was not the result of the belief in a historically ascertained fact but rather the result of Judaeo-Christian theological speculation, strengthened by the powerful influence of Graeco-Roman and Oriental mythological beliefs. This assertion is, as we shall see, untenable, for in order to develop a theological myth and belief and force it upon the Universal Church, a greater length of time is required than the few years which elapsed between the death of Christ and of those who knew Him and His family intimately, and the final codification of the belief in Matthew and Luke, or rather in their yet more primitive constituents. Moreover, the primitive Judaeo-Christian Church of Palestine was a community distinctly Jewish in race, spirit and tendencies, remote from the other Christian churches of Asia Minor, Alexandria and Rome, and possessing little contact with Graeco-Roman or Oriental mythologies. Such speculation, furthermore, was not, as we shall see, in strict harmony with their Old Testament conception of the Messiah.

Besides this historical there is also a theological basis for the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth; and this consists in the fact that the doctrine in question possesses close relations of propriety and of logical sequence with the belief in the divinity of Christ. This divinity of Christ, as is admitted by all critics alike, is solemnly attested and proclaimed by Christ Himself; and after Him, unanimously accepted by all the Apostles, Evangelists, Fathers and Early Christians; hence, it follows that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is to be maintained both on historical and theological grounds.

That the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is quite logically, although not of necessity, connected with the dogma of the divinity of Christ can be quite forcibly shown as follows "Granted that the eternal Son of God did at a certain moment of time take flesh by a real incarnation in the womb of Mary,—granted that he was born as man, without change of personality or addition of another personality, but simply by the assumption of a new nature and by an entrance into new conditions of life and experience—granted in this sense the incarnation of the Son of God in the womb of Mary, can we conceive it to have taken place by the ordinary process of generation? Do not we inevitably associate with the ordinary process of generation the production of a new personality? Must not the denial of the Virgin Birth involve the position that Jesus was simply a new human person in whatever specially intimate relations with God? And this argument becomes almost irresistible when the question is removed from the idea of incarnation strictly considered, to the associated idea of the sinless humanity, the humanity of a second Adam. Christ was a new departure in human life, a marvellous phenomenon, which becomes still more marvellous, more impenetrable and altogether unintelligible were we to ascribe to him the same process of generation as other mortals."⁹²

The second stage of development in the doctrine of Christ's Virgin Birth is shown in the Catholic doctrine of Mary's *perpetual* virginity. As a dogma, the doctrine of the *perpetual* virginity of Mary must be accepted as correct; for it is nowhere contradicted by the Gospels: neither directly (as the reading of the newly discovered Codex Sinaiticus may be safely rejected as being in this case in direct discordance with most of the other Manuscripts of the Gospels), nor indirectly (as the mention of Jesus' brethren can be satisfactorily understood as referring to children of Joseph by a former wife). It has furthermore a powerful support in early Christian tradition, theology and worship. It must be admitted, however, that viewed as an historical fact it has no explicit support in Scripture. The dogma must therefore be based on tradition rather than Scripture, a tradition which is attested by the majority of the Fathers of the Church and by the Christian cult.

Besides the traditional element, specific theological reasons can be shown to have strengthened the basis and motive of this further

⁹²Canon (now Bishop) Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, N. Y. 1895, pp. 64-65.

extension of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. These are: I. The great esteem in which virginity was universally held within as well as without the Christian Church. II. An argument of propriety, viz: that the virgin-mother of God should remain a virgin even after the birth of her Divine Son. III. The pious and quite justifiable fear that, should the brethren of the Lord, so often mentioned in the Gospels, be regarded as His real brethren, having Mary and Joseph for parents, suspicion would be thrown on Mary's "*ante-partum*" virginity, and doubts aroused concerning the divinity of Jesus Himself. Mary's perpetual virginity is, in fact, expressly stated in the works of Clement of Alexandria († 217), Eusebius of Caesarea († 338), Epiphanius († 403), Ephrem († 381) and the great majority of the Eastern and Western Fathers of the Church. It is not implied, however, in Tertullian's writings († circa 225). Indeed, he explicitly affirms that the Lord's brethren were His real brethren, although it is not improbable that his words may be quite satisfactorily interpreted as referring to an earlier marriage of Joseph. On Scriptural grounds, Mary's perpetual virginity seems to be contradicted directly by Matthew's statement in I., 25 "And he (Joseph) knew her not till she had brought forth her firstborn son", as the Authorized, the Douay and the Vulgate versions have it, or "till she had brought forth a son", as the Revised version has it. In which connection it is of interest to note that the Sinaitic Syriac Gospel simply has "When Joseph arose from his sleep he did as the angel of the Lord had commanded him, and took his wife: *and she bore to him a son*, and he called his name Jesus." It seems also to be contradicted, indirectly, by Matthew XIII. 55-56 and, Mark VI. 3-4, where we meet with the following statements: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not His Mother called Mary, and his brethren James, and Joseph, and Simon, and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us?"

Strictly speaking, the above quoted statements of Matthew and Mark do not necessarily oppose Mary's perpetual virginity, as they can be easily referred to Joseph alone in connection with a former marriage as is clearly attested by several apocryphal gospels and many fathers of the Church. But, at any rate, whether the Catholic doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity be scripturally demonstrable or not, it matters little for our present purpose, as it has no bearing whatever on the antecedent question of Christ's virginal conception.

The third and last stage of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth in the Catholic Church closes with the pious belief in the *perpetual virginity* of Joseph. The transition to this belief was quite natural, for if Mary, on account of her being the Mother of the Lord, has been adorned with the crown of perpetual virginity, why should not Joseph, on account of his being Christ's adoptive father, enjoy the same prerogative? When Helvidius, in the IVth century, denied the perpetual virginity of Mary, he was sharply rebuked by St. Jerome who thus replied to him "Tu dicis Marian virginem non permansisse: ego mihi plus vindico, etiam ipsum Joseph virginem fuisse per Mariam, ut ex virginali conjugio virgo filius nasceretur" (Migne. *Pat. Lat.* vol. XXIII. p. 203).

Jerome's line of argument was soon adopted by many writers and commentators, and in the seventh century the Venerable Bede († 735) had already succeeded in propagating the doctrine throughout the West. From that time on, it became a favorite theme for Catholic theologians, exegetes and preachers although, it must be noted, the Catholic Church has never pronounced itself dogmatically on the matter. The Catholic dogma of Mary's perpetual virginity excludes, of course, *ipso facto*, the possibility of any carnal relation between Joseph and Mary, but it does not exclude the possibility of a former marriage of Joseph, the result of which may have been the so-called brethren and sisters of Jesus.

The Catholic tradition of Joseph's perpetual virginity, coupled with the dogma of Mary's similar prerogative, proved a stumbling block to Catholic commentators and exegetes, and it was only to overcome it that they were forced to apply to the Gospel passages referring to Jesus' brethren the most forced and unnatural interpretation. For, if Mary and Joseph were both virgins, "ante" as well as "post partum," logic required that the "brethren and sisters" of Jesus should be understood as being purely his cousins.

It is needless to insist that the belief in Joseph's perpetual virginity has no ground whatever either in Scripture or in early Christian tradition and literature. The Gospel statements, were they to be rationally interpreted, are explicitly against it, although, as a specimen of dogmatic or rather theological process of evolution, it falls quite naturally within the sphere of progressive development, so apparent and visible in both Catholic and Protestant theology alike.

PART IV.

THE DOGMA OF CHRIST'S VIRGIN BIRTH CANNOT BE THE RESULT OF THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.

From the above considerations it is evident that if a process of development can be shown to have taken place in the second (which we deny) and especially the third stage (which we affirm) of the doctrine concerning the parentage and birth of Christ, no such process can be shown to have taken place in the first stage of the doctrine, as it is perfectly demonstrable that the doctrine, in its first stage relating to the divine conception of Christ and His Virgin Birth, was the primitive belief of the Apostles, Evangelists and Disciples of Our Lord, and at a time when theological development could not yet have taken place in the Church. Hence, if the doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary and of Joseph can be attacked on Scriptural and critical grounds, that of the Virgin Birth of Jesus stands as solid as a rock. It is of paramount importance to insist on the absurdity of the theory that the Christian doctrine of the Virgin Birth originated through the theological speculation of the earliest followers and admirers of Christ. Some critics maintain that the early Christians, far from being influenced by purely heathen mythologies, developed a speculative theology of their own. Lobstein expressly excludes the supposition of any dominating heathen influence. "The aversion," he tells us, "which primitive Christianity felt for polytheistic paganism was so deep-seated that before supposing the new religion to have been influenced by pagan mythologies, we must examine with the utmost possible care the points of resemblance which are sometimes found to exist between beliefs and institutions." Harnack, on the other hand, maintains that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and the Virgin Birth rests exclusively on the mistranslation and misunderstanding of the so-called Isaianic Immanuel prophecy (Isa. vii, 14), strengthened, of course, by those Jewish speculative theological tendencies so manifest in the Jewish school of Alexandria, etc.

How groundless this theory is will be easily seen from the following considerations: The belief in incarnations and in births by power of deities was confined exclusively to the heathen, and the conceptions of the Deity which made such notions possible were utterly foreign both to the Old Testament and to the Jewish adherents of the Gospel. It is a well known fact that the Gospel of the

Infancy originated with the Jewish Christian community of Palestine, which was distinctly of the Old Testament type, separate entirely from heathen influences. Hence, the supposition that the idea of the Virgin Birth originated out of the Old Testament ideas, is, to say the least, very improbable. Neander truly says that "such a fable as the birth of the Messiah from a virgin could have arisen anywhere else easier than among the Jews;" and Dr. B. Weiss adds that "According to the views of Judaism, not the virgin condition, but that of marriage was regarded as a Divine institution, and the children of marriage as a blessing from God." Equally baseless is the idea that a misunderstanding of the Isaianic Immanuel prophecy furnished the basis for the doctrine, as it is a well known fact that the prophecy in question was never understood by the Jews as referring to the Messiah's birth, for such an interpretation is distinctly Christian, advanced by early Christian apologists by way of an argument.

According to Lobstein, the process of development must have been simple and easy. From the strong conviction of Jesus' superiority over patriarchs, lawgivers and prophets, to the idea that Jesus was Himself the Son of God by a supernatural generation, the entire process was as easy and natural as the growth of a plant from stem to flower and fruit. But this supposition is too violently opposed to all that we know of the nature of the circumstances under which they were placed. As Dr. Sweet remarks, the most marked characteristic of Christ's disciples and of the people by whom He was usually surrounded, was their almost immovable intellectual conservatism. They were fixed in the traditions of the scribes and elders. Any novelty of teaching or practice, any departure from the beaten track of traditional interpretation or action, was sure to awaken feelings of fear, suspicion and disgust. Christ's own disciples moved under His leadership out of the old era into the new with most amazing reluctance and timidity.

To give these men or their immediate successors credit for so startling an innovation as the attempt to interpret Christ's divine life by a supernatural generation, is to lay upon them a task which they were utterly incapable of performing. The panic into which the more conservative brethren were thrown by the liberalism of Paul gives one an indication of the atmosphere of intense conservatism, in which the early Jewish Christians had been trained, and from which they never wholly escaped. It required all the force of the entire Christian revelation, and the lifelong teaching of such a leader

as John, to bring men of Jewish blood to the acceptance of the idea of an incarnation at all, and many revolted from it finally, to the loss of Christian fellowship and hope. To these men, the chasm which separates the wonder-stories concerning the birth of Isaac, Moses and the other Jewish heroes from the story of a divine incarnation by birth from a virgin would have been utterly impossible. The men, who hesitated to sit down at meat with Gentiles, lest it be an innovation upon what they had been taught, would have hesitated and stopped a long way this side of the invention of a Virgin Birth to explain Christ's divine Sonship. Besides, the Gospels were formed and written in an atmosphere of controversy and criticism and not in a period of peace and tranquillity which is required for theological speculation. During the latter part of Christ's ministry, during the early days of the young church after the Resurrection, and during the entire period of the formation of the canon, the disciples were in the midst of a continual conflict with critics, Jewish and heathen. They were forced to put emphasis upon essentials, to guard every statement, so as not to leave themselves open to misconstruction. They would be loyal to the teachings of the Lord, and to all authentic traditions concerning Him, but they would be certain not to form innovations which might be misconstrued and used against them.

Equally untenable is the supposition that the Virgin Birth narrative was invented in order to increase honor to Jesus or to convince the early Christians of His divinity. It is a well-known fact that among the Jews birth out of wedlock was a fearful disgrace to all in any way connected with it, and with the family.

The reluctance of Joseph to believe in the possibility of a Virgin Birth must have been shared by every person to whom it was told. The doctrine, therefore, would have been the last thing in the world to be invented by the Evangelists, as it would have furnished the Jews and the anti-Christians with a means of discrediting the origin and mission of Jesus, and the character of Mary.

In view of these facts, it is hardly conceivable how Matthew and Luke's narratives of Christ's Virgin Birth should have been the result of Jewish dogmatic speculation rather than the honest and sincere record of a historical event.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

THE SYLLABUS OF PIUS X

It is a fine thing to belong to a great wide old Church, if only for the corporate wisdom and patience which it acquires, and in which one can hardly help sharing. It partakes of the unhurrying confident serenity of things vast and everlasting. Those outside may criticise; some within may worry, but the great body moves on about its work unashamed and unafraid. The latest example of this is the reception of the new Syllabus of Pius X. The gentlemen of the press (one thinks of Edmund Burke's parable of the grasshoppers) have all expressed their well matured over-night views on it. Most of the non-Catholic critics said just what we expected them to say—they would have said the same if the Pope had reaffirmed the Ten Commandments or condemned polygamy and idolatry. Here and there an ardent member of the Church has shown how much better a Catholic he is than the Pope by extending the condemnation to include, it would seem, everybody who has studied biology or Hebrew. But the Church Universal is indifferent alike to critics and alarmists. The teaching authority has condemned only extreme views; and the great body of the faithful, bishops, priests, laity, universities, seminaries, reviews have accepted its decisions with unanimity and equanimity. If the "thousand peering littlenesses" had only the wit to see it, they are here in presence of a great fact which shows that faith and hope and brotherly charity are still forces that unite a large mass of human kind.

The nineteenth century piled up a vast array of facts, and not a few theories which were in many instances incompatible with the accepted statement of Catholic, or, indeed, theistic belief. In response to the needs of the situation learned Catholics took up the work of refutation or the still more delicate task of restatement and reconciliation. From the Catholic point of view as manifested in our history, there is nothing deserving of reproof in this undertaking. To condemn it is to condemn Suarez and Aquinas, Augustine and Clement. But it is essentially a difficult and dangerous undertaking since it is the application by a fallible individual of human reason and knowledge to a set of divine truths which are to be safeguarded in the long run by an infallible teaching body. Despite these dangers, however, in the actual working out of that infallible guidance, the preliminary work is done by historians, exegetes, philosophers, theo-

logians—any one of whom is liable to be mistaken in the solutions he proposes. It would all be easy if we had a new revelation for every difficulty, or if *ex cathedra* pronouncements were given in every case of doubt, or even if we could always be sure of having amongst the body of the faithful an Aquinas in whose scientific knowledge and theological fidelity we could place equal confidence. But such helps are rarely given us. Men must venture on solutions, and men will make mistakes. And there are times when the official caretakers of the faith must “reprove, entreat, and rebuke in all patience and doctrine.”

“In omni patientia et doctrina.” For a quarter of a century and more this movement of Catholic scholarship has been allowed to proceed almost unchecked by the central authority of the Church. Here and there a book, here and there an individual has been censured. But in the main the settlement of difficulties has been left to the friendly warfare of theological schools within the Church. As is generally the result in such cases, many of the new positions after having been hotly debated, were accepted as safe and true. But still more extreme views were proposed which seemed out of harmony with any orthodox statement of Catholic belief. For the past two years the highest Congregation in the Church has been at work considering such views, and the result of their deliberations has been the issuing of the list of condemned propositions which has been called the Syllabus of Pius X.

Reactionary, illiberal, obscurantist, extreme—such are some of the epithets applied to this document in the secular and non-Catholic press, by men who write as if speaking out of the abundance of their knowledge on the matter. But it is a trifle disconcerting to the believer in journalistic infallibility who has taken the trouble to read through the propositions, to reconcile the fact that they contain not the slightest reference to economic questions with the oft repeated statement that the views of the Abbate Murri are again condemned. And for one who is acquainted with the works of (for example) Cardinal Newman or Father Lagrange, it requires a grotesque twisting of words to find in the Syllabus a repudiation of their positions. Now what strikes the Catholic theologian in this document is its moderation. He knows the strength of the language Rome is not using. He reads a list of false propositions which are gently denominated “errors” even though they deserve in many instances the deeper brand of “heresy.” The condemnation is promulgated in a way

that is authoritative and effective indeed, but without invoking the infallible magisterium of the Church. And as he reads the lucid and careful statement of the sixty-five propositions that are proscribed, there come up to his mind a number of opinions which the Congregation must have considered, and left uncondemned.

More official statements of Protestant opinion make interesting and curious reading. The Protestant position, or rather the lack of it, is always an odd thing to the Catholic. They seldom seem to recognize that they have the same dilemma as ourselves to solve in the conflict between authority and individualism, the main difference to a bystander being that we have taken up a more definite and consistent stand. One should expect that, as men who in spite of intellectual difficulties still retain faith in Christ and the Bible, they would welcome a strong pronouncement from the old Church in defense of the common Christian teachings. One should expect that, as members of ecclesiastical organizations, they would have some appreciation of the mind of men who defer to a Church which they have freely accepted as representing divine truth to them. But the old critical and destructive spirit which is the essence of Protestantism is too much for them. So they deplore the tyranny of the Roman Church even though it be defending the basic doctrines of Christianity; and they see in the rational obedience of Catholics only a manifestation of weakness or hypocrisy. If Protestantism were a definite system of any sort, whether of faith or of free thought, one might debate the question. But as things are one can only shrug one's shoulders and regret the lack of logic in men who, by definition, at least, ought to be rational.

The same strange lack of understanding is manifest in the prophecy by some indulged in that this act of authority will lead to a "Los von Rom" movement. If it did, Protestantism would not be the gainer by it. In a famous passage Macaulay notes that "it is surely remarkable that neither the moral revolution of the eighteenth century, nor the moral counter-revolution of the nineteenth, should, in any perceptible degree, have added to the domain of Protestantism.... We think it a most remarkable fact that no Christian nation, which did not adopt the principles of the Reformation before the end of the sixteenth century, should ever have adopted them. Catholic communities have, since that time, become infidel and become Catholic again; but none has become Protestant." It is quite true that during the last 300 years there has been almost no spirit of schism

amongst the religious-minded members of the Catholic Church. Men have dropped away because they abandoned religion entirely. Some have joined Protestant sects, but their motive has been usually political or social, or "for revenue only." It is difficult to find instances of those who have renounced their obedience to the Roman Church to improve their religious condition; the *religious* movement, in fact, has been in the return direction. And, if we may speak plainly, the deterrent reason has been that Protestantism affords a "horrible example" of what heresy leads to. And, to come to the present instance, we find the need of religious unity strongly asserted in the writings of the men who are most directly affected by the condemnations of the new Syllabus.

More naive, if anything, is the notion that some writers seem to have that the result (if it be not indeed the purpose) of the Syllabus will be the stifling of intellectual activity within the Catholic Church. And of this view we find traces in the less thoughtful and less responsible utterances of some writers in the Catholic press. But such an idea is egregiously absurd. The whole history of Catholic theology, the evident intentions of the Holy Father, the very words of the Syllabus itself are against it. One of the condemned propositions reads: "The Church has shown herself to be hostile to the progress of the natural and theological sciences" (prop. 57); and the third and the last propositions of the Syllabus convey the same view.

Non-Catholics who are so generous with their sympathy for unfortunate Catholic scholars deprived of their liberty might do well to reserve their tears until they find out whether these scholars have lost any liberties which they were anxious to retain. It must be a disconcerting experience to go on a visit of condolence only to find the reputed prisoner enjoying the usual liberties of a citizen or the supposed corpse making merry with his friends. As a matter of fact, though a few more adventurous Catholic scholars may be affected by the Syllabus, the vast majority of them have been working quite within the lines that it lays down; and the notion that their activities must now cease betrays gross ignorance both of their views and of the condemned propositions. We have in English a number of Catholic publications which treat serious theological problems: In America, the *University Bulletin*, the *Catholic Quarterly*, the *Ecclesiastical Review*, the *Messenger*, the *Catholic World*, the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, the *New York Review*; in England, the *Dublin Review*, the *Month*, the *Tablet*; in Ireland, the *Ecclesiastical Record*, the *Theological*

Quarterly. Now it would not be difficult to find in any one of these at least some admissions, theories, facts, principles, methods which would sound strange and modern to theologians of the thirteenth or the seventeenth centuries. We need only suggest certain headings: new facts and theories in physics and astronomy, biology and theories of restricted evolution, the results of psycho-physics, the victories of sane criticism, the treatment of the Synoptic problem, the new data in archeology, the study of comparative religions, the use of Newman's theory of development of doctrine, the application of new historical methods to patrology, the handling of obnoxious historical facts, the study of the psychology of religions assent, etc., etc. In all of the fields thus roughly indicated our Catholic writers have grappled with difficulties which were a source of grave fears to the faithful during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But we think it a safe prophecy to make that one could go through these periodicals Syllabus in hand without discovering any one of the condemned propositions. Naturally, nobody has sufficient knowledge of the whole field to declare categorically beforehand that such a quest would be absolutely fruitless. But such we believe would be the case—unless, indeed, the examiner be one of “those vulgar heads that love to look askint on the face of truth.”

It is a great source of confidence in the present crisis that the great mass of Catholic scholars stand in a solid phalanx, obedient to the voice of authority, and ready still for the combat against error. They reject the half-scornful sympathy which subtly attacks their allegiance; they rebuke the counsels of the timid and the lazy who prefer surrender or inaction to an honest, manly effort for truth and right.

“*Foris pugnae,*” says the Apostle, “*intus timores.*” Panic is a greater foe than armed legions. In times of stress there are always to be found men who would haul down the standard from territory which has been occupied, and may still be retained, with the blessing and sanction of authority. They are ignorant or heedless of the fact that the territory which they would abandon must be reoccupied, and the next time by forces disheartened, disorganized, and warring amongst themselves. Such men are ill-fitted to understand or execute the plans of a sagacious leader who recalls his men from untenable positions which can only open an entrance to the enemy, in order to do battle more efficiently on ground that can be defended.

From the dangers which spring from vague and empty fears the Church will be saved by the broad views and wise discretion of its strong central authority, supported by the bishops of the Catholic world, men who are not wont to lose their heads in times of difficulty. Under such leadership the movement towards concentration will not usher in a period of surrender or inaction. Indeed, the history of theology shows that the limitation of the field of free enquiry by dogmatic definitions has frequently promoted rather than suppressed the activity of the Catholic intellect. It was so after Nicæa and it was so after Trent. And so too it will appear, we trust, to the future historian who writes the annals of Catholic thought in the twentieth century.

The above remarks were written some time ago for the number of the Review which appears as the first half of this issue. Since then the Encyclical has appeared. It has been the occasion of new and more violent criticisms of the Holy See of the kind which we have striven to characterise in our comments on the critics of the Syllabus. We see no reason to modify the severity of our remarks, nor the attitude of faith and hope which we hold. The new pronouncement limits more exactly the field of the Catholic worker in the domain of knowledge. It must be studied carefully and followed by all who assume the statement or defense of Catholic positions. But the prophecy we indulged in that these recent decisions of authority will be the beginning of a more glorious period of Catholic intellectual activity is given a prospect of fulfilment by the announcement of the Holy Father's intention to form a body of Catholic scholars who shall devote themselves to the advancement of learning. Catholics needed no such assurance of the Sovereign Pontiff's attitude towards science and progress, but to stop the lips of gainsayers we are happy to be able to quote the decisive words of his Encyclical: "The adversaries of the Church will doubtless abuse what we have said to refurbish the old calumny by which we are traduced as the enemy of science and of the progress of humanity. In order to oppose a new answer to such accusations, which the history of the Christian religion refutes by never-failing arguments, it is our intention to establish and develop by every means in our power a special Institute in which, through the co-operation of those Catholics who are most eminent for their learning, the progress of science and other realms of knowledge may be promoted under the guidance and teaching of Catholic truth. God grant that we may happily realise our design

with the ready assistance of all those who bear a sincere love for the Church of Christ. But of this we will speak on another occasion."

Meanwhile the best refutation that humbler members of the Church can give to the injurious assertion that Catholic scholarship has been rendered impossible by the recent official pronouncements is to go calmly ahead in union with the Holy See, and show the folly of such statements by the facts. "*Solvitur ambulando.*" And as an instance of this method of refutation we may be pardoned if we call attention to the present number of the *NEW YORK REVIEW*. The contributions treat of practically every department of religious knowledge: Dogma, patrology, apologetics, history, archaeology, textual criticism, Biblical theology, theodicy, ethics, metaphysics, science. And be it noted that here we have no attempt to offer a specious appearance of scholarship by directing attention to useless and forgotten questions of interest only to the antiquarians of theology. The topics selected are of present-day interest; the writers are versed in all the lore of the moderns; they face resolutely the most recent difficulties; they make their attack armed with the best weapons of their adversaries. And in their attitude and conclusions they prove that loyalty to science and to the Holy See is a double, but not a divided duty.

Nor can it be said that this happy combination of alertness and obedience is a characteristic of Catholic scholars in only one distant corner of the world-wide Church. We could show this by referring to theological publications in the different countries, but happily we need not go beyond the covers of this issue to prove the point. Our contributors represent three continents: Asia, Europe, America; and nine countries: Mesopotamia, Italy, Switzerland, France, England, Ireland, Scotland, Canada, and the United States. The list includes men who were born to the inheritance of the faith and men who obtained that priceless gift in later life by grace and prayer; priests of different rites; members of the two great religious orders which are most illustrious in the annals of theology; representatives of teaching bodies, of learned periodicals, of the parochial clergy.

Those outside the Church might well pay attention to facts such as these (and they could be multiplied a thousandfold) before they assume so jauntily the office of critics or of prophets. For our own part, we shall go on about our work, devoted to the ancient Faith and to its living exponent, the Vicar of Christ; meeting what is false in modern thought with its own weapons; strengthening our souls

against "combats without" and "fears within" by the reflection with which we began: "It is a fine thing to belong to a great wide old Church, if only for the corporate wisdom and patience it acquires. It partakes of the unhurrying confident serenity of things vast and everlasting. Those outside may criticise; some within may worry; but the great body moves on about its work unashamed and unafraid."

NOTES.

THE EPISCOPATE OF NEW YORK ON THE SYLLABUS.

Most Holy Father,

The recent publication of the Syllabus of Modern Errors calls for some fitting expression of our sentiments of filial devotion, and especially of our most profound gratitude for this exceptional evidence of Apostolic care and solicitude, which all those entrusted with the salvation of souls as well as all the faithful embrace with the deepest appreciation.

The paternal heart of Your Holiness is ineffably grieved over the pernicious persecution that is still raging against the Church of Christ, and this sorrow is all the more insufferable because this insidious attack is being nurtured not only by those outside the fold, but even by sons and brethren who have been carried away by the gravest errors. In view of these facts, We, too, cannot but feel, with Your Holiness, the burden of intense sorrow.

This tender solicitude of Your Holiness commands universal admiration and praise, for though worn out by so many and so great labors and tribulations, you keep a most constant watch over the Universal Church to preserve intact the integrity of the faith and ward off all dangers that menace the deposit of doctrine given to us from Heaven. The decree recently promulgated is a magnificent monument to the office of the Supreme Teacher and evokes from our humble hearts feelings of the liveliest joy and gratitude, first towards the Divine Founder of the Church and then towards His most worthy Vicar on earth.

These same sentiments are unanimously shared by the faithful of the Province of New York who are united to the See of Peter by the closest ties of obedience reverence and affection.

While none among us, as far as We know, is imbued with these disastrous errors nevertheless, We and all those committed to us, both clergy and laity, hasten to assure Your Holiness of our immediate and steadfast adhesion to this most opportune decree. We condemn and proscribe all and each of the propositions condemned and proscribed by Your Holiness, and, moreover, We have taken effective measures to preserve the doctrine and discipline of our Churches, Schools, and Seminaries, from the dangers indicated in the new decree.

The Professors in all the Faculties of our Seminaries subscribe to these provisions with full, explicit, and nominal assent. Peter has spoken once more and though the evils that now threaten Holy Church are numerous and grave, still it is our firm hope that the promise made to Peter and his Successors will triumph: the gates of Hell shall not prevail.

Prostrate at the feet of Your Holiness, We most humbly implore the Apostolic Benediction for ourselves, for our most devoted clergy and for our beloved and faithful flocks.

Your Holiness':

Most obedient sons,

JOHN M. FARLEY, Archbishop of New York,
BERNARD McQUAID, Bishop of Rochester,
PATRICK A. LUDDEN, Bishop of Syracuse,
HENRY GABRIELS, Bishop of Ogdensburg,

CHARLES E. McDONNELL, Bishop of Brooklyn,
THOMAS M. A. BURKE, Bishop of Albany,
JAMES A. McFAUL, Bishop of Trenton,
JOHN J. O'CONNOR, Bishop of Newark,
CHARLES H. COLTON, Bishop of Buffalo,
THOMAS F. HICKEY, Coo-adjutor of Rochester,
THOMAS F. CUSACK, Auxiliary Bishop of New York.

Given at New York, the thirty-first day of August, 1907.

On account of its value to those who are interested in clerical studies, we present to our readers the letter of Cardinal Ferrafa to the Bishops of Italy prescribing a uniform course of studies in the seminaries of that land. The version and synopsis are taken from the *Ecclesiastical Review*.

The Congregation of Bishops and Regulars commissioned by the Holy Father to reorganize the Seminaries of Italy has deemed it advisable to submit a common Program of Studies whereby to unify and improve the instruction imparted in our Seminaries.

In outlining the order of studies it has been decided to take as a basis the division of the courses which has been already introduced into nearly all the seminaries, namely, Gymnasium, Lyceum, and Theologicum.

For the subjects which make up the courses in the Gymnasium and Lyceum, and for their distribution, it was necessary to adopt, with some necessary modifications, the programs in general use in Italy, not because these are perfect, but principally for the following reasons:

1. The program in use represents in public estimation that culture which is required to-day; hence the efficiency of the clergy who have been educated according to them will be increased, whilst a lack of these demands will create, at least in the eyes of many, the impression that priests are inferior to laymen as regards true culture.

2. It is also to be considered that candidates, as a rule, cannot definitely decide upon their having a vocation to the ecclesiastical state before they have reached a certain age; hence it is advisable to regulate their studies in such a way that they may obtain recognized certificates of fitness, which will be useful to them in case they should adopt some other state of life. It is needless to say that such certificates are also likely to prove of advantage to those whom God may be pleased to call to the priesthood.

A wise and judicious superintendence will easily prevent, or will at the least greatly lessen, the abuses arising from the fact that students may remain in the seminaries after the Gymnasium course, for the mere purpose of obtaining the licentiate of the Lyceum course.

Moreover, the program of studies in the Lyceum accords with that which should form part of the Philosophy course in the seminaries, with the addition only of the department of Letters and History, quite necessary for students of the sanctuary who should be *instructi ad omne opus bonum*.

It has also been deemed advisable to prefix to the Theology course a year of Propedeutics, so as to complete the course of Philosophy, and to treat of certain subjects which cannot easily be included in the course of Theology. This additional year may be dispensed with, if it can be shown that during the Lyceum course adequate preparation has been given for that of Theology.

Rules for the theological course are given so as to render it complete and easily compassed within four years.

Finally, a time-table is added, to serve as a guide to Prefects of Studies.

By the authority of the Holy Father, I have the honor to communicate this program to you with the request that you see it put in force in your seminary for the course of the next scholastic year.

You are also requested to report to this Sacred Congregation the rules governing the studies in your seminary and to forward the list of professors and of text-books used by them.

I trust that, under the assiduous care of Your Lordship, the exact observance of the program will be ensured whereby you will contribute efficaciously to the higher education of the clergy and enable them, with greater advantage to souls, to fulfil their noble mission.

D. CARD. FERRATA, *Prefect.*

F. GIUSTINI, *Secretary.*

THE COURSE OF STUDIES.

The course of studies in all the Seminaries of Italy is divided into the departments of the Gymnasium, Lyceum, and Theologicum.

I. GYMNASIUM.

1. No student shall be admitted to the classes of the Gymnasium unless he present a certificate of fitness, showing that he has regularly completed the preceding classes, and pass the entrance examination.

2. The course of the Gymnasium shall be one of five years, divided into five classes, during which shall be taught the matters of the programs in general use, and the same time-table shall be followed, but in such a way as to give a certain preference to Latin in all the classes while at the same time qualifying the students to pass the examination of the Gymnasial licentiate.

3. At least one hour a week shall be assigned in every class for catechetical instruction.

II. LYCEUM.

1. No student shall be admitted to the Lyceum unless he have regularly gone through the classes of the Gymnasium and passed the examinations.

2. The Lyceum shall be divided into three classes, corresponding with the three years of the course, and these classes shall correspond both with regard to the subjects and to the time-tables with the programs in general use, in such a way that the students shall be prepared to pass the Lyceal licentiate and at the same time a more ample development be given to sound philosophy. (See IV, 2 and 3.)

3. At least one hour a week shall be assigned for religious instruction.

III. PROPEDEUTICS.

1. In this course the students, besides acquiring a more profound knowledge of philosophy, shall study other matters, which may be those indicated in the time-table appended.

2. In the Seminaries where this year of Propedeutics shall be established the study of philosophy in the three years of the Lyceum shall embrace psychology, logic, general metaphysics, ethics.

3. Where a dispensation for this year has been obtained, clerics aspiring to the priesthood shall during the three years of the Lyceum, in addition to the matters contained in the program, have assigned to them at least two hours a week, if neces-

sary even on Thursdays, for the completion of the study of philosophy, and especially of those parts of philosophy which are necessary for an adequate preparation for theological studies.

IV. THEOLOGY.

1. The course of Theology shall be one of four years, divided into four classes, with a regular time table of four hours a day of teaching.

2. It shall embrace the following matters: Loci theologici, General and Particular Introduction to the Sacred Scripture, Biblical Exegesis, Dogmatic Theology and the Sacraments, Moral and Pastoral Theology, Institutions of Canon Law, Ecclesiastical History, Hebrew, Greek, Sacred Archeology and Art, Sacred Eloquence and Patrology, Liturgy.

V. GENERAL REGULATIONS.

1. In order that this program may be properly carried out every Seminary shall have a Prefect of Studies, who is to be elected by the Bishop.

2. To the Prefect, always under the superintendence of the Bishop, shall appertain the preparation of the course of lectures for the Professors, the compilation of the Calendar and of the scholastic time-tables.

3. After having consulted with the Professors, whom he is to assemble in council every month, and more frequently should he judge it necessary, the Prefect of Studies shall apply, or even modify, the program in general use, arrange the hours of teaching according to these programs in such a way as to observe the substance of them and leave them adequate for the examinations of the licentiate, while at the same time allowing more time for matters of greater importance for the scope of the Seminaries, as has been above observed for Latin in the Gymnasium and Philosophy in the Lyceum.

4. The scholastic year shall last for not less than nine months.

5. The Prefect of Studies with the Board of Professors shall arrange that at the end of the year searching examinations be held regularly in all the matters, for promotion to the higher classes, and decide on the number of votes required for a pass.

6. A session for supplementary examinations shall be established for those who have failed to pass in the first examinations.

7. The different matters in the Lyceal and Theological courses shall be entrusted to good Professors, who may also, by way of exception, be charged with teaching some branch kindred to their own. But in all cases care must be taken that no Professor be burdened with too many hours of teaching, to the evident loss of the students.

8. Each Professor in treating his subject shall employ a text-book, which he shall explain in such a way as to complete the annual course marked out in the Program.

9. For the Gymnasium and the Lyceum, as the programs in general use are to be followed, the text-books shall be selected in conformity with these programs, due regard of course being paid to the nature and scope of the Seminaries.

10. For Philosophy and Theology the text-book shall be proposed by the Board of Professors, and submitted for the approval of the Bishop.

NOTE.—In the central and interdiocesan seminaries the rights of the Ordinary belong to the body of Bishops interested.

Seen and approved, with the earnest recommendation that Our Venerable Brothers the Bishops faithfully observe the above.

Feast of St. Pius V.

5 May, 1907.

PIUS X POPE.

APPENDIX.

TIME-TABLE FOR THE CLASS OF PROPEDEUTICS.

First hour.—Every day: "De vera religione,"

Second hour.—Monday, Wednesday and Friday: "Propedeutics to Ecclesiastical History;" Tuesday and Saturday: "Biblical Greek."

Third hour.—Monday, Wednesday and Friday: "Theodicea;" Tuesday and Saturday: "Natural Law."

Fourth hour.—Monday, Wednesday and Friday: "Cosmology;" Tuesday and Saturday: "History of Philosophy."

TIME-TABLE FOR THEOLOGY.

Monday, first hour.—First year: "Locī Theologici;" second, third and fourth year: "Moral Theology."

Second hour.—Second, third and fourth year: "Dogma;" first year: "Moral, De actibus humanis, Conscientia, Legibus."

Third hour.—First and second year: "Hebrew or Greek, Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures;" third and fourth year: "Institutions of Canon Law."

Fourth hour, for all years: "Hebrew or Greek, Introduction to Ecclesiastical History."

Tuesday, first hour.—First and second year: "The Sacred Scriptures;" third and fourth year: "Institutions of Canon Law."

Second hour, all four years: "Biblical Exegesis,"

Third hour, all four years: "Sacred Archeology and Art."

Fourth hour, all four years: "Ecclesiastical History."

Wednesday, first, second and third hour as on Monday.

Fourth hour, all four years: "Biblical Exegesis."

Friday, as on Monday.

Saturday, first and second hour, as on Monday.

Third hour, all four years: "Sacred Eloquence, Patrology."

Fourth hour, all four years: "Sacred Liturgy."

With the foregoing time-table the plan of lectures works out as follows:

For the first year: Four hours of "Hebrew or Greek, and Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures;" two hours of "Biblical Exegesis;" four hours of "Locī Theologici;" four hours of "Fundamental Treatises of Moral Theology;" three hours of "Ecclesiastical History;" one hour of "Sacred Archeology and Art;" one hour of "Sacred Eloquence and Patrology;" one hour of "Sacred Liturgy." Total, twenty hours.

For the second year: Four hours of "Hebrew or Greek and Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures;" four hours of "Moral;" two hours of "Biblical Exegesis;" four hours of "Dogma;" three hours of "Ecclesiastical History;" one hour of "Sacred Archeology and Art;" one hour of "Sacred Eloquence and Patrology;" one hour of "Sacred Liturgy." Total, twenty hours.

For the third and fourth years: Four hours of "Moral and Pastoral Theology;" four hours of "Institutions of Canon Law;" three hours of "Ecclesiastical History;" two hours of "Biblical Exegesis;" one hour of "Sacred Archeology and Art;" one hour of "Sacred Eloquence and Patrology;" one hour of "Sacred Liturgy." Total, twenty hours.

SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI PII DIVINA PROVIDENTIA PAPAE X.

DE SENTENTIIS PONTIFICALIS CONSILII REI BIBLICAE PROVEHENDAE PRAEPOSITI AC
DE CENSURIS ET POENIS IN EOS QVI PRAESCRIPTA ADVERSUS MODERNIS-
TARVM ERRORES NEGLEXERINT.

MOTV PROPRIO

Praestantia Scripturae Sacrae enarrata, eiusque commendato studio, Litteris Encyclicis *Providentissimus Deus*, datis XIV Calendas decembres a. MDCCCLXXXIII, Leo XIII, Noster immortalis memoriae Decessor, leges descripsit quibus Sacrorum Biblicorum studia ratione proba regerentur; Librisque divinis contra errores calumniasque Rationalistarum assertis, simul et ab opinionibus vindicavit falsae doctrinae, quae *critica sublimior* audit; quas quidem opiniones nihil esse aliud palam est, nisi *Rationalismi commenta*, quemadmodum sapientissime scribebat Pontifex, *e philologia et finitimis disciplinis detorta*.

Ingravescenti autem in dies periculo prospecturus, quod inconsultarum deviarumque sententiarum propagatione parabatur, Litteris Apostolicis *Vigilantiae studique memores*, tertio calendas novembres a. MDCCCII datis, Decessor idem Noster Pontificale Consilium seu *Commissionem* de re Biblica condidit, aliquot doctrina et prudentia claros S. R. E. Cardinales complexam, quibus, Consultorum nomine, complures e sacro ordine adiecti sunt viri, e doctis scientia theologiae Biblicorumque Sacrorum delecti, natione varii, studiorum exegeticorum methodo atque opinentis dissimiles. Scilicet id commodum Pontifex, aptissimum studiis et aetati, animo spectabat, fieri in Consilio locum sententiis quibusvis libertate omnimoda proponendis, expendendis disceptandisque; neque ante, secundum eas Litteras, certa aliqua in sententia debere Purpuratos Patres consistere, quam quum cognita prius et in utramque partem examinata rerum argumenta forent, nihilque esset posthabitu, quod posset clarissimo collocare in lumine verum sincerumque propositarum de re Biblica quaestionum statum: hoc demum emenso cursu, debere sententias Pontifici Summo subiici probandas, ac deinde pervulgari.

Post diuturna rerum iudicia consultationesque diligentissimas, quaedam feliciter a Pontificio de re Biblica Consilio emissae sententiae sunt, provehendis germane biblicis studiis, iisdemque certa norma dirigendis perutiles. At vero minime deesse conspicimus qui, plus nimio ad opiniones methodosque proni perniciosi novitatibus affectas, studioque praeter nodum abrepti falsae libertatis, quae sane est licentia intemperans, probatque se in doctrinis sacris equidem insidiosissimam maximorumque malorum contra fidei puritatem fecundam, non eo, quo par est, obsequio sententias eiusmodi, quamquam a Pontifice probatas, exceperint aut excipiant.

Quapropter declarandum illud praecipendumque videmus, quemadmodum declaramus in praesens expresseque praecipimus, universos omnes conscientiae obstringi officio sententiis Pontificalis Consilii de re Biblica, ad doctrinam pertinentibus, sive quae adhuc sunt emissae sive quae posthac edentur, perinde ac Decretis Sacrarum Congregationum a Pontifice probatis, se subiiciendi; nec posse notam tum detrectatae oboedientiae tum temeritatis devitare aut culpa propterea vacare gravi quotquot verbis scriptisve sententias has tales impugnent; idque praeter scandalum, quo offendant, ceteraque quibus in causa esse coram Deo possint, aliis, ut plurimum, temere in his errateque pronunciatis.

Ad haec, audentiores quotidie spiritus complurium modernistarum repressuri, qui sophismatis artificiisque omne genus vim efficacitatemque nituntur adimere non Decreto solum *Lamentabili sane exitu*, quod v nonas Iulias anni vertentis S. R. et U. Inquisitio, Nobis iubentibus, edidit, verum etiam Litteris Encyclicis Nostris *Pascendi Dominici gregis*, datis die VIII mensis Septembris istius eiusdem anni, Auc-

toritate Nostra Apostolica iteramus confirmamusque tum *Decretum* illud Congregationis Sacrae Supremae, tum *Litteras* eas Nostras *Encyclicas*, addita *excommunicationis* poena adversus contradictores; illudque declaramus ac decernimus, si quis, quod Deus avertat, eo audaciae progrediatur ut quamlibet e propositionibus, opinionibus doctrinisque in alterutro documento, quod supra diximus, improbatis tueatur, centura ipso facto plecti Capite *Docentes* Constitutionis *Apostolicae Sedis* irrogata, quae prima est in excommunicationibus latae sententiae Romano Pontifici simpliciter reservatis. Haec autem excommunicatio salvis poenis est intelligenda, in quas, qui contra memorata documenta quidpiam commiserint, possint, uti propagatores defensoresque haeresum, incurrere, si quando eorum propositiones, opiniones doctrinaeve haereticae sint, quod quidem de utriusque illius documenti adversariis plus semel usuvenit, tum vero maxime quum modernistarum errores, id est *omnium haereseon collectum*, propugnant.

His constitutis, Ordinariis dioecesum et Moderatoribus Religiosarum Consociationum denuo vehementerque commendamus, velint pervigiles in magistros esse, Seminariorum in primis; repertosque erroribus modernistarum imbutos, novarum nocentiumque rerum studiosos, aut minus ad praescripta Sedis Apostolicae, utcumque edita, dociles, magisterio prorsus interdican: a sacris item ordinibus adolescentes excludant, qui vel minimum dubitationis iniiciant doctrinas se consecrari damnatas novitatesque maleficas. Simul hortamur, observare studiose ne cessent libros aliaque scripta, nimium quidem percrebrescentia, quae opiniones proclivitatesque gerant tales, ut improbatis per *Encyclicas* *Litteras* *Decretumque* supra dicta consentiant: ea summovenda curent ex officinis librariis catholicis multoque magis e studiosae iuventutis Clerique manibus. Id si solleter accuraverint, verae etiam solidaeque faverint institutioni mentium, in qua maxime debet sacrorum Praesulum sollicitudo versari.

Haec Nos universa rata et firma consistere auctoritate Nostra volumus et iubemus, contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, die XVIII mensis Novembris a. MDCCCXVII, Pontificatus Nostri quinto.

PIVS PP. X.

We offer no apologies for presenting *in extenso* the remarks of some evidently friendly critic of this REVIEW, which were published in the English *Catholic Weekly*, November 15, 1907. We feel that the pleasure we experience in having our efforts appreciated will be shared by all our friends.

"With the current number, THE NEW YORK REVIEW enters upon its third year of publication. We take the occasion to congratulate it on its success, and to call the attention of our readers to some of its more salient features. When it was started three years ago, its promoters realized that the strides made in scientific and historical research during the past half-century demanded the consideration of new problems. But they also realized that those problems could not be adequately dealt with except by working in sympathy with the Holy See. The journal, issuing from the diocesan seminary of New York, was under the responsibility of Archbishop Farley, whose intimate friendship with, and devotion to Pius X. were sufficient guarantee of the utmost loyalty. Working, then, in this spirit of progress under authoritative guidance, the editors have been able to produce in one special periodical some of the best work of Catholic scholars, both at home and abroad. Not only have America and England been represented, but also France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Italy. Amongst the contributors we notice the names of Wilfrid Ward,

Ernesto Bonaiuti, William Turner, James J. Fox, Francis E. Gigot, William Barry, M. J. Lagrange, William J. Kerby, Henri Bremond, Vincent McNabb, Walter McDonald, Gabriel Oussani, John T. Driscoll, Joseph Turmel, Cornelius Clifford, Edward J. Hanna, William L. Sullivan, Henry A. Poels, Mgr. Batiffol, Joseph McSorley, George Fonsegrive, Thomas J. Gerrard, Charles Plater.

It only too frequently happens that the learned journals are so highly technical that the busy layman, and even the busy missionary priest, has neither the time nor the courage to digest them. Yet if the work of experts is to be of any value at all, if it is not to remain for ever in the catacombs of libraries and buried in dust, it must be presented in a way so that it may be fairly well assimilated by the average all-around scholar. And we think that the *NEW YORK REVIEW* has succeeded in striking that happy mean which avoids extreme dryness on the one hand, and the obvious or commonplace on the other.

The first place is naturally given to the apologetic questions of the hour. They are treated, however, in a positive and constructive, rather than in a controversial or destructive manner. Thus, Mr. Wilfrid Ward, in an article entitled "The Spirit of Newman's Apologetics," outlines the temper and spirit of the review. The movement, or, rather, tendency, known as the new apologetic, has been treated with an objectivity which is as rare as it is necessary and admirable. If M. Fonsegrive, for instance, has been allowed to present one aspect of the matter, Dr. McDonald, and Dr. Turner have had equal liberty in presenting another. Again, in the criticism of the articles a new line has been taken. A section is reserved for discussions. A critic may say what he has to say, the original writer is allowed one reply, and there the discussion ends. Writers on both sides thus learn to set forth their remarks in the fewest possible words, and no time is allowed for any controversy to reach its personal, and therefore useless, stage.

Next in importance after the current articles is a section for shorter studies, dealing with such subjects as Scripture, Patrology, and Archæology. Here the Review has been especially fortunate in securing writers of the first rank. The Abbé Joseph Turmel has given patristic studies on St. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, St. Augustine, and St. Clement of Alexandria. Dr. Gabriel Oussani would seem to have prepared himself for Orientalism from his childhood. Born in Bagdad, he studied in the patriarchal seminary at Mossul (ancient Ninive), in Mesopotamia, travelled extensively in the Levant country, studied further at Propaganda, in Rome, and eventually at the Johns Hopkins University in the United States, where he was appointed fellow in Semitic Languages. His studies on the Code of Hammurabi are models of what can be done in making difficult subjects comparatively easy, and in bringing the big questions within reach of moderate capacities. Then we have Dr. Gigot, who has given us three courses of study, respectively in "The Synoptics," "Divorce in the New Testament," and the "Higher Criticism of the Bible."

Finally there is a section entitled "Notes and Reviews." Of the "reviews" it may be sufficient to say that they are all signed—a most desirable feature in these days of the writing of many books, and when so much depends on the reviewer. Of the "notes," however, it ought to be said that they are worthy of a better name. They are unsigned. We suggest to the writer that his work is of an importance which should justify him in coming to the front with his name. Practically every recent event worth speaking about which has happened in the world of religious thought is recorded with suitable, and sometimes very vigorous, comment. It is largely through "notes" of this kind that general opinion is formed. It is particularly here that those expressions of loyalty to the Holy See find vent. It is here that an attitude is taken towards orthodoxy and unorthodoxy. It is here that

we find an indication of that spirit of true progress which pays due regard to the guidance of authority and to the choice of the most distinguished thinkers and writers.

Those of our readers who desire to be kept up-to-date, and at the same time to be kept within the safety limits, cannot do better than add the New York Review to their list of periodicals. We commend it especially to the hard-worked parochial clergy."

His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, in his capacity as Chancellor of the Catholic University, has issued the following report and appeal in the matter of its finances. Wealthy Catholics, in our opinion, could find no worthier object of their generosity than this center of Catholic faith and learning.

BALTIMORE MD., NOVEMBER 1, 1907.
CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE,

It affords me great pleasure to inform you that the collection for the University last year reached the handsome sum of \$100,000, and I avail myself of this opportunity to express my profound satisfaction at this result and my sincere thanks therefor to yourself and to the generous clergy and laity of your diocese. While it is true that this sum falls somewhat below the amounts collected in former years, the difference is readily explained in view of unusual circumstances in some localities, and it is offset by the fact that in many dioceses there was a notable increase.

With the collection and with other contributions, the University met all current expenses, made various needed improvements without incurring any debt, and added to its assets the sum of \$93,530.52. The Report just published for 1906-07 is truly encouraging, as it shows a sound financial condition and a vigorous academic life.

But at the same time it is clear that much remains to be done. While it is very consoling to know that under present arrangements the work of the University is conducted on a safe economic basis, it would be blindness on our part not to recognize the urgent need of enlarging that work and securing for it the highest possible efficiency. Faculties must be completed, equipment increased and an endowment provided that will enable the University to become in reality what its name implies. For this purpose the sum of \$2,000,000, at least, will be required; and as at present we have only about \$550,000, it follows that the remaining \$1,450,000 should be raised. We have in prospect, on a reasonable expectation, \$450,000; thus leaving a million dollars, which I sincerely trust will be obtained by earnest efforts in the near future. The proposed endowment of two million dollars would mean an annual income of eighty thousand dollars.

In comparison with the revenues of the older universities in our country, this is not a large amount. And when we consider that in many of these institutions with unlimited resources and far-reaching influence there is a spirit of antagonism to revealed religion, the necessity of developing our Catholic University as a stronghold of faith becomes more and more obvious.

It is doubtless a great and laudable work to erect imposing temples for Divine worship, yet these will avail but little unless we also build the living temple of God in the souls of men. The very splendor of the material structure requires that the spiritual edifice should be of equal strength and proportion; and this requirement, under God's grace, is chiefly fulfilled by education. Our Catholic schools are doing a noble work towards this end, and it is but just and reasonable that they should enjoy the advantages which a thoroughly equipped university would offer to our educational system.

Our action in building up the University would also be a fitting response to the words burning with zeal of our Holy Father who, in his recent Encyclical, appeals so earnestly to all Bishops to withstand, by the teaching of sound science, the pernicious encroachments of error. Nothing, I am sure, would afford him greater comfort nor prove our devotion to him more completely than a resolute and united endeavor in behalf of the Catholic University.

For these reasons, then, I venture to urge that ~~the great movement~~ for higher Catholic education be carried forward with ever-increasing energy for the glory of God, the defense of religion, the consolation of our sorely-tried Pontiff and the honor of the Church in America.

J. CARD. GIBBONS,

Chancellor of the Catholic University of America.

We have received the following notice, entitled "Modernism and the Bible," from the publishers of the *Catholic Encyclopedia*. We are happy to print it in full, and for various reasons:—for the compliment it pays to the really remarkable scholarship of a confrère and contributor of our own; as a confirmation from irreproachable sources of views expressed elsewhere in this issue of the NEW YORK REVIEW; as an evidence of the fine blending of Catholic loyalty and devotion to science which marks the editorial management of the *Catholic Encyclopedia*; and most of all, as an inducement to the learned readers of this REVIEW to give all possible financial and moral support to that excellent publication.

"It may not be the fault of the average Catholic layman if recent non-Catholic newspaper talk has somewhat confused and bewildered him as to the Pope's recent Encyclical on "Modernism." In this rushing age the average layman can hardly be expected to make a profound and exhaustive study of the Encyclical itself and the history of nineteenth-century thought which led up to it, which would be necessary to reach any clear and well-defined idea as to what "Modernism" really means. The thing meant seems, in fact, to be rather a diffused taint in the intellectual atmosphere than any compact body of doctrine; the Modernists, says the Holy Father, "present their doctrines without order and systematic arrangement into one whole, scattered and disjointed."

And yet there is a solid nucleus to this impalpable noxious vapor of Modernism. The nebula seems to thicken round and about the field of sacred letters, where the exegesis of some Catholic scholars has been far too accommodating to the modern spirit of scepticism. The new volume, the second, of *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, comes opportunely to summarize and to illustrate our position in the matter of Pius X. and "Modernism." Those whose function it is to watch over the safety of God's flocks have long since perceived that here was a danger for which the Chief Shepherd must immediately find a remedy. The article "Biblical Commission," in this volume, tells, within the relatively small compass of one page, how that body was constituted by Papal authority in 1901, to investigate the menacing conditions and to suggest a remedy; it tells of the personnel, the official authority, and the work of the commission, and a perusal of that one, clearly and tersely written page is as the beam of a great searchlight striking through the fog which our non-Catholic contemporaries have raised. So much for clear instruction; for illustration the same volume gives us, among others of similar scope, an article entitled "Biblical Antiquities"—eight pages—which in years to come will serve to mark the degree of enlightened freedom fairly sanctioned by the Church in Old-Testament exegesis. Let no good Catholic

with this volume before him be afraid that Pius X. is going to "turn off the light" which modern research has afforded to Christian scholarship; the last-named article and those on "Assyria," "Babylonia," and "Baal" (all by the same author, the Rev. Dr. Gabriel Oussani) give ample assurance that in our day, as heretofore, the Catholic Church can afford to tolerate a proper freedom of criticism in her exegetes in perfect consistency with her own inflexible principles."

BOOK REVIEWS.

The International Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament—edited by REV. CH. A. BRIGGS, D.D., D.Litt.; REV. S. R. DRIVER, D.D., D.Litt., and REV. A. PLUMMER, M. A., D.D.: New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.

That the study of the Bible in the present day should be not only reverential but also thoroughly critical and scientific no one doubts, for the problems involved are of vital importance, not only for theology but also for the interests of the Christian religion itself. It is therefore much to be regretted that English speaking Catholics do not as yet possess any critical and scientific commentary on the Bible. In this respect our Catholic brethren of the Continent are much more fortunate than ourselves. Thus the Germans can justly be proud of their *Kurzgefasster Kommentar zu den heiligen Schriften* and many other valuable commentaries on several of the O. and N. T. books; while the French have *Le Saint Bible*, in 27 vols., by such writers as Fillion, Clair, Gillet, Lesêtre, Trochon, etc. This work is, of course, in many respects antiquated, but the new series projected by the distinguished head of the Dominican Biblical School of Jerusalem, and of which the vol. on Judges, by Lagrange; on Isaias, by Condamin; on John, by Calmes, and on the Minor Prophets, by Van Hoonacker, have already appeared, will doubtless leave nothing to be desired in point of sound, accurate scholarship. The Italian brethren too, are beginning to appreciate the value and usefulness of Dr. Minocchi's praiseworthy commentaries on the Song of Songs, on the Lamentations, on the Psalms, on Isaias, and lately on Genesis. Such are some of the products of our scholarly exegetes on the Continent. English speaking Catholics can point to no such achievement. Not only do we lack a complete critical commentary on the Bible in English, but we are also without any serious critical commentary on any of its individual books. This fact alone is painfully significant and should, we think, stimulate some of our representative English speaking Catholic exegetes to take the matter in hand and begin to fill this grave lacuna in our religious literature. The *Cursus Scripturæ Sacræ*, projected and edited by some distinguished German Jesuits, such as Cornely, Knabenbauer, Hummelauer and a few others, is indeed an admirable monument of erudition but

it is written in Latin, and the credit for it belongs to Catholic Germany.. Yet a critical English commentary of the Old and New Testament is an ever growing need for all Catholic theologians and clergymen, to say nothing of the cultured laity; and awaiting the realization of such a work by our Catholic scholars, we deem it useful to call the attention of those interested in such studies to the International Critical Commentary, which in many respects is well adapted to satisfy our present needs. The series, though incomplete, has already won its place among the best critical commentaries on the Bible, be they German, French, Latin or Italian. Indeed, many of its volumes are doubtless the best that have as yet been written on their respective portions of Holy Writ. The practical success and popularity of the International Critical Commentary is due to two main reasons, viz: I. Its strictly scientific, critical and up-to-date treatment of topics, and II. Its truly international or better, inter-denominational character.

The series, as is well known, is published under the editorship of three distinguished biblical scholars, namely, Prof. Charles Briggs, of Union Theological Seminary, New York; Prof. S. Driver, of Oxford, foremost among the living Old Testament scholars of England, and Prof. Plummer, of University College, Durham. The first two are in charge of the Old Testament, while Prof. Plummer edits the New Testament commentaries in the series. From the point of view of competency, of painstaking, sober and reverent criticism, the selection of editors was indeed a happy one, and leaves nothing to be desired. Their programme, which has been conscientiously carried out, is set forth by the Editors themselves as follows: "The Commentaries will be international and inter-confessional, and will be free from polemical and ecclesiastical bias. They will be based upon a thorough critical study of the original texts of the Bible, and upon critical methods of interpretation. They are designed chiefly for students and clergymen, and will be written in a compact style. Each book will be preceded by an Introduction, stating the results of criticism upon it, and discussing impartially the questions still remaining open. The details of criticism will appear in their proper place in the body of the Commentary. Each section of the Text will be introduced with a paraphrase, or summary of contents. Technical details of textual and philological criticism will, as a rule, be kept distinct from matter of a more general character; and in the Old Testament the exegetical notes will be arranged, as far as possible,

so as to be serviceable to students not acquainted with Hebrew. The History of Interpretation of the Books will be dealt with, when necessary, in the introduction, with critical notices of the most important literature of the subject. Historical and archeological questions, as well as questions of Biblical Theology, are included in the plan of the Commentaries, but not Practical or Homiletic Exegesis. These volumes will constitute a uniform series."—(From the Editors' Preface). The following is a list of the various volumes of the series, many of which have been published, while others are in preparation:

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Genesis. The Rev. John Skinner, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature, College of Presbyterian Church of England, Cambridge, England.

Exodus. The Rev. A. R. S. Kennedy, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, University of Edinburgh.

Leviticus. J. F. Stenning, M.A., Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford.

Numbers. The Rev. G. Buchanan Gray, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Mansfield College, Oxford. [Now Ready].

Deuteronomy. The Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., D.Litt., Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford. [Now Ready].

Joshua. The Rev. George Adam Smith, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, United Free Church College, Glasgow.

Judges. The Rev. George Moore, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Theology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. [Now Ready].

Samuel. The Rev. H. P. Smith, D.D., sometime Professor of Biblical History, Amherst College, Mass. [Now Ready].

Kings. The Rev. Francis Brown, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew and Cognate Languages, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

Chronicles. The Rev. Edward L. Curtis, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Ezra and Nehemiah. The Rev. L. W. Batten, Ph.D., D.D., Rector of St. Mark's Church, New York City, sometime Professor of Hebrew, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia.

Psalms. The Rev. Chas. A. Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York. [2 vols. Now Ready].

Proverbs. The Rev. C. H. Toy, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. [Now Ready].

Job. The Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., Litt., D. Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford.

Isaiah. Chaps. I-XXXIX. The Rev. G. Buchanan Gray, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Mansfield College, Oxford.

Isaiah. Chaps. XL-LXVI. The Rev. S. R. Driver, D.D., D.Litt., Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford.

Jeremiah. The Rev. A. F. Kirkpatrick, D.D., Dean of Ely, sometime Regius Professor of Hebrew, Cambridge, England.

Ezekiel. The Rev. G. A. Cooke, M.A., sometime Fellow Magdalen College, and the Rev. Charles F Burney, D.Litt., Fellow and Lecturer in Hebrew, St. John's College, Oxford.

Daniel. The Rev. John P. Peters, Ph.D., D.D., sometime Professor of Hebrew, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia, now Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York City.

Amos and Hosea. W. R. Harper, Ph.D., LL.D., sometime President of the University of Chicago, Illinois. [Now Ready].

Micah to Haggai. Prof. John P. Smith, University of Chicago; Prof. Charles P. Fagnani, D.D., Union Theological Seminary, New York; W. Hayes Ward, D.D., LL.D., Editor of *The Independent*, New York; Prof. Julius A. Bever, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Prof. H. G. Mitchell, D.D., Boston University.

Zechariah to Jonah. Prof. H. G. Mitchell, D.D., Prof. John P. Smith and Prof. J. A. Bever.

Esther. The Rev. L. B. Paton, Ph.D., Professor of Hebrew, Hartford Theological Seminary.

Ecclesiastes. Prof. George A. Barton, Ph. D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Bryn Mawr College, Pa. [In Press].

Ruth, Song of Songs and Lamentations. Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York.

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

St. Matthew. The Rev. Willoughby C. Allen, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in Theology and Hebrew, Exeter College, Oxford. [Now Ready].

St. Mark. Rev. E. P. Gould, D.D., sometime Professor of New Testament Literature, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia. [Now Ready]

St. Luke. The Rev. Alfred Plummer, D.D., sometime Master of University College, Durham. [Now Ready].

St. John. The Very Rev. John Henry Bernard, D.D., Dean of St. Patrick's and Lecturer in Divinity, University of Dublin.

Harmony of the Gospels. The Rev. William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Oxford, and the Rev. Willoughby C. Allen, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in Divinity and Hebrew, Exeter College, Oxford.

Acts. The Rev. C. H. Turner, D.D., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, and the Rev. H. N. Bate, M.A., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of London.

Romans. The Rev. William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, and the Rev. A. C. Headlam, M.A., D.D., Principal of King's College, London. [Now Ready].

Corinthians. The Right Rev. Arch. Robertson, D.D., LL.D., Lord Bishop of Exeter, and Dawson Walker, D.D., Theological Tutor in the University of Durham.

Galatians. The Rev. Ernest D. Burton, D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature, University of Chicago.

Ephesians and Colossians. The Rev. T. K. Abbott, B.D., D.Litt., sometime Professor of Biblical Greek, Trinity College, Dublin, now Librarian of the same. [Now Ready].

Philippians and Philemon. The Rev. Marvin R. Vincent, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Union Theological Seminary, New York City. [Now Ready].

Thessalonians. The Rev. James E. Frame, M.A., Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York.

The Pastoral Epistles. The Rev. Walter Lock, D.D., Warden of Keble College and Professor of Exegesis, Oxford.

Hebrews. The Rev. A. Nairne, M.A., Professor of Hebrew in King's College, London.

St. James. The Rev. James H. Ropes, D.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism in Harvard University.

Peter and Jude. The Rev. Charles Bigg, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. [Now Ready].

The Epistle of St. John. The Rev. E. A. Brooke, B. D., Fellow and Divinity Lecturer in King's College, Cambridge.

Revelations. The Rev. Robert H. Charles, M.A., D.D., Professor of Biblical Greek in the University of Dublin.

Some of the published volumes such as those on Judges (Moore), Deuteronomy (Driver), Numbers (Gray), Psalms (Briggs), Romans (Sanday), Luke (Plummer), and Matthew (Allen), have already won international applause, and have taken their place among the classical treatises of their kind. It is to be noted, however, that with few exceptions (v. g., Matthew), the volumes on the Old Testament are more original and searching than those on the New.

Students of theology, teachers and preachers will find in these Commentaries invaluable aid for their public and private studies and references. They are, as a whole, sound, sober, and conservative, embodying the results of the most scholarly and reliable biblical research.

GABRIEL OUSSANI.

The Life of Christ—by MGR. E. LE CAMUS, Bp. of La Rochelle, France. Translated by WM. A. HICKEY, priest of the diocese of Springfield. Vol. II. New York. The Cathedral Library Association. pp. xviii, 499.

This volume is the second instalment of the English translation of the late Bp. Le Camus' valuable *Vie de Notre Seigneur Jésus Christ*. With regard to both its contents and its rendering into English, this second volume is the worthy continuation of the preceding one, an account of which was given in THE NEW YORK REVIEW for Nov.-Dec., 1906. It takes up the narrative of Our Lord's Public Life at the precise point where it was left off at the end of the first volume, and carries it on to the Third Part of the whole work, which tells of the Last Days of Jesus on earth. It deals first with the remainder of the period in Christ's ministry which Bp. Le Camus aptly calls the "Formative Period in Galilee," and during which Jesus organized, taught, and disciplined "with the wisdom of a God," the new society which owes to Him its origin (pp. 1-204). It next treats of the "Period of Struggle in Judea" (pp. 205-499), recording in detail Our Lord's visits to Jerusalem on the solemn festivals of the Tabernacles and the Dedication, and concluding with the narrative of Jesus' journey through Perea on His way for a last public entrance into the Holy City on Palm Sunday. It thus narrates much the larger part of Christ's public ministry, and hence, as far as the topics handled are concerned,

this second volume is, if anything, of greater importance than the preceding one. The method applied by the late Right Rev. author to the study and setting forth of these topics, is the one which he has pursued in all his writings, and which has secured for him the following high commendation from the present Sovereign Pontiff, Pius X, in date of Jan. 11, 1906: "You deserve a special praise for your constant care, in explaining Holy Writ, to adhere to that method which, through respect for the truth and the honor of the Catholic doctrine, should absolutely be adhered to under the guidance of the Church. For, as we must condemn the temerity of those who, having more regard for novelty than for the teaching authority of the Church, do not hesitate to adopt a method of criticism altogether too free, so we should not approve the attitude of those who in no way dare to depart from the usual exegesis of Scripture, even when, faith not being at stake, the real advancement of learning requires such departure. You follow a wise middle course, and by your example show that there is nothing to be feared for the Sacred Books from the true progress of the art of criticism, nay, that a beneficial light may be derived from it, provided its use be coupled with a wise and prudent discernment." The present, like the foregoing, volume bespeaks at each step a close acquaintance with the recent data of Palestine exploration, Biblical philosophy, textual and historical criticism. The historical setting of the Savior's words and deeds is given with great fulness and remarkable accuracy. The difficulties arising from a comparison of the parallel texts of the Evangelists are not minimized, but frankly acknowledged and examined with the honesty that befits genuine Catholic scholarship. The authenticity of certain important passages of the Gospels is discussed with learning and lucidity. The actual meaning of Christ's utterances regarding the most varied topics is established with true and reverent historical insight. The human side of Jesus' mortal life is not ignored, but pictured in such a way as to show that, though true God of true God, He was indeed a man moving and acting among the men of His time. In every way, the narrative is made interesting and instructive.

In view of the fact that Bp. Le Camus' *Life of Christ* embodies the results of his mature learning and of his prolonged study of the Gospel narratives, it may not be amiss to point out a few of the scientific positions which he has deliberately adopted in the present volume. With regard to the manner in which our first Gospel was composed,

he informs us (p. 5) that "owing to the analogous nature of the subjects, and through the force of a simple association of ideas, he (St. Matthew) has even inserted (into the Sermon on the Mount) some fragments, which on St. Luke's authority we shall place where they more naturally belong." To complete this statement he adds at once the following note (footn. 2 p. 5). "Inasmuch as it is evident that St. Matthew did not seek to maintain the strictest order in his narrative, we may reasonably suppose that he was not much more concerned about adhering to it in his discourses. As he groups together, simply because they have an analogous meaning (chap. xiii), parables separated from each other by several incidents, so he may have united in one great moral thesis (the Sermon on the Mount) diverse fragments that refer to the development of the spiritual life." At p. 80, footn. 1, he says in connection with directions given by Our Lord at different times: "St. Matthew has put all this together because passing over the later sending of the Seventy disciples, he found trouble in otherwise distributing those important instructions which he did not wish to sacrifice. Again, it is well known that he took pleasure in summing up in one discourse such teachings as were analogous, although given at different times. St. Luke, in this discourse at least, puts each in its own place." Finally, at p. 360, footn. 1, he speaks of a "capricious distribution of fragments in St. Matthew." In reference to the compilatory character of St. Luke's Gospel, Bp. Le Camus writes (p. 35 footn.): "We have here another instance of the great respect with which he (St. Luke) treated the fragmentary narratives which were at hand in the preparation of his Gospel;" and at p. 498, footn. he says: "St. Luke (xvi, 18), having found only a word on this question (the question of divorce) in the documents at his disposal, has located it haphazard, like almost all the fragments from the middle of this chapter as far as xviii, 15, without seeking to attach to it an incident of which he knew nothing. These breaks in continuity and the appearance of disorder found in St. Luke are a proof of his conscientious accuracy." In connection with the differences which exist between Mt. x, 9; Mk. vi, 3; and Lk. ix, 3, the learned prelate writes: "This is probably another of those unimportant inaccuracies which we must admit in the sacred text,..... however, although the terms differ, the idea is the same in the three Gospels." In his comments on the description of heaven and hell in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, he rightly remarks (p. 484 note) that "the details of the scene are adapted to the hearers, and do not

create any serious objection against Christian dogma." The traditional tomb of Lazarus still shown at Bethany he does not regard as answering sufficiently the description in St. John's Gospel (p. 457); and Mt. Tabor is not, according to him, the summit on which occurred Our Lord's transfiguration (p. 462 sq.). He prefaces his narrative of the raising of Lazarus by the following words; "This event, which is one of the most important in the Gospel history, since it provoked the Sanhedrim to extreme measures against Jesus, has been passed over by the synoptics in complete silence. They tell of the repast at Bethany without the slightest allusion to this event which was directly connected with it. The triumphal entrance into Jerusalem was itself partly a consequence of the resurrection of Lazarus. How then shall we explain that they who relate the one incident, say nothing of the other? Such silence is as surprising as that of St. John concerning the institution of the Eucharist. No hypothesis, yet suggested, gives the solution of the enigma, which very likely lies wholly in the fragmentary character of the Synoptics" (p. 446 footn.). In his critical note relative to the woman taken in adultery, he admits distinctly the genuineness of the passage (pp. 232-234).

The Rev. Translator of this second volume has done his work with the same constant care and felicity as we had noticed in his rendering of the first part of Bp. Le Camus' *Life of Christ*. This indeed will appear no small merit to any one who is at all acquainted with the idiomatic, and at times over-rhetorical, style of the original French. In respect to both its contents and its literary form, this second, like the first, volume of this translation fully deserves to obtain a wide circulation among English-speaking Catholics.

FRANCIS E. GIGOT.

The Legends of the Saints—From the French of Père H. Delchaye, S. J., Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.

A sharp reviewer once said of one of England's historians: "Everybody reads, everybody admires, but nobody believes, Mr. Macaulay." With certain restrictions the same has often been said of the second nocturns in the Roman Breviary. In fact, their character has formed the basis for a terse saying on mendacity which in ecclesiastical circles in Rome itself has almost passed into a proverb. The desire for the unvarnished statement of plain facts in the lives of the servants of God has within recent years given birth to an ex-

cellent series of biographies based on the sound psychological as well as ethical, principle that the truth about the saints is much more to their glory and to our comfort and encouragement than repertoires of extraordinary and often extravagant, unsubstantiated events and performances. Indeed it is well known that Leo XIII projected the revision of the biographical notices given in the breviary, being fully aware, it is said, that such revision would entail no inconsiderable amount of correction and suppression.

The achievements of the illustrious Jesuits forming the society of Bollandists which during nearly three hundred years has been engaged in sifting the evidence connected with the lives of the saints, have made a revision of many of the generally received traditions in these matters both possible and imperative. Since the first five volumes compiled and edited by John Bolland in the early part of the seventeenth century, this work has gone on with more or less regularity. No man should be better qualified to speak of the nature of the material out of which the lives of the saints have been put together for the public than a Bollandist; and that one of them has been able to digest, classify and reduce to some system this material, good, bad, and indifferent, only goes to show how thoroughly familiar he is with his subject. This, Père H. Delehaye, S. J., has done for us in his excellent little volume, "The Legends of the Saints."

It is the third in "a Series of Manuals for Catholic Priests and Students," published by *The Westminster Library*, and designed to meet the wants of those who wish to be in touch with the results of science and criticism as these bear on religion.

Father Delehaye clears the ground for us with a chapter of Preliminary Definitions. A hagiographic document is not a page out of a secular or ecclesiastical history. A hagiographic document must have a religious character and aim at the edification of the faithful. It may therefore be an official record or an exuberant poetical composition. We see at once what an important *role* the imagination may play, and yet its product be a hagiographic document. The imagination may either be that of an individual, and then the result will be simply a romance; or the imagination may be at work as the collective force of a whole people, and then there grow up unconsciously and little by little, myths, legends, folklore. These are "the anonymous product of that abstraction known as the spirit of the people."

Has the popular imagination been thus at work upon the lives of the saints? The saints are the heroes of faith, and a people always decks out its heroes according to generally accepted ideals. There is a certain stock of folklore which the popular mind loves to fasten upon its heroes or to connect with unique spots on the earth. Some extraordinary character or some unusual natural phenomenon attracts the attention of the people and around them is built up a story in all its details.

A very interesting chapter is that on the development of the legend, of this "outcome of an unconscious or unreflecting agent acting upon historical material." Every individual takes his own view of things. No two men who have seen the same event will recount it in exactly the same fashion to a stranger. Did not this constitute the virtue of the troubadours and minstrels? These little personal touches served to distinguish one from another. Personal prejudice, too, would play a large part. The prejudice might be, of course, in favor of astonishing one's hearers and readers by the strangeness of the events described. The ordinary man exercises but little discrimination and when even the better equipped or better trained man thinks he is exercising discrimination, he may be only trying to make out his case.

As for the crowd, there are special abstract qualities peculiar to it. A mob or gathering of people will do things which as individuals no one would be guilty of. They are carried away by an idea or assent to a statement in a body. This truth finds exemplification in hagiographic literature. In the Middle Ages the populace was intensely interested in the saints. The extraordinary was, so to speak, a commonplace to them. Even the rare individual possessed of the critical faculty was absorbed in the crowd and carried away by its spirit. Then came the hagiographer, or man of letters, who gathered up these factitious traditions. Frequently such men were mere literary hacks with a certain stock in trade culled from general literature. Orators, as far back as Cicero at least, have kept what they call a commonplace book, a book of topics in which under their proper headings they gather strange facts, stranger stories, beautiful and appropriate passages on subjects of frequent occurrence, and to which they have recourse for the building up of their speeches. We may well suppose that a panegyrist would not be at a loss for material to draw upon in the hagiographic treatment of the life and virtues of his hero.

Just as the struggles of centuries between two peoples are summed up and told as though they had happened within the fraction of a year around the walls of Troy, so frequently in hagiographic literature a local saint would become heir to the whole tradition of the marvelous common to his people. Chronology and geography presented no difficulties to the popular imagination or to the hagiographer who wrote down its product. No one for long centuries dreamed of writing in this connection history, as we now understand it. The people formed a concept of the typical saint or martyr, and the individual favorite was made to conform to it. And so we find the stories recurring among all races and in all countries. The themes are identical and have been traced back to common sources by the study of comparative folklore.

Again, the popular mind has a weakness for trivial details. The average man wants the concrete and the visible. And so we find the names of great men so often connected with the stones, the rocks, or the buildings of a country. Relic-hunting is a fad and a weakness from which many people of pretensions are not wholly free, and to satisfy it, the people of a locality find no difficulty in pointing out to a morbid curiosity "the precise spot where David composed his psalms, the rock smitten by Moses, the cave that sheltered Elijah," etc., etc. Strange phenomena in the natural world have to be attributed to some person, and so we find all sorts of connections established: footprints of famous men on rocks, or men turned into stone by wonderworkers. Nay, paintings and statues must have their prototypes, and so the people of Verona have gone so far as to locate the fancy of the poet's mind, and point out to tourists the house and the tomb of Romeo and Juliet. All of which is lucidly set forth and illustrated by facts and examples in Père Delehaye's splendid little book.

A chapter is given to the work of the hagiographer in writing the life of his saint. He strove but little after accuracy, had no critical spirit whatever, and was preoccupied mainly with "the beauty of the descriptions and the brilliancy of the style." He wrote to edify as well as to entertain, and so we have "biography, panegyric and moral instruction" all combined in one. We can readily see what will be the result. He was especially interested in the glory of his saint, and it seemed to him that anything merely human would bedim that glory.

What were the sources at the disposal of the hagiographer? Sometimes, indeed, a certain childish pride led him to conceal his sources from his readers, as if to appear the sole creator of his work. To-day the historian plumes himself on the lists of his references and authorities. Not so the classical authors and their imitators, the hagiographers. Written tradition, oral tradition, pictures, monuments, buildings, a tomb, a shrine, or some relic of the saint were the data of the hagiographer. He was rarely a good epigraphist, but that did not at all deter him from entering boldly where specialists fear to tread. In his enthusiasm he could guess what an abbreviation should mean. The popular taste craved for what was striking, and he felt it to be his duty to furnish it in no stinted measure. And so we find a writer transfer "the 83rd mile of a Roman road, LXXXIII mil (liario), into 83 martyred Roman soldiers, LXXXIII mil (ites)"! Whatever real historic material came to his hand he changed and amplified in his effort to write a literary life; for, a story of just proportions, with the Aristotelian beginning, middle and end, of rounded periods and well-balanced sentences, was of much more importance to him than a few unvarnished facts of authentic value. He had skeletons or programmes for different classes of saints, just like the antiquated outlines given to students for school-compositions and other things. These he filled up from his classic commonplaces. The plagiarizing of passages or incidents did not trouble him at all, and even "as early as the fourth century in Italy, and, indeed, in Rome, we come across deliberate adaptations of foreign legends to fit national saints."

The longest and most interesting chapter in the book is that on "Pagan Survivals and Reminiscences." It is a contribution to the study of comparative religion. Father Delehaye naturally finds in analogies between pagan and Christian rites and practices not so much borrowings of the latter from the former, as the natural response of men everywhere to the same needs, cravings, or questions; or under stress of like emotions. The alleged connection between saint-worship and hero-worship is examined, but though the parallels are numerous and marked, it is pointed out that the Christian practice arose independently in the honors paid to the early martyrs, the witnesses to faith in Christ. Their remains and everything connected with them became objects of veneration. But unlike the pagans, the Christians always recognised and emphasised the martyrs and saints as servants of the Most High God.

But while the general proposition that the Christian saints are only the heirs of the pagan gods and heroes is shown not to be sustained, yet it is admitted that there are some remarkable resemblances, and that a few representations and practices have continued under new patronage. But this was inevitable; the wonder is that the developing Church did not take over and metamorphose more subjects found ready to hand.

Father Delehaye's book is interesting from beginning to end, and we owe a debt of gratitude to the editors of the Westminster Library for bringing it out in English, for it cannot fail to render a note-worthy service to the interests of real religion.

THOMAS J. MULVEY.

Divine Authority—by J. F. SCHOLFIELD, M. A. Longmans, Green & Co.

Mr. Scholfield was, until lately, an Anglican clergyman, rector of a "High" Episcopalian Church in Edinburgh, Scotland. He is also, it is said, a nephew, or, at all events, some near relative of Father Faber, whom he has now followed into the Catholic Church.

The nature of his book will be evident from its title. It deals with the need of a Teaching Authority to set forth and guard the Christian Revelation, and no doubt it conducts us through the train of reasoning which led its author to abandon "Advanced" Anglicanism for the Catholic Church. The book travels over familiar ground, showing the needs of human nature to which a Divine Revelation corresponds; the claim of Christ to be such a Revealer; the need of some organ to proclaim, interpret and guarantee His message; the qualities and characteristics which such an organ must possess; and the actual possession of these by the Holy Catholic and Roman Church. Necessarily, also, Mr. Scholfield is led to discuss the claim made by High Anglicanism to satisfy these demands, and does full justice to the incoherences and contradictions of that position. The ground traversed is, as we have said, familiar, for we have had of recent years many accounts by converts from Anglicanism of their conversion and the reasons impelling thereto. There does not seem to be anything strikingly original in the present treatment of the theme, but it is a calm, carefully reasoned and readable presentation of the argument for the authority of the Church as understood by Catholics.

SAMUEL P. MACPHERSON.

The Principles of Christianity—by REV. A. B. SHARPE, M. A. Sands & Co., London and Edinburgh. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo.

This is the first volume in the series of Expository Essays in Christian Philosophy, edited by Dr. Aveling, of which two have already appeared and others are announced to follow. Such a series, supplementing the Westminster Lectures, issued under the same editorship, is calculated to do a great amount of good in these days when the press teems with cheap editions of books, pamphlets and essays attacking different portions of the Christian system. Fr. Sharpe has already given us proof of his ability to deal with such subjects in his essay, in the Westminster series, on the Freedom of the Will, and in articles along philosophical lines in various reviews, and this present volume, we believe, will go far to enhance his standing as a Catholic apologist. To bring together, within the space of some one hundred and seventy pages a discussion of the leading principles of Christianity, embracing such subjects as the Existence of God, the Soul, Revelation, Faith, Miracles, etc., necessarily implies that the treatment of each must be but brief, and in a few cases the presentation of the argument seems to suffer from the exigencies imposed by brevity; however in no case can it be called inadequate. If at times it seems so, the reader must always bear in mind the nature of the volume (and, indeed, of the whole series), which is that of exposition, not of controversy. If the latter element had entered in, a much fuller treatment would have been required on many points; but as it is, opposing theories are only noticed when really necessary. Fr. Sharpe might have given us references to works dealing more at large with the subjects treated, say by means of a list at the end of the book but at all events, we are thankful for what we have supplied here, which is of good quality as far as it goes. After all that has been said *pro* and *con* in regard to these subjects, it is hard to find anything new to say, nor do we see much evidence of originality here—indeed the author expressly warns us not to expect anything new—but it is something to have brought together in a small volume, and expressed in clear and readable style an exposition like this of all the leading principles of Christianity, which will doubtless meet the wants of many who have not time nor opportunity to consult larger works.

SAMUEL P. MACPHERSON.

The Prince of the Apostles : A Study—by The REV. PAUL JAMES FRANCIS and The REV. SPENCER JONES. The Lamp Publishing Co., Graymoor, Garrison, N. Y., 1907.

Under the above title we have not only an exposition of the place of St. Peter in the Christian economy, an exposition which is at the same time thoroughly Catholic and Roman, but also an apology for the position taken by those Anglicans who desire corporate reunion with the Roman Catholic Church. The Rev. Paul James Francis, one of the authors of this book, who is also the editor of *The Lamp* (which is described as an Anglo-Roman monthly in advocacy of the re-union of the Anglican church with the Apostolic See of Rome,) has since 1898 been the leader of a body of men in the High Church party of the Anglican communion whose purpose is to do all in their power to bring about corporate reunion with the Roman Catholic Church. Father Paul in this country, Lord Halifax and the Rev. Spencer Jones in England, and the Rev. Arthur Lloyd in Japan, among others, stand in the front rank of those Anglicans who believe that when any members of their communion come to recognize the fact that the body to which they belong has gotten out of its orbit by rejecting Papal Supremacy, their duty is not to seek their individual safety regardless of their brethren by an immediate submission to our Holy Father the Pope, but rather to remain in the Anglican communion and endeavor to bring it back into right relations with the Holy See. They hold that the breach with the Roman Catholic Church was due in the first instance to the violence and self will of Henry VIII and not to the free act or choice of the Church of England. They claim, too, that though the Anglican Church has wandered far afield from her Catholic traditions and sunk deeper and deeper into the slough of Erastianism, yet by her *own free synodical action* she has never formally repudiated the spiritual jurisdiction and authority of our Holy Father the Pope or denied the Catholic faith as defined by the General Councils.

The order in which the High Church party has returned to its Catholic position has been the exact reverse of the order in which little by little she allowed her ancient faith to fall into decay. The first battle at Oxford had to do with Baptismal Regeneration; next the controversy raged over Apostolic succession; then came the furious struggles to restore, according to their belief, the Mass and the long neglected use of Confession; very recently Purgatory and the Cultus of the Saints have been the battle grounds of their advance,

and now, simultaneously in England and America, the vanguard of the Romeward movement has unfurled the banner of reunion with the see of Peter.

They believe that their priests are true priests and that their sacraments are true sacraments; in other words they hold to the validity of their orders, believing that the Bull of our Holy Father, Leo XIII, was not an infallible utterance on the subject. They declare that besides the recognition of the validity of Anglican orders it would be necessary that the *Ecclesia Anglicana* be allowed to retain the use of the Book of Common Prayer, the English Bible, and the Mass and the office in English. In fact, that the Holy Father would deal no less generously with them than he has in the past with the Uniat Greeks and other Eastern bodies.

The question of the validity of Anglican orders might possibly be reconsidered by our Holy Father, the Pope, and the details concerning the use of English in the mass and office are matters of discipline which the Church might decide one way or the other, but the question which comes to our minds is that in the event of corporate reunion becoming a fact, would the number of Anglicans who would take advantage of it be large enough to warrant our Holy Father to grant a separate rite, or large enough to maintain it, once it were granted.

The individual soul which recognizes the truth of the Church of God and puts off its individual submission to it, no matter for what reason, assumes a grave responsibility before God, not only for itself, but for all those who may be affected by its example. Each soul should fulfil its own personal obligations and trust to the Providence of God to bring about reunion in His own good time. Over and above the question of reunion the book is an excellent exposition of Catholic belief concerning the Prince of the Apostles. It sums up in a clear, distinct, and forcible manner all that is usually taught in Catholic Apologetics about St. Peter and we recommend it to the use of the students in our Seminaries as the best short work in English upon the subject.

SAMUEL LUDLOW.

Have Anglicans Full Catholic Privileges?—By E. H. FRANCIS, Benziger Brothers, N. Y., 1907.

Another point of view of the Anglican question is presented in this little book. The author tells us that the Church of England may be roughly divided into three parties; first, the Evangelical or Low Church party, who are proud of the title Protestant, who repu-

diate everything Catholic and glory in "the principles of the Reformation"; second, the great body of moderate men, "the historic High Church party," who claim that the Church of England is a branch of the Catholic Church, but who have no sympathy with many of the essentials of the Catholic Church; then there is the third party, who claim they are Catholics in the modern sense, who speak of Holy Communion as the Mass, who use Catholic books of devotion, and adopt, as far as they can, Catholic practises. The author points out that this third body is a very small one and that they themselves admit that they are in a minority and that the rest of the Anglican Communion is not in sympathy with them. He goes on to show that this party in the Anglican Church, prescinding from the question of the validity of Anglican orders, does not enjoy the privileges of the Blessed Sacrament, the sacrifice of the Mass, the sacrament of penance, and the privileges of authority and discipline. His main argument for his position is that the teaching and practise of the very large majority of the Anglican communion and of all the Anglican bishops are opposed to the claims of this small *Catholic* body, and this body has only its own assertions to these great privileges, and that its practises are merely tolerated and that to a very limited extent by the Anglican body in general. It is a very lucid, brief, and interesting work and should be read by all who take an interest in the Anglican question.

SAMUEL LUDLOW.

Ritual in Catholic Worship—by the VERY REV. FATHER PROCTOR, O. P., Benziger Bros.; 1907.

The mind turns willingly from the controversy of Ritualism to these truly Catholic sermons of Father Proctor on the use of ritual in Catholic Worship. Under the headings of the use, the soul, the language, the centre, and the development of ritual, the author leads us, willing and interested readers, through a series of excellent discourses, originally preached in Westminster Cathedral during the Lent of 1904. Though but a small brochure the work is an epitome of good things, teeming with learning and eloquence. The introductory discourse on the use and abuse of ritual would make excellent reading for those, especially outside of the Church, who make too much of the externals of worship.

The final chapter, on the other hand, is a well put answer to those who appeal to the primitive usage of the early church. It is book well worth buying and perusing.

SAMUEL LUDLOW.

The Blind Sisters of St. Paul—Authorized translation by L. M. Legatt
—By MAURICE DE LA SIZERANNE, Benziger Bros. pp. 303.

This volume belongs to the International Catholic Library edited by the Rev. Dr. J. Wilhelm. In it, Monsieur de la Sizeranne gives us an account of the origin, mode of life, etc., of a minor religious community. Like a great many other minor communities, this one has France for its birth-place. It is known as the "Blind Sisters of St. Paul". The title of the book is misleading: One might be led to think it had reference to the natural sisters of the Apostle of the Gentiles.

The community was founded about the year 1850 by Anne Bergunion. She had tested her vocation in a few religious communities, but found herself wanting. She then started a workshop for blind girls, from whom she afterwards formed her community. She herself became known as Sister Saint Paul. The community was named from that instance in the Apostle's life when he was struck with blindness and miraculously cured. After nearly sixty years of existence, the community can lay claim only to about sixty members. It still exists undisturbed in irreligious France; not being a teaching order but a "Congregation Hospitalière", it has received authorization. Not all the sisters are devoid of sight; blindness is not a condition of reception. Their constitution requires that the superioress be never chosen from among the blind.

From its name and appearance it would appear that this book is out of place among the erudite works of the International Catholic Library. But no; on perusal the book is scientific and interesting. It is divided into two parts; the first of interest to psychologists; the second, to philanthropists.

The first part is, in the main a psychological treatise in which are brought together a great number of curious incidents all bearing on, and illustrating the law governing the abnormal development of the other senses in those who have been deprived of their eyesight. Thus, for instance, a case is on record of a blind person who could take a dozen gloves belonging to different persons present, and then by merely smelling the hands of the latter, return each glove to its proper owner.

Part II of the book is devoted to a history of the community. Their occupations are principally music, knitting, brush making and printing of "White books", or books for the blind. It is interesting

to note the processes employed to teach these different occupations to the blind pupils.

JOHN F. CHERRY.

"The Papers of a Pariah"—By ROBERT HUGH BENSON, Longmans Green & Co., pp. 211.

This is a posthumous work of an English convert, edited by Rev. Father Benson, who received the author into the church a week before his death.

It consists of a number of papers committed to the disposal of the editor. The essays are fourteen in number, and consist in observations on the Catholic Church by one outside her pale.

The editor tells us "they were written by one who was not only not a Catholic but by one who did not at all continuously contemplate the becoming one."

It is good to know how outsiders view the Catholic Church, her ceremonies and practices, but it would be an advantage to be able also to identify the outsider. There is very little in the book to commend it. Nobody would think of placing it in a Library where all hands could reach it; it would only tempt its readers to ridicule Catholic ceremonies. The writer had no idea of the mind of the church in her Ritual. He was not an apt pupil in that school wherein she teaches by signs and ceremonies. Were all his observations on a par with those he gives us at seeing a priest administer the last Sacraments, the book would fulfil a useful mission. Father Benson has been a busy writer and many things have come in quick succession from his facile pen. Possibly he is exposing himself to the danger of quantity versus quality. At all events, he has been more fortunate in writing than in editing.

[J. F. C.

